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ABSTRACT
Latin America is the most unequal region across the globe. Inequality has increased the
election of populist leaders and has resulted in massive social movements and protests in the
region. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 2000s, a process of inequality reduction started in
the majority of the countries. Since the end of the 1990s, a large number of Latin American
countries were the world pioneers developing Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), to put money
in the hands of the poor with the conditions of school attendance and nutritional check-ups for
their children. Most of the studies have analyzed the effectiveness of CCTs in how the conditions
are met; some of them have also measured the impact on poverty. Nevertheless, few studies have
evaluated the impact of CCTs on the reduction of inequality. For this reason, this dissertation’s
main question is: Have CCTs reduced inequality and poverty in Latin America?
This dissertation measures and compares the fiscal redistribution, develops a model of
decomposition of the Gini index, and elaborates a counterfactual analysis in order to measure the
impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Moreover, this
dissertation analyzes the efficiency of CCTs. First finding, some results are not the expected
ones. CCTs have a marginal impact on inequality, a slight impact on poverty, and varying results
regarding the efficiency of CCTs. A relationship can be established between the size, in terms of
budget, and number of beneficiaries of a CCT program and its impact on poverty. Second
finding, as was expected, there is an inverse relationship between the size of a CCT and its
efficiency.
xi

INTRODUCTION
Latin America has historically been one of the most inegalitarian regions in the world. Inequality
has polarized societies and has led to the rise of anti-systemic political and social movements and
to the election of populist leaders (Fukuyama, 2008). More recently in 2019 and 2020, inequality
has resulted in massive social movements and protests in Venezuela, Haiti, Ecuador, Peru,
Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia.
Moreover, some countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela have elected populist presidents who promised institutional changes and
reduction of poverty and inequality. Most of those countries had been previously ruled by elites
who did not invest the benefits from commodities in structural programs to reduce higher
inequality and social exclusion. The Latin American populist presidents have consolidated
power, especially in the executive branches of their respective governments, but also in the
legislative and the judicial branches, which effectively dismantled the democratic institutions
(Fukuyama, 2008). These political crises have interrupted economic growth because of the
unequal distribution of resources. Nevertheless, according to the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2014 and 2020), at the beginning of the 2000s, in the
majority of the countries of the region, a process of inequality reduction started and still, between
2002 and 2018, the average Gini index fell by approximately 14%, from 0.532 to 0.462.
In the recent past, two different strategies have been established to reduce poverty and
inequality. The first strategy is based on demand-side programs that increase the income of
1

poor households through direct-cash subsidies and sometimes with some conditionalities to the
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beneficiaries. This is the case of conditional cash transfer programs that
provide money to poor families conditional on investments in human capital, such as
sending children to school or bringing them to health centers on a regular basis. That
conditionality makes this new generation of social programs an instrument for longerterm human capital investments as well as short-term social assistance. Additionally,
along with school voucher programs and certain subsidized health insurance schemes,
conditional cash transfer programs are part of a growing policy emphasis on the use of
market-oriented demand-side interventions to directly support the poor. (Rawlings and
Rubio, 2005, p. 29)
Brazil and Mexico were the first two countries that developed CCTs in the region and
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank—IADB—, have promoted CCTs in Latin America. According to Fiszbein et al. (2009) and
Stampini and Tornarolli (2012), after Brazil and Mexico, CCTs have been implemented in
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Uruguay.
The second strategy is to develop supply-side public policies, which are “[n]on-cash
universal transfers from the government: These refer to government-provided services that
benefit individuals but are provided with the primary objective of meeting the general needs of
the overall population, rather than that of assisting the poor” (LIS, 2020b). The supply-side
public policies look to bring access to all the members of a society to the fundamental goods,
such as education, health, productive projects, the right to vote, and participation by the
distribution of income and wealth (Piketty, 2020).
Several studies have analyzed a strategy that has been established to reduce poverty and
inequality in Latin America. Latin American countries were the world pioneers in creating and
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developing Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, to put money in the hands of the poor in
order to increase the demand-side and increase human capital. The increase of the demand-side
is defined by the capital that is provided to poor families, but conditions are placed on those
transfers to ensure that the funds are used in ways that promote and increase human capital.
Most of the studies have analyzed the effectiveness of CCTs in how the conditions are
met (Rawling & Rubio, 2003; Parker 2003, 2004; Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Rawling & Rubio
2005; García & Saavedra, 2017). Moreover, a large part of the literature also analyzes the impact
of CCTs in diminishing poverty (Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011;
Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012; Robles et al., 2015; Amarante & Brun 2018). Nevertheless, few
studies have evaluated the impact of CCTs on the reduction of inequality (Wodon & Yitzhaki,
2002; Soares et al., 2007; Medina & Galván, 2008; and Amarante & Brun, 2018). For this
reason, this dissertation’s main question is: Have CCTs reduced inequality and poverty in Latin
America?
The main methodology applied in this dissertation is based on the analysis of microdata,
developing a Comparative Public Policy Analysis, taking as a reference the case studies of CCTs
in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. The hypothesis of this dissertation is based on the following
criteria: first, few studies have evaluated the impact of CCTs on inequality through 2010
(Amaranta & Brun, 2018); there is an opportunity to update these evaluations, using the method
of decomposition of the Gini index. The advantage of using the decomposition of the Gini index
is this method decomposes the income of a household into several sources, such as CCTs, and
analyzes their impact on the difference of the Gini index in multiple countries in different
periods of time. This dissertation uses the most recent LIS data, resulting in a full analysis of the

impact of CCTs on the Gini index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico from the beginning of CCTs
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implementation to the most recent data.
Second, some studies have measured the impact of CCTs on poverty; this dissertation
determines the percentage of the transfers in beneficiaries’ total income and the impact on
poverty by comparing estimated incomes with a no-CCT counterfactual (Stampini & Tornarolli,
2012). This dissertation develops a counterfactual analysis measuring the impact of CCTs on
poverty, using two relative measures: The Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure. The
advantage of using relative measures is that they generate specific poverty thresholds for each
country in specific period of time, taking into consideration patterns in the income distribution
(Brady, 2003). Moreover, it is useful to use both measures of poverty; while the Headcount Ratio
measures the proportion of poor people, the Interval Measure includes the Income Gap between
the median income of the total population and the mean income of the poor (Mahler & Jesuit,
2006). Third, the weakness in targeting the lowest income group as beneficiaries; this
dissertation shows the evolution of poverty and the magnitude of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico, analyzing the quality of the targeting mechanisms used for the inclusion of
beneficiaries.
Finally, there is an opportunity to describe the political and economic context of Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico in order to analyze some control variables that could have caused the
reduction of inequality and poverty, such as the growth Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
economic globalization, ideological orientation of governments, participation and political voice,
and corruption. The studies that have analyzed the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty
have not included a political and economic analysis, describing a model which includes control
variables. Therefore, this dissertation is a contribution to the literature.

5
This is the first study of CCTs to employ the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS),
which is a contribution to the literature. The LIS is a cross-national data center located in
Luxembourg and is the largest available income database with income, wealth, employment, and
demographic of harmonized microdata collected to enable cross-national comparisons from
about 50 countries around the globe, spanning five decades (LIS, 2020b). The LIS uses the
Household Surveys of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in order to access the data and develop
public policy analysis. An additional benefit of LIS data is that results for these case studies can
easily be compared to results for other countries, in Latin America and elsewhere. The key
contribution of the LIS is that, while it does not collect any data on its own, it does allow for
meaningful comparison in a way that was not previously possible. Therefore, the contribution of
this dissertation is that the results can easily be placed in a broader context.
The hypotheses established to develop the analysis of the impact of CCTs in Latin
America are:
Hypothesis 1: CCTs have diminished inequality in Latin America
Hypothesis 2: CCTs have diminished poverty in Latin America
The main contribution of this dissertation is the analysis of CCTs based on a Public
Policy Analysis by making comparisons and incorporating political explanations. CCTs are
analyzed by two criteria of Public Policy Analysis: impact and efficiency. First of all, this
dissertation complements the studies that have analyzed the impact of CCTs on inequality and
poverty, using the most recent data available, and developing methods that answer national broad
issues based on the micro-data analysis. These methods based on micro-data analysis use the
data of national household surveys, which are the main tool for governments to define index
(such as inequality and poverty), to evaluate public policies, and to make public policy decisions.

Second, this dissertation measures the efficiency of CCTs, complementing studies in terms of
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targeting and graduation. Third, the case studies comprise the Pacific Alliance; for this reason,
the conclusions and recommendations will not only contribute to the national governments, but
also to this regional multilateral organization to address inequality and diminish the social gaps
in their societies. Fourth, using the LIS for studying inequality and poverty in Latin American
countries highlights the relevance of analyzing the most unequal region in the world.
In sum, the main contributions of my dissertation to the literature of CCTs are the
analysis of the impact of CCTs on inequality through the decomposition of the Gini index, the
analysis of the impact of CCTs on the poverty Headcount Ratio and Interval Measure through
the counterfactual analysis, and the development of a micro-data analysis in order to answer
national issues on poverty and inequality by using the LIS and national household surveys,
comparing three Latin American countries: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
The dissertation is developed in seven chapters: After the introduction, chapter 1 explains
the origins of CCTs and a description of the case studies, reviewing their development as well as
the support of International Organizations. Chapter 2 describes the literature review,
summarizing the results of some studies regarding the efficiency of CCTs and the impact of
CCTs in diminishing poverty and inequality. Chapter 3 describes the conceptualization and
income data. Chapters 4 explains the methodology and conceptualization. Chapter 5 extends the
method and the analysis of the impact of CCTs on income inequality. Chapter 6 extends the
method and the analysis of the impact of CCTs on poverty and the efficiency of CCTs. Chapter 7
describes a cross-national variance model. Finally, the conclusion provides recommendations for
how to address inequality in Latin America and its implications.

CHAPTER 1
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS IN LATIN AMERICA - CHILE, COLOMBIA, AND
MEXICO
Latin America is the most unequal region across the globe. The academy, international institutions,
and governments have design and analyzed strategies to reduce inequality and poverty. Since the
end of the 1990s, a large number of Latin American countries have developed Conditional Cash
Transfer programs (CCTs) in order to reduce poverty and inequality with the support of
international organizations. CCTs have become an international reference for combating poverty
and inequality. This dissertation contributes to the discussion on how CCTs have impacted
inequality and poverty and how to diminish inequality for the Pacific Alliance members. The
following subsections describe inequality and poverty in Latin America, the influence of
international organizations on CCTs, the evolution and history of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico, and analyzes the characteristics of these CCTs.
Inequality and Poverty in Latin America
Latin America has historically been one of the most inegalitarian regions in the world (see Figure
1). According to the World Bank (2020), while Latin America and the Caribbean achieved an
annual GNI per capita of US$ 14.084 in 2018, the East Asia and Pacific achieved an annual GNI
per capita of US$ 17,344; the Middle East and North Africa (2017): US$ 18,055; East Asia and
Pacific: US$ 10,982; the European Union: US$ 43,714; and the United States of America: US$

7

63,690. “Although income inequality has fallen in recent years, Latin America remains the most
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unequal region in the world. In 2014, the richest 10% of people in Latin America had amassed
71% of the region’s wealth” (Bárcena & Byanyima, 2016). The high level of inequality in Latin
America has negative effects in the region’s long-term economic growth and political stability;
inequality has polarized social conflict, has caused the rise of antisystemic political and social
movements, and has polarized societies (Fukuyama, 2008).

Figure 1. Inequality in Latin America

Source: The most unequal regions in the world. Adapted from “Latin America is the world's
most unequal region. Here's how to fix it,” by A. Bárcena and W. Byanyima, 2016, January 17,
January's World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos.
https://www.weforum.org/about/privacy-and-terms-of-use.
Moreover, inequality has increased the election of populist leaders, in which the demand
for popular government was the political source of the tension (Polanyi, 2001). More recently in
2019 and 2020, inequality has resulted in massive social movements and protests in Venezuela,
Haiti, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia. Social groups from Chile and Colombia
have massively protested because of inequality, among other reasons. Moreover, some countries,

such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela have elected
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populist presidents who promised institutional changes and the reduction of poverty and
inequality. Most of those countries had been previously ruled by elites who did not invest the
benefits from commodities in structural programs to reduce higher inequality and social
exclusion. The Latin American populist presidents have consolidated power, especially in the
executive branches of their respective governments, but also in the legislative and the judicial
branches, which in some countries effectively dismantled the democratic institutions (Fukuyama,
2008). These presidents have been reelected several times and have developed social policies
that have reduced poverty but are unsustainable in the long term (Fukuyama, 2008, p. 71).
Political and social conflict have restricted the free press, constraining the power of the media in
some cases (Fukuyama, 2008).
Nevertheless, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), at the beginning of the 2000s, a process of inequality reduction started in
the majority of the countries of the region. Consequently, between 2002 and 2018, the average
Gini index fell by approximately 14%, from 0.532 to 0.462. While in urban areas the diminishing
of inequality was approximately 14%, from 0.509 to 0.436, in rural areas it was approximately
12%, from 0.05 to 0.442 (see Figure 2).
Similarly, poverty has decreased in Latin America in the last 20 years. According to
ECLAC, the percentage of poor people in Latin America diminished from 44% in 2001 to 30%
in 2018. Conversely, the percentage of the extremely poor in Latin America has not decreased in
the same proportion, diminishing from 12.1% in 2001 to 10.7% in 2018 (see Figure 3). As can be
seen, inequality and the percentage of poor people in Latin America have decreased during the
same period as the implementation of CCTs.
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Figure 2. Evolution of the Gini index in Latin America
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Figure 3. Evolution of Poverty in Latin America (Percentage of Total Population)
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In order to understand Latin America’s inequality, some authors have emphasized
historical reasons. “[Latin American countries’] origins as extractive colonial states led to the

11
exclusion of large parts of the population from the political system, leaving the excluded without
the ability to protect their rights” (Fukuyama, 2008, p. 69). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
explain how Latin American countries differ in the way their political institutions were created
from the ones created at the origins of the United States of America, and how those political
institutions affect the economic institutions. During the Spanish colonization of Latin America,
the institutions of the encomienda system, the mita, and the repartimento increased the wealth of
the Spanish Crown but caused great inequality in Latin America. The political institutions are the
ones that determined the economic institutions within states. This historical analysis contributes
to the discussion of how political institutions have consequences in the development and
redistribution of countries’ economies. In sum, the Latin American political process excluded
large parts of its population since its origins, which contributed to inequality and caused dramatic
consequences in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres.
After the economic crisis and the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, which in
Latin America and the Caribbean produced a remarkable increase in poverty, in the 1990s the
commitment to face the social gaps began to gain ground (Tassara et al., 2015). The environment
was favorable because in the same period democratic institutions were consolidated and new
more advanced constitutions were approved in many countries (Tassara et al., 2015) while the
political leadership "aims to translate into concrete actions the idea of a more present State, with
greater capacity to intervene in economic and social development" (Repetto, 2010, p. 1).
Moreover, economic growth, the consolidation of fiscal policies, and larger public budgets
favored the increase of available resources for the implementation of social policies. This new
approach gradually replaced the paradigm based on the Washington Consensus that persistently
sought to reduce the role of the sate (Tassara et al., 2015).

12
There have been some Latin American states with weak institutions that have established
populist programs, which have highly negative consequences in social, economic, and political
spheres. Those programs offered by populist governments have damaged the economy, have
increased political polarization and, in some cases, have weakened democratic institutions
(Fukuyama, 2008, p. 71). For instance, inequality in Venezuela led to the election of a populist
leader, former President Chavez and his successor current-President Maduro. Both
administrations have manipulated the law to stay in power, have severely weakened institutions,
have polarized the country, and have created one of the most acute political, social, economic,
and humanitarian crises in Latin America in recent years. In sum, populist governments arose in
states with weak institutions and their manipulation led to more detrimental outcomes.
Other countries which have not necessarily been distinguished as populist governments
have developed institutional programs such as CCTs. Latin American countries were the world
pioneers in creating and developing CCTs, to put money in the hands of the poor in order to
increase the demand-side and to promote human capital. Even though the earliest CCT programs
were introduced in communities in Brazil in 1995 (Federal District, Campinas, Belo Horizonte,
Vitoria, Recife, etc.), Mexico was the first to launch a national CCT program in 1997. The
program was initially called PROGRESA from 1997 - 2001, then it was called Oportunidades
(Opportunities) from 2001 to 2014, and finally it was called Prospera (Prosperity) beginning in
2014 (Cecchini & Atuesta, 2017 and ECLAC, 2020).
The transfers increase the purchasing power (demand) of marginalized communities,
allowing them to consume more in the economy and stimulate employment. However, the
money that they receive is conditional in that it must be used to ensure school attendance and
nutritional medical check-ups for their children, promoting the accumulation of human capital in

youth as a way to break the intergenerational cycles of poverty and diminishing inequality
(Rawlings & Rubio, 2003). “By making insurance available, helping credit-constrained poor
people become productive workers, and providing incentives for long-term investments in
human capital, safety nets are now seen to have a potentially important role in compensating for
the market failures that help perpetuate poverty, particularly in high-inequality settings”
(Ravallion, 2003, as cited in Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). Moreover, CCTs contribute to making
economic growth more inclusive, by providing a large and reliable source of income (Stampini
& Tornarolli, 2012). Even though Mexico and Brazil were the pioneers in designing the CCT
programs, international organizations have promoted CCTs in Latin America.
The Influence of International Organizations
International organizations have played an important role in the development of CCTs in Latin
America. “The enthusiasm and speed with which CCT programs were received in parts of the
academy is astonishing, and their enthusiastic embrace by international financial institutions
is even more surprising” (Lomelí, 2008, p. 478). Even if international organizations did not
contribute to financing the design and development of CCTs in Brazil and Mexico in their
beginning, these organizations actively participated in expanding CCT programs and replicating
them in other countries (Handa & Davis, 2006, p. 514). The World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) have helped Latin American countries by giving extensive loans to
expand the programs. For instance, the IDB approved a one-billion-dollar loan to Mexico in
2001, financing the expansion of that country’s CCT program, the largest loan in its history at
that time (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008). International organizations not only have financed CCTs
programs, but they have also promoted these programs.
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In addition, international organizations have promoted CCT programs as models of best
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practice of social assistance for governments and policymakers (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008). Initially,
almost all of the programs were financed with international development cooperation resources
and loans from the IDB or the World Bank (Tassara et al., 2016). For instance, the World Bank
has increasingly recommended adopting CCT programs and giving loans to those countries that
made the decision to implement them. This promotion of CCTs has not been the traditional area
of the World Bank’s financing, such as infrastructure. It could be considered a highly risky
decision, which is also uncommon in these types of organizations. Thus, the responsibility
around the positive and the negative impacts of CCT programs in Latin America is not only with
the government, but also with the international organizations that promote them.
According to the World Bank (2007), as a result of impact evaluations that have been
incorporated into the design and implementation of CCTs, there is increasing evidence of
positive results regarding the use of these programs. The evidence shows that CCT programs
reduce the poverty of the poorer households in the short term, resulting in better indicators in
education, such as the rate of schooling ––both in attendance and in permanence––and better
indicators in health, relative malnutrition, vaccination, and prenatal controls (World Bank, 2007).
“As evidence of impact grows, customers of the Bank increasingly request support to start or
expand CCT programs” (World Bank, 2007). In sum, the evidence of the impact of CCTs on
diminishing poverty and improving inter-generational human capital motivates and justifies
international organizations in promoting CCTs and thus promotes giving loans to LatinAmerican governments for the purpose of establishing and expanding these programs.
Furthermore, international organizations have contributed to the development of studies
to measure the impact of CCTs in Latin America. For instance, an Inter-American Development
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Bank study (Bouillon & Tejerina 2006) concluded that in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Brazil,
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Colombia between 1997 and 2003, CCTs “were found to be ‘very
effective tools’ for reducing poverty and inequality ‘in the long term’ and [providing] the relief
of poverty ‘in the short term” (Lomelí, 2008, p. 478). According to Tassara et al. (2016), the
Inter-American Development Bank (2014) estimates that around 96 million people emerged
from poverty between 2003 and 2013, and that the percentage of poor people in the region would
have been, on average, 13% higher in the absence of CCTs. Moreover, in its 2006-Annual
Report, the Inter-American Development Bank (Russell-Bitting, 2007) concluded that CCTs
have successfully reduced low-income groups in Latin America as well as have strengthened
human capital accumulation (Lomelí, 2008).
Evolution and History of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Mexico and Brazil were the pioneers in the world to develop CCTs, and Colombia soon
followed. The World Bank has subsequently supported the replication of CCTs all around Latin
America. Chile has implemented CCTs, but not on the same scale as Colombia and Mexico.
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, as most of Latin Americans countries that have implemented
CCTs, have similar objectives: to improve the welfare of families by increasing its consumption
capacity through cash transfers and to develop human capital in education and health in order to
reduce poverty and to reduce social exclusion, thereby diminishing inequality. The CCTs in
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile clearly emphasize the reduction in poverty as a key goal. While
Colombia’s CCTs have an objective of diminishing inequality, Mexico and Chile’s CCTs
implies the reduction of inequality as an objective through the reduction of social exclusion and
the increase of human capital.

Finally, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Peru comprise the Pacific Alliance, which is an
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initiative of regional integration founded in 2011; one of its main objectives is “[to] drive further
growth, development and competitiveness of the economies of its members, focused on
achieving greater well-being, overcoming socioeconomic inequality and promot[ing] the social
inclusion of its inhabitants” (Pacific Alliance, 2019). This dissertation could contribute to the
discussion on how to diminish inequality for the Pacific Alliance’s members. This dissertation
analyzes the impact and efficiency of three important CCT programs: Prospera (Prosperity) in
Mexico, Más Familias en Acción (More Families in Action) in Colombia, and Programa Ingreso
Ético Familiar (Ethical Family Income Program) in Chile.
Prosperity in Mexico.
Each governmental administration in Mexico has made changes to the CCT program and,
most importantly, has changed the name after each succession for the sake of difference. The
first CCT program started in 1997 with the name PROGRESA and attended to rural areas only
(ECLAC, 2020). It was created in the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
(1994-2000) as a national program to reduce poverty. PROGRESA initially benefited 300,000
families in rural areas (Government of Mexico, 2018) and then jumped to 2.5 million in 2000
(Moreno-Brid et al., 2009, p. 165). This model established that the money was given to the
women of households if beneficiaries’ children had attended local schools and families had
attended regular health checks.
The government of Mexico designed and developed the CCT program in its first stages
without the support of international organizations. Nevertheless, the international organizations
played a significant role in the expansion of CCTs in Mexico. For instance, the IDB approved a
one-billion-dollar loan to Mexico in 2001, financing the expansion of that country’s CCT
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program (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008). Moreover, international organizations, such as the IDB, World
Bank, and ECLAC, have supported the development of public policy and academic studies.
“Since its inception, it has been one of the programmes with more impact evaluation reports in
several areas” (ECLAC, 2020).
In 2002, the administration of President Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-2006) introduced
some changes to the program and named it Opportunities. The program’s coverage included
urban areas, and more years of education were subsidized (not only elementary but also high
school). In addition, this administration created a sub-program named Jovenes con
Oportunidades (Youth Opportunities) “which provided a savings account for children of
beneficiaries if they were performing satisfactorily in the last three years of high school” and
could be used toward paying for university or opening a small business (Moreno-Brid et al.,
2009, p. 165). The beneficiaries of Opportunities increased to 4.2 million households that
attended in 2002 (Government of Mexico, 2018). According to Moreno-Brid et al., the
distribution of the beneficiaries’ location in 2004 was 68.8% in rural areas, 17.2% in semi-urban
regions, and 14% in urban centers (2009, p. 166).
Moreover, the administration of Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012)
increased the coverage of the program from 24.8 to 26.9 million people (ECLAC, 2020),
meaning the program did not suffer significant changes. Conversely, the administration of
president Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) changed the name of the program to Prosperity in
2014, becoming a program not only for conditional transfers but also for social inclusion,
beneficiating around 6.8 million families in 2016 (Government of Mexico, 2017).
The current program establishes two related objectives: to improve the welfare situation
of families by increasing their consumption capacity, and to develop the human capital,
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especially in education, health, and food, of their family members, mainly of children and young
people, as a mechanism to improve their welfare situation in the future. The central hypothesis
that guided the design of Prosperity is to allow the new generations to enter the labor market in
activities of greater status, productivity and remuneration, promoting equal opportunities, social
mobility, and the breakdown of the intergenerational reproduction cycle of poverty (CONEVAL,
2019). According to the ECLAC (2020), Prosperity benefited 31,2 million people in 2017.
Moreover, Mexican government has developed and strengthened an institutional
framework. According to ECLAC (2020), the National Coordination of the Human Development
Program of Prosperity was created through an executive order in March 2014. This institution is
a decentralized agency of the Ministry of Social Development, with technical autonomy.
In 2019, the administration of president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018 – present)
launched the Programa de Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juárez.
“The Benito Juárez Scholarships for the Well-being seek to strengthen an inclusive and
equitable education by expanding the capabilities associated with the education of the
population that is in a situation of poverty or in conditions of vulnerability…. As of 2019,
this program replaces the educational components of the Prosperity Social Inclusion
Program.” (ECLAC, 2020).
According to the Government of Mexico (2019), it is a set of priority programs that seeks to
contribute to the right to education of children, adolescents, and young people with limited
economic resources to support them in their school enrollment, completing their studies through
monetary support. Additionally, the program considers ex-recipient households of Prosperity
that meet the eligibility requirements in 2019, whose estimated per capita income is below the
Income Poverty Line (LIS, 2020b).
In sum, the government of Mexico has expanded CCT programs, believing that they are
indeed pulling people out of poverty and increasing human capital. The Mexican CCT program

increased the beneficiaries from 1.49 million people in 1997 to 31.2 million people in 2018,
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increasing the coverage of beneficiaries from 1.55% of the total population in 1997 to 24.13% in
2018. Overall, the definition of eligibility of Prosperity is similar to the definition of CCTs in
Colombia and Chile.
More Families in Action in Colombia.
Colombia’s More Families in Action is the flagship of the region that was designated to
supply relief from the negative effects of an economic recession (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). This
program, created in 2001 during the administration of president Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002),
followed the model of CCTs implemented in Mexico. At the beginning the program was called
Families in Action and was implemented only in the rural areas, covering municipalities smaller
than 100,000 inhabitants.
During the administration of president Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010), a pilot program
was carried out to include displaced populations located in large urban centers. Thus, the
program included medium and large urban centers, covering all the municipalities of the country
and adding strategies for the inclusion of indigenous communities. In addition, the administration
of Uribe developed another CCT called Jóvenes en Acción / Youth in Action in 2012. This social
prosperity program supports young people in poverty and vulnerability in order to continue their
technical, technological, and professional studies, impacting the demand for higher education at
the technical, technological and professional levels, increasing the educational achievement of
this population and increasing their permanence in the educational system (DPS, 2017c). Youth
enrolled in higher technical or technological education receive a cash incentive up to US$ 822
(COP$ 2,400,000) per year, and youths enrolled in undergraduate studies receive up to US$ 548
(COP$ 1,600,000) per year, or up to US$ 685 (COP$ 2,000,000) per year if they receive the

performance incentive (DPS, 2017c). This program started in 2012 as a component of the
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redesign process of the More Families in Action program and has benefited 420,000 vulnerable
young people (DPS, 2017c). Vulnerability means in poor condition and with the possibility of
suffering a decline in well-being, which can be caused by an economic crisis or natural disaster.
The vulnerable are poor people and those who are likely to move out of poverty but may become
poor again (World Bank, 2013).
In the administration of president Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (2010-2018), the
program became the Law of the Republic (Law 1532 of 2012), giving it national coverage (DPS,
2015). In this case, the program did not change its name in every administration; it only altered
the original Families in Action to the name More Families in Action in the Santos administration.
In 2016, More Families in Action benefited 2,503,713 families in health and education
incentives, in which 1,243,985 children under seven years of age benefited from health
incentives and 3,129,861 children and adolescents of school age from the educational incentives.
Incentives in education and health settled in the order of $ 1.7 trillion pesos, which equaled
approximately US$ 612.7 million (DPS, 2017b). Finally, the program has continued during the
Duque administration (2018 - present), maintaining the number of beneficiaries during the first
year of his mandate.
More Families in Action received the financial support of international organizations,
such as IDB and the World Bank. These loans not only contributed to the design and
implementation of the program, but also to establishing “a coherent safety-net to replace a
fragmented array of existing programmes” (Handa & Davis, 2006, p. 514). More Families in
Action is a program that consists of conditioned and periodic delivery of a direct monetary

transfer to complement the income and improve the health and education of children under 18
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years whose families are in poverty.
The objective of More Families in Action is to contribute to overcoming and preventing
poverty and encouraging human capital formation through direct monetary support to the
beneficiary families (Congress of Colombia, 2012). According to the Departamento para la
Prosperidad Social –DPS- (2017a), the program seeks the promotion of assistance to children
under the age of six. Moreover, the program encourages school attendance at the elementary and
high school levels (children and adolescents between four and 18 years of age). Finally, More
Families in Action seeks to contribute to the reduction of inequality and the closing of regional
urban-rural and center-periphery gaps (DPS, 2017a). Thus, one of the specific objectives of
CCTs in Colombia is to reduce inequality, clearly reflecting the importance of reducing
inequality between urban and rural areas.
Colombia is becoming a highly interesting case because of the protest of Colombians
against inequality during 2019 and 2020. In addition, the implementation of CCTs in Colombia
had been marked by a unique political situation of violence in rural areas because of the internal
conflict that exists in Colombia with the guerrillas. Nevertheless, the current situation of postconflict after the signing of the peace process between the government and the Fuerzas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) (FARC) guerrilla
group is a historic moment in developing public policies and programs that close the social gap
and reduce inequality, specifically benefiting rural areas and marginalized urban zones.
In sum, More Families in Action is similar to Prosperity in how the number of
beneficiaries has highly increased through its implementation. Moreover, the governments of

Colombia and Mexico have increased the territorial coverage, starting from exclusively rural
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areas and then including urban areas as well.
Programa Ingreso Ético Familiar / Ethical Family Income Program in Chile.
The Ethical Family Income Program has its roots in Chile Solidario (Solidarity Chile),
which was created during the administration of President Ricardo Froilán Lagos Escobar (20002006). Solidarity Chile articulated the access of the participants to a numerous set of programs
and social benefits that were assigned to various ministries and public agencies and were mostly
operating prior to this policy (Larrañaga et al., 2014), coordinating the whole public offer of
social services around its beneficiaries (ECLAC, 2020). Moreover, this program gave its
beneficiaries family support through a psychosocial approach (ECLAC, 2020).
The Ministry of Social Development and Family (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y
Familia) is the political and technical institution that was in charge of Solidarity Chile. This
ministry managed financial resources and information records, coordinated the institutional
network, collected data for further evaluations, and designed the beneficiaries’ selection
instruments (Larrañaga et al., 2014). According to Larrañaga, Contreras and Cabezas (2014),
Solidarity Chile focused on psychosocial support, giving preferential access to the network of
social programs as well as guaranteed access to subsidies, while financial support for supporting
short-term consumption was very low (Vargas et al., 2017). The World Bank contributed with
studies and evaluations, as well as guidelines for the management and institutional strengthening
of Solidarity Chile (Larrañaga et al., 2014).
In 2012, the first administration of President Piñera enacted Law 20595, which created
the program Ethical Family Income Program, replacing Solidarity Chile. The objective of the
program is to serve families in extreme poverty and those affected by certain conditions of

vulnerability, in order to promote access to better living conditions (Vargas et al., 2017). The
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Ethical Family Income Program incorporates elements of Solidarity Chile, such as socio-labor
support to facilitate families participating in the formal labor market and achieving economic
autonomy (Vargas et al., 2017). Conversely, the Ethical Family Income Program incorporates
higher value transfers to alleviate the lack of income in the short term (Larrañaga et al., 2014).
The Ethical Family Income Program had an inclusion of 50,000 new families in its first year
(Tassara et al., 2017).
The Ethical Family Income Program prioritizes the reduction of extreme poverty through
two strategies: conditional transfers and the development of personalized strategies for labor
insertion and training, combining transfers with family interventions. The first increases the total
income of families in an extreme poverty situation; the second strategy encourages the entry of
women, and adults in general, to the labor market, including psychosocial support (Tassara et al.,
2017). Transfers are designed to supplement families' autonomous income and help them exceed
the extreme poverty threshold. However, the program also seeks to develop skills for families to
insert themselves into stable—and long-term—productive trajectories so that the exit from
extreme poverty is sustainable; that is, it does not depend on permanent transfers, but on a
greater ability to generate income in families (Vargas et al., 2017).
Households eligible for the Ethical Family Income Opportunity Program are those who
are in extreme poverty (per capita income below the basic basket) or in vulnerable conditions
(Vargas et al., 2017). The program defines a limit in the access of new beneficiaries and exit
strategies; beneficiaries can only be there for a maximum of two years and the annual coverage
of new beneficiaries of the program may not exceed 70,000 people or families (Government of
Chile, 2012).

Chile is becoming a highly interesting case because of the protest of Chileans against
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inequality during 2019 and 2020. Perhaps Chile has been seen as a model in the region because
of the social programs described above. Nevertheless, inequality has been an increased concern
among the population.
In sum, the definition of eligibility of Ethical Family Income Program is similar to
Prosperity and More Families in Action, in which poor and vulnerable families should be the
beneficiaries of the programs. In addition, the conditionalities to the beneficiaries are also similar
to these programs. Conversely, Ethical Family Income Program has not increased its targeting or
number of beneficiaries in the same way as Prosperity and More Families in Action has. In fact,
the program defines a limit of new beneficiaries.
Characteristics of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
This historical description of the CCTs in three countries shows some similitudes and differences
among them. The following subsections analyze and compare the characteristics of CCTs in
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. The characteristics to analyze are targeting, conditions and
amounts of subsidies, budget and expenditure, and the coverage and beneficiaries.
Targeting.
The role of CCTs in social policy varies in each program as a consequence of differences
in design and the context of each country. The targeting procedures for the selection of the
CCTs’ beneficiaries are commonly based on different stages. The target population changes from
one program to other. While Mexico’s Prosperity seeks households below the food poverty line
(ECLAC, 2020), Colombia’s More Families in Action targets households in poverty and
vulnerable situations, with children under 18 years old who are displaced or indigenous. In

addition, Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program seeks families in extreme poverty and
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vulnerable situations (Cecchini & Madariaga 2011; Vargas et al., 2017; and ECLAC, 2020).
First of all, CCTs use indices which may include income variables or unsatisfied basic
needs for the selection of geographical units with the highest levels of poverty, using sources
such as population censuses, household surveys, and poverty maps (Cecchini & Madariaga,
2011). “They use a combination of approaches to identify needy households, including a proxy
means test to collect information about household characteristics (Chile was first to use this
approach), geographic clustering of poverty, and in some cases community-based targeting and
self-selection” (Lomelí, 2008, p. 480). On the one hand, Prosperity uses indicators of unsatisfied
basic needs from census data in order to select poor rural communities based on a marginality
index and expenses for urban areas (Orozco & Hubert, 2005; Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; and
ECLAC, 2020).
More Families in Action uses a proxy-means testing instrument known as the System for
Selecting Beneficiaries of Social Programs (Sistema de Beneficiarios de los Programas Sociales
or SISBEN). SISBEN is based on the assessment of living conditions of individual families, and
it has been used extensively since 1994 to target subsidies for education, health insurance, CCTs,
public works, youth training, subsidies for the elderly in poverty, and by national and local
governments (Catañeda, 2005). Nevertheless, there is an exclusion of areas with an insufficient
supply, such as banks, financial institutions, and health and education infrastructures (ECLAC,
2020). In addition, the Ethical Family Income Program uses the Social Household Registry
(Registro Social de Hogares or RSH), which is developed by Decree 22, 2015. The RSH is the
information system that began operating in January 2016 in order to support the selection
processes for users of the different programs as well as benefits or social benefits of the Chilean

State. The RSH was an important and successful innovation, which has strengthened the social
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protection system, providing a socioeconomic characterization of households and other quality
information and contributing to the design of more efficient and effective social policies (BernerHerrera & Diaz-Silva, 2019).
Secondly, the programs address the unit selection: families or household. Most of the
programs use indirect livelihood testing methods. Some programs incorporate a final stage of
community selection, under the assumption that local agents have more information regarding
the needs and deficiencies of the homes of a community (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011). While
Prosperity uses formulas that predict income through variables that assume that they are closely
related to said income, the Ethical Family Income Program uses multidimensional quality of life
indices (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011). The Mexican CCTs “officials carry out a socio-economic
survey for all households in the selected communities and then use discriminant analysis to
distinguish eligible from ineligible households using characteristics such as dwelling conditions,
dependency ratios, ownership of durable goods, animals and land, and the presence of disabled
individuals” (Parker & Volg, 2018, pp. 5, 6).
Conversely, More Families in Action includes a community selection component as part
of the adaptation of its operating rules in indigenous localities (Parker & Volg, 2018, and
Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011). In sum, these mechanisms point out to a social vigilance and
transparency, targeting households more effectively. Because of the efficiency and the limited
budget of Latin American governments, targeting has been an important element in the design
and development of CCTs. The main targeting goal is to achieve the greatest effect at the lowest
budget cost.
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Finally, the criteria of selecting the families differs among the programs, according to the
children’s ages and their enrollment in school. On the one hand, Prosperity targets poor
households with children of eight to 20 years enrolled in elementary (3rd to 6th grade) and high
school for the educational conditions (Rawlings & Rubio, 2003, and ECLAC, 2020). On the
other hand, More Families in Action targets poor households with children between seven and 17
years enrolled in elementary or high school (2nd to 11th grade) (Rawlings & Rubio, 2003).
Conversely, Chile targets families living in extreme poverty and who have school-age children in
elementary or high school and families with children under the age of six (Robles, 2013).
The importance of targeting is the public policy analysis of CCTs through the criterion of
efficiency. CCT beneficiaries should follow the criterion of each program and the analysis must
be in accordance to each program. As can be seen, in general terms, CCTs are focused on poor
people and vulnerable people, meaning the policy analysis should result in including
beneficiaries from only low-income groups. Moreover, the poorer the beneficiaries, the higher
the efficiency of the program will be in reducing poverty and inequality.
Conditions and Amounts of Subsidies.
The amounts and conditions of the transfers differ in each program. In 2019, Mexico’s
Prosperity gave grant amounts ranging from US$ 9.10 (MXN$ 175) to US$ 70.20 (MXN$
1,350) monthly to families, in which the transfer increases with school level: elementary, middle,
upper-middle and for women (ECLAC 2020). The senior-grant amount represents approximately
two thirds of Mexico’s minimum wage (Parker & Volg, 2018). Moreover, the transfer for health
was US$ 17.40 (MXN$ 3,355) per household per month in 2018 (ECLAC, 2020).
The transfers of Colombia’s More Families in Action in 2017 ranged from US$ 3.90
(COP$ 11,375) to US$21.40 (COP$ 62,475) (ECLAC, 2020). The amount is based on

geographical criteria (four groups of cities) and level of grades (five groups of school grades.
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The geographical differentiation is defined using the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI),
with the objective of increasing the progressivity of the program, in which higher-income people
should pay higher taxes to benefit low-income groups. “The differentiation establishes four
groups of municipalities divided in the following way: Group 1: Bogotá; Group 2: 21 capital
cities; Group 3: municipalities with MPI lower than 70%; and Group 4: municipalities with an
MPI of 70% or higher” (ECLAC, 2020). The lowest amount corresponds with primary education
and the geographic groups one and two, and the highest is for grade 11th in geographic group 4
(ECLAC, 2020). In addition, the transfer for health in 2017 ranged in 2017 from US$ 23.40
(COP$ 68,150) to US$ 27.29 (COP$ 79,500) per family monthly (ECLAC, 2020), following the
same criteria as the educational subsidy. Conversely, the transfers in the Chile’s Ethical Family
Income Program are US$ 16.00 per child for families living in extreme poverty (Robles, 2013).
In addition, the conditions differ among the countries. While Prosperity asks for
minimum attendance of 85% school enrollment, monthly and annually, and the “compliance by
all household members with the required number of health center visits and mother’s attendance
at health and nutrition lectures” (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005, p. 35), More Families in Action asks
for at least 80% of school attendance in a two-month cycle in education and regular health care
visits for monitoring of the child’s development (Rawlings & Rubio 2005). Conversely, the
Ethical Family Income Program asks for a percentage of school attendance of no less than 90%
in the case of primary education and 85% in secondary education. In addition, for families with
children under the age of 6, the condition is their attendance at health check-ups.

A public policy analysis should take into consideration the differences among the CCTs’
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conditions. For instance, the minimum percentage of school attendance matters because it can
show a difference in the effectiveness of a CCT.
Budget and Expenditure.
As the number of beneficiaries of CCTs has increased since their origins in each country,
the budget and expenditures have also increased, showing a more recent decline in 2012 in
Colombia and Mexico (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Budget of CCTs, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, 2003 to 2017 (Percentage of GDP)
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and
the CEPALSTAT database.
Notes: Chile: Solidarity Chile. Colombia: More Families in Action. 2006, 2016, and 2017’s data
is not available. Mexico: Opportunities (2003-2013) and Prosperity (2014-2017).

Mexico increased its budget for CCTs from US$ 133 million (MXN$ 1,055.5 million) in

30

1997, which represented the 0.03% of the GDP, to US$4.299 million (MXN$ 82,730 million) in
2018, which represented the 0.35% of the GDP (ECLAC, 2020). This increment represents an
increase of 0.32% of the GDP over 21 years. Colombia increased its budget for CCTs from US$
14.3 million (COP$ 32,905 million) in 2001, which represented 0.01% of the GDP, to US$ 840
million (COP$ 2.25 trillion) in 2015, which represented 0.29% of the GDP. Chile increased its
budget for CCTs from US$ 12 million (CLP$ 8,251 million) in 2003, which represented 0.02%
of the GDP, to US$ 381.6 million (CLP$ 251 billion) in 2017, which represented 0.14% of the
GDP (ECLAC 2020). These increments represent an increase of 0.28% and 0.12% in Colombia
and Chile respectively.
One of the Latin American countries that had the highest levels of per capita expenditure
in CCT programs in 2015 was Chile, with an annual investment of US$ 245 at current prices per
person in recipient households (Cecchini & Atuesta, 2017). It was followed by Mexico, which
expended US$ 163 per capita in CCT programs. Meanwhile, Colombia made per capita
expenditures of US$ 69 in current dollars (Cecchini & Atuesta, 2017). Among the case studies of
this dissertation, Chile was the country that had scaled up its per capita expenditure the most in
nominal terms from US$ 132 in 2005 to US$ 250 in 2015, which can be explained by the
expansion of CCTs under the Ethical Family Income Program (Cecchini et al., 2012 and
Cecchini & Atuesta 2017). The budget size is important in a public policy analysis of CCTs
because the differences among the budgets could explain the differences among the impact on
poverty and inequality. The higher the budget, the higher the impact.
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Coverage and Beneficiaries.
CCTs vary with respect to absolute coverage and percentage of recipient households of
the total population. In terms of absolute coverage, the estimation of the number of people in

recipient households ranges from 31.2 million in Mexico in 2018, to 10.5 million in Colombia in
2017, and 800,000 in Chile (ECLAC, 2020). The number of beneficiaries has increased almost
every year in the three countries. Even though CCTs have increased almost every year since its
creation, 2016 and 2017 saw a decrease in terms of the number of beneficiaries (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Evolution of Individuals in Recipient Households of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico, 1997 to 2017
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Mexico’s Prosperity had an estimated 1.5 million people in recipient households,
Colombia’s More Families in Action had 1.1 million people in 2001, and Chile’s Ethical Family

Income Program had 181,000 in 2012 (ECLAC, 2020). In terms of relative coverage (see Figure
6), CCTs increased their range from 1.5% in 1997 to approximately 24.13% of the population in
2018 in Mexico, from 3.01% in 2001 to 21.50% in 2017 in Colombia, and from 1.15% in 2002
to 4.44% in 2017 in Chile (ECLAC, 2020).

Figure 6. Individuals in Recipient Households of CCTs, 2002 to 2017 (Percentage of Total
Population)
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online]
http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and the CEPALSTAT database.
Notes: Chile: Solidarity Chile (2002-2012) and Ethical Family Income (2013-2017). Colombia:
More Families in Action. Mexico: Opportunities (1997-2013) and Prosperity (2014-2017).
The importance of coverage and beneficiaries is important in a CCT public analysis
because it can establish a relation between the coverage of the program and the impact on
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poverty and inequality, meaning that coverage can establish a difference among the impact of the
case studies. The greater the coverage, the bigger the impact. In addition, it is also important to
analyze targeting, such as the percentage of the population in poverty, that is covered by these
programs, in order to establish a difference of the efficiency of CCTs among the case studies.
Conclusion
In sum, CCTs have been a common strategy for most Latin American countries to reduce
poverty and inequality. Mexico, Colombia, and Chile have increased the number of beneficiaries
over the years. Even though these programs have a common objective and use similar strategies,
there are differences among them to take into consideration. The three programs look to diminish
poverty by increasing the income of low-income families by giving a cash subsidy. In addition,
the programs have some conditions regarding children’s school attendance and health-nutritional
check-ups.
Nevertheless, there are some differences among the programs. First, the sources of
funding do not necessarily include international financial institutions. While Prosperity and
More Families in Action received international cooperation—the World Bank in both cases and
the Inter-American Development Bank to Colombia—the Ethical Family Income Program has
not received funds from international financial institutions. Chile has received funding for CCTs
from the government, which can account for the program’s lack of expansion compared to those
in Mexico and Colombia.
The main differences among the programs are budget and coverage, which are causal
relationships. According to ECLAC (2020), Mexico has large and expansive CCTs that covered
24.13% of its population in 2018, expending 0.37% of the GDP. It is followed by Colombia that

covered 21.50% of its population in 2017, expending 0.28%. Meanwhile, Chile covers only
4.44%, expending 0.12 of the GDP.
It is important to study the impact of CCTs on poverty and inequality and the
effectiveness of these programs in order to contribute to the literature and to give
recommendations to policy makers that design these programs. Studying the criteria of
conditions, budget, and targeting to determine the variations of these criteria could explain the
differences among CCTs’ in their impact and effectiveness. Chapter 2 describes the literature
review.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies have measured the results of CCTs in improving the education, nutrition, and
health of its beneficiaries (Cecchini et al., 2001; Rawling & Rubio, 2003; Parker, 2003, 2004;
Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Rawling & Rubio, 2005; Handa & Davi,s 2006; Rangel, 2011;
Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; Segura-Perez et al., 2016; García & Saavedra 2017). Nevertheless,
there is not as much literature measuring the impact of CCTs in reducing poverty and inequality
in the long term (see Table 1). Even if some studies present significant positive impacts and
successes during the CCTs’ first stages, some authors doubt the CCTs’ effectiveness in achieving
the principal goal of diminishing poverty and inequality (Moreno-Brid, 2009; Lloyd-Sherlock
2008). Fiszbein et al. state that “much more needs to be known about the long-term effects of
CCT programs in a variety of dimensions” (2009, p. 380). This is an opportunity to deepen the
public policy analysis of CCTs in Latin America, based on the evaluation of their results and
effects on societies.
Public Policy Analysis and Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs)
In Public Policy Analysis, Knoepfel defines four criteria in order to evaluate a policy: impact,
effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance (2007). Impact refers to the results of a policy on a
surrounding community; it can be intentional or unintentional, as well as both positive or
negative. Effectiveness establishes a cause-effect relationship regarding the extent to which a
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particular policy produces the desired outcomes. Efficiency refers to the cost-effect relationship
of a policy, and relevance is determined by how applicable and practical analytical findings are
to policymakers’ decisions that need to make on policy priorities. The literature review that this
dissertation focuses on is regarding the criteria of impact, effectiveness, and efficiency. It does
not take into consideration relevance because, in the end, if the analysis of a public policy
determines a positive impact, is effective and uses resources efficiently, then policymakers will
consider it as a relevant policy.
Accordingly, Chaterjee & Vadapalli (2009) analyze the approaches to evaluate social
policies, which include the impact analysis, effectiveness analysis, and efficiency analysis. Some
elements of impact analysis are established in the following definition: “A problem relative to a
given program as some predicted condition that will be unsatisfactory without the intervention of
the program and satisfactory, or at least more acceptable, given the program’s intervention”
(Mohr, 1995:14). Effectiveness analysis has its origins in the work of Max Weber (1947) and is
related to the field of organizational studies, which includes studies of rational bureaucracies and
their effectiveness (Chatterjee & Vadapalli, 2009). While the impact “measures the suitability of
the normative objectives of a policy in terms of the real behavior of target group” (Knoepfel
2007, p. 228), effectiveness is related to outcomes, establishing a “relationship between the
anticipated effects of a policy and those that emerge in social reality” (Knoepfel, 2007, p. 230)
and assessing how much the goal has been reached (Chatterjee & Vadapalli, 2009).
Efficiency “refers to the relationship between the resources invested in a policy and the
effects achieved” (Knoepfel, 2007, p. 233). Therefore, it describes the cost-benefit relationship
of a policy (Chatrejee & Vadapalli, 2009), effectively reaching targeted populations at a low cost
(Lomelí, 2008). Finally, “a policy is described as relevant if the objectives implicitly formulated

37
(…) are adapted to the nature and temporal and socio-spatial distribution of the problem that the
policy is intended to resolve” (Knoepfel, 2007, p. 234). Thus, the relevance of a public policy,
such as CCTs, examines the link between the objectives defined and the nature of the public
problem to be resolved. At the end, if a public policy positively impacts the target population, is
effective and efficient, it will be relevant for policymakers.
While CCT’s effectiveness is determined by the conditionalities of these programs, such
as school attendance and nutrition control, impact is determined by the reduction in poverty and
inequality. On the other hand, the efficiency of CCTs in terms of the target beneficiaries is
measured by the coverage of CCTs in low-income groups. Regarding the coverage of CCTs in
low-income groups, it establishes the coverage in two analyses: first, the percentage of
beneficiaries that are in low-income groups; second, the percentage of eligible poor that receive
benefits from the program, according to standardized international poverty lines.
As can be seen in Table 1, most of the literature analyzes the effectiveness of CCTs,
measuring the outcomes of the conditionalities, such as school attendance and nutritional checkups for children and the impact in terms of diminishment of poverty. Conversely, there is a lack
of literature that analyzes the impact of CCTs on inequality and the efficiency of CCTs.

Table 1. Public Policy Analysis and CCTs
Policy Analysis
CCTs
Literature
Review
Level of
Analysis
Source: The author

Impact

Effectiveness

Efficiency

i) Diminishing inequality:
the decomposition of the
Gini coefficient.
ii) Diminishing poverty.
i) Low
ii) High

i) School attendance

Targeting the poorest
as CCTs’
beneficiaries

ii) Nutritional checkups for children.
i) High
ii) High

Low
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The following sections describe the literature regarding the effectiveness of CCTs, their
impact on poverty and inequality, their efficiency, the influence of international organizations,
and finally, other variables that could affect inequality.
Effectiveness of CCTs: School Attendance and Nutritional Check-Ups
Most of the literature analyzes the effectiveness of CCTs, measuring the outcomes of the
conditionalities, such as school attendance and nutritional check-ups for children. In general
terms, these studies show the positive outcomes of CCTs on higher levels of education
attendance (Rawling & Rubio, 2003; Parker 2003, 2004; Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Rawling &
Rubio 2005; García & Saavedra, 2017). Nonetheless, there are some who critique the quality of
the education; “efforts to boost school enrolment have not been matched by public investment in
education, which undermined any real welfare gain” (Lloyd-Sherlock 2008, p. 630), affecting the
quality of education in general and the access to education, especially in rural areas. For the
youth that remain in the educational system during high school, there are also disparities in the
result of the learning they acquire throughout their career (ECLAC, 2014). Even though these
programs have increased school-attendance rates, they have not improved the quality of
education (Fukuyama, 2008). Moreover, Handa and Davis (2006) state the necessity for the
improvement of school quality, including access, in order to give opportunities to the poor to
take advantage of education without the assistance of direct monetary transfers.
In addition, CCTs have also contributed to the rise of the demand for basic services and
participation in the health system, especially preventive and control medical check-ups for
children (Cecchini et al., 2001; Rawling & Rubio, 2003; Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Rawling and
Rubio, 2005; Rangel, 2011; Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; Segura-Perez et al., 2016). Even
though studies emphasize the contribution of CCTs on developing human capital of the next
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generation by increasing attendance in education and nutritional-medical check-ups for children,
“it is necessary to consider the CCTs in the broadest set of social policies of each country and,
particularly, in a series of actions aimed at cementing the foundations of an inclusive and
comprehensive social protection system, in order to achieve combined effects in human
capacities” (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011, p. 124).
Furthermore, some studies assert that there is not enough empirical evidence to conclude
that CCTs have stimulated employment (Tassara et al., 2017; UTESI, 2006 and 2012; CNC,
2011). Moreover, some studies point out that adult beneficiaries still need to continue looking for
jobs because the small size of the transfer does not cover the deficit of the minimum income
needed for the family (Tassara et al., 2017; ECLAC and ILO, 2014). Regarding child-labor
exploitation, Tassara et al. (2017) state that even though the parents try to increase their
children’s school attendance, the option for children to work in order to contribute to the family
income is still a possibility.
Impact of CCTs on Poverty and Inequality
As was mentioned above, most of the literature has not only analyzed the effectiveness of CCTs,
but also the impact of CCTs on poverty. Conversely, only a small percentage of the literature has
analyzed the impact of CCTs on inequality.
Impact of CCTs on Inequality.
Regarding the impact of CCTs in diminishing inequality, Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002),
Soares et al. (2007), Medina y Galván (2008), and Amarante and Brun (2018) present evidence
in terms of the correlation between CCTs and the fall of inequality in Latin America, using
principally household survey data.

While Wodon and Yizhaki (2002) and Medina and Galvan (2008) analyze the
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distributional impact of some social programs in Latin American countries which include CCTs
and non-conditional cash transfers, Soares et al. (2007), and Amarante and Brun (2018) analyze
exclusively CCT programs. Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002) analyze three poverty-reducing
programs from Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico, but the only CCT program is the Familiar
Assignation Program (Programa de Asignacion Familiar) in Honduras. Similarly, Medina and
Galvan (2008) analyze 23 subsidy programs in four countries, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and
Uruguay. This dissertation includes this study on the literature review because of its
methodology, which will be explained below. Even if all five countries are implementing CCTs,
Medina and Galvan only analyze one CCT program: PROGRESA in Mexico. On the contrary,
Soares et al. (2007) analyze the Conditional Cash Transfer Programs of Chile, Mexico, and
Brazil (Bolsa Familia, Solidarity Chile, and Opportunities respectively). Likewise, Amarante
and Brun (2018) provide evidence of the coverage of CCTs in eight Latin American countries:
Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. The conclusions of
these studies are analyzed below.
Moreover, a method that has been used to determine whether CCTs have diminished
inequality is based on the decomposition of the Gini coefficient (GIE), which shows the impact
of the program on the Gini index of income inequality and is itself decomposed into two
components: the targeting performance of the program and “the impact of the allocation rules for
the distribution of the benefits among program participants” (Wodon & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 103).
Likewise, Medina and Galvan (2008) use the method of decomposition of the Gini coefficient by
factors in order to qualify the effect of public policies on income distribution, allowing
evaluators and policy-makers to anticipate and analyze the impact on inequality caused by a

percentage change in income (Medina and Galvan, 2008). While Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002)
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base their method on Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985, 1994), Garner (1993), Yitzhaki (1994), and
Yitzhaki (1999), Medina and Galvan (2008) base the method on Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985)
and Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002).
Similarly, Soares et al. (2007) use decomposition changes in the Gini coefficient in order
to quantify the effect of public policies on income distribution. First of all, Soares et al. analyze
the total house income and the house income per capita, and decompose it into categories: labor
income, social security income, CCT income, and other income (Soares et al., 2007). Then, the
concentration coefficient of CCTs’ component and its weight in income inequality is analyzed, in
which CCTs’ components that are less concentrated than the Gini are inequality reducing (Soares
et al., 2007). Soares et al. (2007) base their method on Kakwani (1980), Shorrocks (1982), and
Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002). Finally, Amarante and Brun (2018) estimate the targeting quality of
CCTs’ computing indicators of progressivity and redistributive impact, using the method of
Kakwani (1980).
These studies present some conclusions related to the impact of CCTs on inequality.
CCTs have some progressive effects on income distribution but have a low redistributive impact
(Medina & Galvan, 2008 and Amarante & Brun, 2018). The impact of CCTs on diminishing
inequality is due to the size related to the weight of the transfers in the household income, who is
targeted, and the percentage of the total population, especially the lower-income deciles. Soares
et al. (2007) conclude that CCTs in Mexico and Brazil were responsible for about 21% of the fall
in Gini Index, which decreased by around 2.7 points in each country from 1995/1996 and
2003/2004. Even though Solidarity Chile was responsible for a 15% reduction in inequality in
this period of time, the diminishing inequality was only 0.1 Gini point because of the small size
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of the program (Soares et al., 2007). In sum, the size of CCT programs is related to the impact of
diminishing inequality; the size is the number of beneficiaries, which can be measured as the
percentage of the total population. Large scale programs, such as in Mexico, have had a greater
impact in decreasing inequality than those which have had a smaller scale (Soares et al., 2007).
On the contrary, Medina and Galvan (2008) state that CCTs contribute to an increase in
household income, but their improvement on income distribution is marginal because the amount
does not have much weight in the household budget, meaning that CCTs’ impact on reducing
inequality rely on their share of the total household income (Amarante & Brun, 2018). Therefore,
high-progressivity CCTs are not enough to reduce inequality (Amarante & Brun, 2018) if the
share of total household income is meaningless.
On the other hand, Medina and Galvan (2008), and Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002) analyze
some CCTs, decomposing the Gini index into three factors: “(a) the relative participation of each
source in per capita income; (b) the correlation of each stream with the per capita income of the
household, and (c) the level assumed by the Gini coefficient of each item of income” (Medina
and Galvan 2008:32). Mexico’s PROGRESA implies that the poorest families apparently receive
a higher amount of income (Medina & Galvan 2008). Conversely, the CCT in Honduras
“suggest[s] that although those who benefit from the program tend to be poor, the less poor
among them tend to receive more support” (Wodon & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 113). In sum, the
analysis of the decomposition of the Gini index by income source must be considered in order to
analyze the impact of the CCTs in the lowest income deciles.
This dissertation will measure the impact of CCTs on inequality in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico by developing two methodologies. The first one analyzes the effects of taxes, public
transfers, and CCTs on inequality, taking into consideration the fiscal redistribution. The second

one is based on the method of the decomposition of the Gini index. The advantage of using the
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decomposition of the Gini index is this method decomposes the income of a household into
several sources, such as CCTs, and analyzes their impact on the difference of the Gini index in
multiple countries in different periods of time.
Impact of CCTs on Poverty.
A large part of the literature also analyzes the impact of CCTs in diminishing poverty
(Attanasio & Gomez, 2004; Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012; Robles
et al., 2015; Amarante & Brun 2018). First of all, it is necessary to address the discussion of
measuring poverty. According to Brady, a measure of poverty should: “(1) measure comparative
historical variation effectively; (2) be relative rather than absolute; (3) conceptualize poverty as
social exclusion; (4) assess the impact of taxes, transfers, and state benefits; and (5) integrate the
depth of poverty and the inequality among the poor” (Brady 2003:717). Explaining the variations
in poverty in cross-country analysis is essential to understanding poverty in contemporary
societies (Cantillion, 1997 and Brady, 2003), measuring the effect of causal factors such as
public policy, and demographic and economic changes (Brady 2003). Nevertheless, several
studies (Hagenaars, 1991, Atkinson, 1998, and Brady, 2003) show that some differences are
produced when comparing poverty across nations, especially because of methodological
concerns (Brady, 2003).
Despite the debate between the relative versus absolute definitions of poverty, scholars
have stated that a relative definition is highly proper (Hagenaars, 1991, Sen, 1992, Atkinson,
1998, Ravallion, 1998, Madden, 2000, and Brady, 2003). “Relative measures generate specific
poverty thresholds for each society in each time period from patterns in the income distribution.
Typically, relative measures begin with a threshold of 50% of the median income” (Brady, 2003,

p. 722). Moreover, Rawls (1971) suggested that poverty should be defined as income groups
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with less than half of the median (Brady, 2003).
Because redistribution makes an impact in household’s incomes, taxes and transfers must
be included when measuring poverty (Brady, 2003). “Poverty analysts often ignore state benefits
when assessing family income because problems in measurement, valuation, and imputation of
near- and non-cash income to individual households are quite formidable” (Brady, 2003). Under
the assumption that the most comprehensive definition of income is optimal for assessing
familial welfare, the LIS analysts have made significant strides in incorporating taxes and
transfers into their measures of income. Smeeding et al. (1993) state that cash income provides
significant resources for families, raising living standards and reducing poverty (Brady, 2003).
While national differences exist in the nature and extensiveness of these benefits, their
importance to the income distribution is universal. Importantly, these benefits accrue from both
the government and the private sector. To be most effective, poverty should be examined both as
it is generated in the private sector and as it is mediated by the state. To the extent possible,
private benefits should be considered as part of market income, and state benefits should be
considered as part of ultimate state-mediated income. Both types of income - before and after
taxes and transfers - are important to understanding the complex nature of poverty” (Brady,
2003, p. 726).
The measurement of poverty has evolved, having different indices and formulas. First of
all, poverty is measured with a Headcount Ratio (H), which is “the percentage of the population
that is below a certain threshold of income” (Brady, 2003 p. 727). Even tough H offers evidence
on the percentage of the population that is poor, according to Sen (1976, p. 219) “it ignores the
income distribution of the poor and contains no information on the depth of poverty” (Brady,

2003, pp. 727-728). The second common measure of poverty is the Income Gap (I), which “is
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normally standardized by the median income of poverty to render it comparable across
populations….and captures the continuous quality of poverty” (Brady, 2003, p. 728).
Nevertheless, The Income Gap is not sensitive to the quantity of poor people (Sen, 1976 and
Brady, 2003). Consequently, scholars created the Interval Measure (HI), which is the product of
H and I (Atkinson, 1987 and Brady, 2003). “One advantage of HI over H manifests in economic
recessions. A relative H may be criticized because during a recession the median may decline,
and households with stable income will suddenly be considered poor and will count equally as a
household with no income. While the household would still be poor with HI, since H is a
component, the I component would decline, and the overall effect on HI would be less
significant than with H” (Brady, 2003 p. 746).
According to Sen (1976), the Income Gap (I) should be weighted to correspond to the
rank order in the interpersonal welfare ordering of the poor and that “HI should be weighted such
that the income gaps of the poorest of the poor had more influence” (Brady, 2003, p. 728),
forming the Ordinal Measure (O), with the following formula: O = H * I * (1 + CV), where CV
is the inequality among the poor (Brady 2003). Finally, Brady (2003) developed the Sum of
Ordinals Measure (SO) is the sum of headcounts for some different thresholds, and thus builds
on relational distribution measures of inequality by weighting the lower thresholds at: 5, 10, and
20% of the median income (Brady, 2003).
Some scholars analyze the impact of CCTs on poverty using absolute measures of
poverty. Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) defined poverty using an international poverty line set at
USD 2.5 per capita per day, after Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjustment, and using the
“household survey data [that] allows exploring the relationship between participation and

household characteristics, hence the magnitude of coverage and the quality of targeting of the
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poor…[and] estimating the trends in poverty, which will be compared to the trends in the
expansion of CCT programs” (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012, pp. 6-7). Stampini and Tornarolli
analyze the magnitude of CCTs as a percentage of recipients' income in 13 Latin American
Countries in 2010 and the evolution of poverty and the magnitude of CCTs from 2001 to 2010
by using household survey data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the
Caribbean (SEDLAC) that estimated trends in poverty and compared them to the trends in the
expansion of CCTs (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012).
Stamppini and Tormallori (2012) estimate that poverty in Latin America would be on
average 13% higher if CCTs had not been implemented. These estimations are acquired by
“comparing estimated incomes with a no-CCT counterfactual in which incomes are recalculated
net of the transfers” (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012, p. 11). In addition, according to Cecchini and
Madariaga (2011), CCTs can double the primary income in the first decile of the income
distribution. By measuring the percentage that represents transfers in comparison with the line of
indigence or poverty in 19 Latin American countries in 2008, it was found that in rural areas, the
amount (on average) of transfers represents 12% of the homeless line and 7% of the poverty line,
whereas in urban areas it is equivalent to 11% and at 5%, respectively (Cecchini & Madariaga
2011, pp. 124-125). Nevertheless, in most cases, even though the transfer moves families closer
to the poverty line, it is not high enough to get them over the poverty line (Cecchini &
Madariaga, 2011). Therefore, CCTs have contributed to increasing the income of poor families.
Nevertheless, the program raises some questions regarding the sustainability of that income once
the families end their participation in the program.

This dissertation will measure the impact of CCTs on poverty in Chile, Colombia, and
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Mexico by developing two main models. The first one analyzes the effects of taxes, public
transfers, and CCTs on the poverty Headcount Ratio of market income. Some of the advantages
of using this model is that one can determine the impact of CCTs on poverty by the analysis of
poverty of market income and after government intervention through transfers and redistribution
in each case study. The second model develops a counterfactual analysis measuring the impact of
CCTs on two measures of poverty: the Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure. Some of the
advantages of using the counterfactual analysis is that one can determine the impact of a specific
income source, such as CCTs, on poverty. In addition, the advantage of using relative measures
is that they generate specific poverty thresholds for each country in a specific period of time,
taking into consideration patterns in the income distribution (Brady, 2003). Moreover, it is useful
to use both measures of poverty, the Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure. While the
Headcount Ratio measures the proportion of poor people, the Interval Measure includes the
Income Gap between the median income of the total population and the mean income of the poor
(Mahler and Jesuit, 2006).
Efficiency of CCTs
The literature has not only discussed the impact and the effectiveness of CCTs, but also the
efficiency of these programs in Latin America. Policymakers are making decisions based on a
lack of information dealing with the cost-effective option between supply- and demand-side
factors. According to Huber (2005), there is a general agreement about the necessity for social
reform in Latin America, but there is a wide divergence of opinion: “Proponents of the marketoriented changes are arguing that they have brought greater efficiency, that is, better social
services and transfers, particularly for the truly needy, at an affordable cost. Opponents are
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arguing that the changes amount to an abdication of state responsibility and of the principles of
solidarity and redistribution on which social policy should be based” (Huber 2005, p. 75).
Moreover, politics in Latin America has a constant and deep debate regarding the role of the
state and how inequality and poverty should be reduced.
Korpi and Palme (1998), Hand and Davis (2006), and Ocampo (2016) emphasize the role
of states to offer a better quality of public services, prioritizing this role over financing the
demand-side. A latent risk of CCTs is that even though subsidies are established in education and
health, there is not necessarily an adequate supply or quality of services (DNP, 2008). According
to Korpi and Palme, “the more we target benefits at the poor and the more concerned we are with
creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and
inequality” (1998, pp. 681-682). Moreover, Ocampo (2016) argues that it is necessary to avoid
direct subsidies, which should be implemented in exceptional conjunctures, having low fiscal
costs and being exclusively transitory. Handa and Davis (2006) go further, asserting that the poor
would take advantage of opportunities in education without the support of direct cash transfers if
school quality was significantly improved. Furthermore, cash-transfer programs are
economically unsustainable over long periods of time, generating fiscal problems, affecting
macroeconomic stability and long-term economic growth (Fukuyama 2011). In sum,
policymakers in Latin America have developed public policies to reduce poverty and inequality
without enough or significant information regarding the debate among the increase of the
demand-side, such as CCTs, and the increase of the supply-side.
The efficiency of CCT program is measured by the results in targeting the poorest as
beneficiaries, and by the definition of graduation or exit rules for those beneficiaries. The main
exit rule of CCTs is getting beneficiaries over the poverty line. Both measures, targeting and exit

rules, have an impact on the sustainability of CCTs. Financing of CCTs is especially sensitive
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due to its implications with fiscal policies. Initially, almost all of the programs were financed
with international development cooperation resources and loans from the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (Tassara et al., 2016). Then the governments
needed to ensure more institutional and financial stability and, therefore, to assign resources
from the national budget (Tassara et al., 2016). However, there is still a strong discussion about
the social investment costs caused by CCTs and their sustainability (Tassara et al., 2016).
Sustainability means that CCTs have an impact on reducing poverty, moving the beneficiaries
over the poverty line, graduating them, preventing them from returning to poverty, and using the
resources to benefit other low-income groups. It is necessary to determine the efficiency in terms
of the fiscal sustainability of CCTs in the long term.
Even though CCTs have grown rapidly (Cecchini &Madariaga, 2011; Stampini &
Tornarolli, 2012; Robles et al., 2015), their coverage of the extreme and moderately poor
remains low in many cases (Robles et al., 2015). If CCTs do not really reach the people in
extreme poverty, it seems these programs are not able to be effective. By 2013, CCTs coverage
“of both extreme and moderate poor remains in many cases surprisingly low . . . reach[ing] only
50.6 percent of the extreme poor” (Robles et al., 2015, pp. 7-8) in Latin America, meaning CCTs
are struggling to achieve their goals.
Robles, Rubio, and Stampini (2015), who analyzed 16 Latin American countries in 2013,
conclude that in urban areas, 39.2 percent of CCT beneficiaries were not poor while in rural
areas, 43.1 percent of CCT beneficiaries were not poor, meaning around 40 percent of the total
CCTs beneficiaries were not poor. According to Stampini and Tornarolli (2012), the number of
CCT beneficiaries exceeded the number of poor in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2006,
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resulting in a significant leakage. Leakage is defined as the percentage of beneficiaries who are
not poor (Robles et al., 2015). Amarante and Brun report similar results from eight Latin
American countries (Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay): “highlighting the potential need for re‐targeting and re‐certification” (2018, p. 13),
CCTs cover on average only 50.5% of the extreme poor in households with children under 18
years of age, 40.4% of CCT beneficiaries are not poor. Therefore, it is necessary to establish
some mechanisms of rotation, permitting opportunities for new families (DNP, 2008, p. 15).
Even though Chile and Mexico targeted the 40% of CCTs in the poorest populations
(Lomelí, 2008), the five upper deciles (from six to ten) in Chile contain 25% of total
beneficiaries (Amarante & Brun, 2018) and, in Mexico, 4% of the transfers were targeted to the
richest quintile and 16.3% of CCTs did not go to the poorest households (Lomelí, 2008).
Moreover, 21% of households are in the top segment of the beneficiary classification system in
Colombia (Lomelí, 2008). In sum, CCTs have contributed to poverty reduction in Latin America,
but there are some critiques regarding the inability of CCTs to increase their impact in terms of
the selection criteria and the poor definition of graduation rules.
Most of the studies that measure the impact of CCTs on poverty use household survey
data, which allows exploring the relationship between participation and household
characteristics, hence the magnitude of coverage and the quality of targeting of the poor. It also
allows estimating trends in poverty, which will be compared to the trends in the expansion of
CCT programs. Most of the household surveys include a module on participation in social
assistance programs and features a specific question on CCTs (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012).
This dissertation will measure the efficiency of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico by
applying Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers which is used by Mahler and
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Jesuit (2006). The Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ is a summary index of the degree
to which transfers are targeted towards low-income groups. Perhaps the CCTs might be a useful
program for fighting poverty and inequality, if it had a larger coverage.
In sum, there is a vast amount of literature that analyzes CCTs, especially the
effectiveness of their conditionalities in the short term, the impact on poverty, and their
efficiency in terms of criteria of selection and exit rules. Nevertheless, there are few studies
regarding the impact of CCTs on inequality.
Moreover, this dissertation contributes to a broader theoretical debate in the field of
comparative social policy, adding to Korpi and Palme’s ‘paradox of redistribution’. On the one
hand, Le Grand states that “public expenditure on the social services has not achieved equality in
any of its interpretations. Public expenditure on health care, education, housing and transport
systematically favors the better off and thereby contributes to inequality in final income” (1982,
p. 137). On the other hand, Tawney (1952) maintains that “social policy should not be directed to
the poor alone but should include all citizens” (Korpi & Palme, 1998, p. 662). Moreover, Lawson
and Wilson (1995) argue that public policies to support low-income groups should focus “on the
problems that afflict not only the poor, but the working and middle classes as well; and
emphasizes integrative programs that promote the social and economic improvement of all
groups in society" (Korpi & Palme, p. 683). Moreover, Korpi and Palme (1998) state:
the size of the budget available for redistribution is not fixed and that the institutional
structures of welfare states are likely to affect the definitions of identity and interest
among citizens. Thus, an institutional welfare state model based on a universalistic
strategy intended to maintain normal or accustomed standards of living is likely to result
in greater redistribution than a marginal one based on targeting. (Korpi & Palme, 1998, p.
663)

Korpi and Palme conclude that shallowly progressive but very large programs can accomplish
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more redistribution than more targeted but much smaller programs. The results of this
dissertation will contribute to this theoretical debate.
Other Variables that Could Impact Inequality and Poverty
Finally, some studies have analyzed other variables that can affect inequality, such as economic
growth, economic globalization, ideology and types of governments, and participation and
political voice. During the last two decades, some scholars have debated the relationship between
economic globalization, domestic politics, and income inequality. The relationship between
economic globalization and market income inequality have both supporters and critics. On the
one hand, globalization works as a powerful engine of economic growth, benefitting all income
groups. Moreover, global integration and international competition decrease the prices of goods
and services, giving a particular advantage to low-income groups (Mahler, 2004). For this
reason, states promote nationalism in their citizens in order to distract them from the structural
problem of inequality, removing redistribution from the national agenda (Solt, 2011). On the
other hand, globalization affects the wages, benefits, and job security of low-income groups
(Mahler, 2004).
Kenworthy (2008) explains that globalization is a potential confounding factor of
inequality, specifically in trade and imports. The more imports increase, the less they need to buy
national products, affecting domestic employment (Kenworthy, 2008). Moreover, “when
domestic employers face competition not only from domestic firms but also form foreign
companies, their profit rate is likely to be lower” (Kenworthy, 2008:75). Nevertheless,
Kenworthy (2008) finds there is only a tradeoff between jobs and wages in low-end services.
According to Mahler (2004), there is little evidence of the relationship between the three major
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modes of international integration ––trade, foreign direct investment, and international financial
flows––and the fiscal redistribution by the public sector, the distribution of disposable income, or
the distribution of holding earnings. Conversely, Mahler (2004) finds there is a relationship
between financial openness and earnings inequality.
Social programs are used by politicians as a form of patronage in order to build political
machines (Fukuyama 2011), taking advantage of national programs with large number of
beneficiaries for exclusively particular interests. Politicians who are primarily looking for votes
can use cash transfer programs for electoral purposes, producing “unhealthy interest-group
politics at best, and clientelism and corruption at worst” (Fukuyama, 2011:86). The large number
of beneficiaries, which has been increasing since the creation of CCTs in Latin America, have
inevitably linked those programs to electoral manipulation by politicians. The low-income
population generally does not vote regularly in elections. For this reason, politicians can use
CCTs to influence them to vote, using the data to invite beneficiaries to attend meetings of the
official party that is in power. Focusing on 65 developing and developed countries during the
period from 1975 to 2010, Kammas and Sarantides (2016) uncovered strong empirical evidence
of pre-electoral budgetary manipulation in new democracies.
Also, politicians can use the income transfers corruptly as a condition to keep the
beneficiaries who vote for the incumbent party. The strategic thinking of political parties and its
members is imperative in the election process, meaning that attaining votes is one of their most
important goals, if not the most and exclusively important one. For this electoral reason, CCTs
have become a unique and easy-to-use tool by politicians, who build interest-groups based on
CCTs’ beneficiaries and influence them to vote for their own politicians’ interests. Even worse,

politicians have built some clientelist relations with beneficiaries, using CCTs’ process of
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beneficiary selection for electoral purposes.
In addition, since the 1940s, the academy, governments, and international organizations
have discussed the degree of intervention by governments to reduce inequality among and within
societies. The main mechanism of income distribution is the welfare state in liberal democracies.
The welfare state, developed in some western countries, especially in Europe, involves
compensatory arguments, taxing high-income groups, and redistribution in order to reduce
inequality (Scheve & Stasavage, 2016), especially through social transfers and pensions. Socialwelfare programs differ in the size and mode of social assistance provided. Garrett (1998) states
that the basic patterns of partisan politics show the differences of the political-economic models
of states in the era of global markets. While social democratic corporatism is characterized by
high levels of government expense, high rates of economic growth, and high deficits, right-wing
parties have fewer progressive public policies, low rates of economic growth, and low deficits
(Garrett, 1998).
According to Mahler, “the level of coordination of wage bargaining in a country will be
associated with a more egalitarian distribution of household earnings…. However, it appears that
coordination need not necessarily involve direct government participation” (2010, p. 529). As a
result, the role of government redistribution by way of taxes and social transfers in reducing pregovernment inequality will not only be through social transfers, but also by influencing
institutions to increase wages.
Moreover, some theories uncovered that inequality is dangerous to democracy
(Fukuyama, 2011), and rulers should take into consideration the design and implementation of
social programs in order to reduce inequality and to strengthen democracy. Those costs are

reflected by the “erosion of social and environmental standards, high poverty rates in less
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developed countries and ever higher frequencies of financial crisis resulted in protests and even
riots” (Dreher, 2006, p. 1091). According to the median voter theorem, the more unequal the
income distribution, the more the median voter has to gain through the joint action of taxes and
transfers, and the more likely the citizen is to vote for higher taxes and transfers (Mahler, 2010).
In addition, it is expected a positive relationship between turnout and state redistribution (Mahler
and Jesuit, 2006), meaning “low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased
turnout” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 2).
Nevertheless, some public opinion studies demonstrate the inapplicability of this
theorem. Kenworthy and McCall conclude that some of “the trends in public perception of the
levels of pay inequality and income inequality were inconsistent with trends in actual levels”
(2008, p. 49). Moreover, Solt states that “substantial empirical evidence has accumulated of late
for the prediction of relative power theory that more economic inequality is associated with less
political participation” (2016, p. 4), and that citizens who live in states with higher levels of
inequality are less likely to vote (Solt, 2010). If public opinion of high income-groups does not
have the same level of inequality than real trends, they will influence policies according to their
perception. The result is that governmental intervention will not be enough to diminish
inequality.
Political participation and political equality are basic democratic ideals (Lijphart, 1997);
government ideology and public policies of redistribution are influenced by voters (Franko,
Kelly, and Witko, 2016). Schlozman et al. define political voice as “any activity undertaken by
individuals and organizations that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—
either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by
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influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (2012, p. 10). The question is how
represented the society is, especially the low-income groups, by the organizations that influence
politics.
Political voice is important because it strengthens communication and provides incentives
to policymakers; however, the inequality of representation and influence are systemically biased
in favor of high-income groups (Lijphart, 1997); low-income groups and disadvantaged educated
people are less likely to vote and participate in politics in the American democracy (Schlozman,
Verba & Brady, 2012). Furthermore, public officials are more responsive to high-income groups
than to average income groups and low-income groups (Kenworthy, 2008). According to
Teixeira (1992), who summaries the work of other authors (Gant & Lyons, 1993; Shaffer, 1982,
Studlar and Welch, 1986), “nonvoters are somewhat more liberal than voters on policy issues
concerning the economic role of government…and all agree that the magnitude of the
differences is not large and that therefore the absence of nonvoters from the voting pool probably
has little immediate effect on the policy output of government” (Lijphart, 1997:4). In the same
way, Franko et al. (2016) explain that when political participation usually becomes more inclined
to the high-income groups, the connection between public opinion and policymaking breaks, and
the distributional outcomes favor high-income groups (Franko et al., 2016).
The current academic discussion also suggests what public policies and researchers
should focus on. While Schlozman et al. (2012) recommend political mobilization in order to
reduce inequality, Lijphart (1997) recommends compulsory voting; this policy is a partial
solution to making voting participation more equal. Alternatively, researchers should focus their
studies on “how laws, mobilization strategies, demobilization strategies, and other factors
influence the decisions of different economic groups to turn out to vote” (Franko et al., 2016, p.

363). Furthermore, reformers should design policies to limit the influence of business,
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specifically in lobbying and funding campaigns, such as public financing of elections (Franko et
al., 2016). Recent increases in income inequality within countries are related to political voice.
Nationalist and populist leaders are taking advantage of inequality and antiestablishment speech
exploits the socioeconomic differences. States do not redistribute enough because even the elites
and the pressure groups influence or control governments, or revolutionaries and populist
governments rule without the necessary expertise. Polarization is high in the globe and lowincome groups do not have a voice that is heard.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is based on the following criteria: first, few studies
have evaluated the impact of CCTs on inequality through 2010; there is an opportunity to update
these evaluations, using the method of decomposition of the Gini index. Second, some studies
have measured the impact of CCTs on poverty, such as Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) that
analyze the magnitude of CCTs as a percentage of recipients' income in 13 Latin American
Countries in 2010; this dissertation determines the percentage of the transfers in beneficiaries’
total income and the impact on poverty by comparing estimated incomes with a no-CCT
counterfactual, evaluating the magnitude of the CTT in the total income of all citizens Third, the
weakness in targeting the lowest income group as beneficiaries and defining exit strategies
affects financial sustainability; this dissertation shows the evolution of poverty and the
magnitude of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico from 2004-06 to 2016-17, and their levels
of leakage, analyzing the quality of the targeting mechanisms used for the inclusion of
beneficiaries. Fourth, policy-makers are making decisions based on a lack of information dealing
with the cost-effective option between supply- and demand-side factors. Finally, there is an
opportunity to describe the political and economic context of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in
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order to analyze some control variables that could have caused the diminishing of inequality and
poverty, such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, democracy, economic
globalization, ideological orientation, and ethnic fractionalization.
The influence of International Organizations.
Brazil and Mexico were the first two countries that developed CCTs in the region and
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank—IADB—, have promoted CCTs in Latin America.
While support for targeting has decreased among social scientists, it has increased among
policymakers in Western countries. Thus, for example, on the international scene,
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have argued
that a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction . . . calls for a program of welltargeted transfers. (Korpi & Palme, 1998, p. 663)
According to Fiszbein et. (2009) and Stampini and Tornarolli (2012), after Brazil and Mexico,
CCTs have been implemented in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
The policy dialogue among the national and international academy as well as national
governments and multilateral organizations is crucial to improve knowledge about poverty in
order to increase the impact of public policies (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). Nevertheless,
the influence of international organizations on the development of CCTs has not been deeply
analyzed. Von Glisszczynsky and Leisering (2016) present an in-depth analysis of all major
documents of international organizations and propose a multi-layered model of global
knowledge to analyze Social Cash Transfers from the point of view of sociological
constructivism. International organizations have driven global knowledge to construct policy
models using mechanisms and strategies to change ideas and agendas (Von Glisszczynsky &

Leisering, 2016). In the beginning of the 2000s, international organizations constructed four

59

models of social cash transfers: social pensions, family allowances, general household assistance,
and conditional cash transfers (Von Glisszczynsky & Leisering, 2016, p. 331).
These models includes four layers which represent different degrees of abstraction from
social progress to social cash transfers, in which “changes in more abstract layers may prepare
the ground for changes in more concrete layers” (Von Glisszczynsky & Leisering, 2016, p. 328):
i) world culture that includes the idea of social progress; ii) discourses of specific forms of
knowledge, such as social human rights; iii) more specific policy paradigms like social
protection; and iv) models which include conditional cash transfers (Von Glisszczynsky &
Leisering, 2016, p. 328). Models are likely to spread if they meet the following conditions (Von
Glisszczynsky & Leisering, 2016, p. 329): first, an organizational mandate, in which an
international organization introduces the model; second, national examples, in which
governments develop models based on those already adopted by other states or following the
proposal of international organizations; third, expert knowledge that analyzes theories and
empirical evidence from academic and non-governmental organizations—NGO—expertise;
fourth, contextualization, in which the model is linked to policy paradigms, discourses, and
strong ideas from policy fields; and fifth, presentation, in which the model receives a publicly
recognized name.
According to Von Glisszczynsky and Leisering (2016) CCTs accomplished some criteria
to be considered a multi-layered model of global knowledge. First, the World Bank adopted
CCTs as part of its mandate; second, some Latin American governments have replicated the
model of PROGRESA (Mexico) and Bolsa Familia (Brazil); third, the World Bank has
supported and made several publications based on CCTs, which include statistical evidence;
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fourth, the CCT model is strongly anchored in the economic development discourse of the 1990s
in which the poor are potential contributors to economic growth and rational agents, and children
are the economic agents of the future, in which “conditionality is justified by the assumption of
bounded rationality which is part of a variant of the economic agency discourse” (Von
Glisszczynsky & Leisering, 2016, p. 335); fifth, the World Bank has established the name ‘CCT’
as a brand, developing global conferences. Therefore, CCTs are classified as a model of global
knowledge, especially because of the support and promotion of the World Bank.

CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND INCOME DATA
The methodology of this dissertation is based on Comparative Public Policy Analysis, taking as a
reference the case studies of CCTs in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. The following subsections
describe the national household surveys of each case study and the main concepts and variables
used in this dissertation.
Income Data of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
In order to understand the impact of CCTs in reducing poverty and inequality in Latin America
through comparative analysis, this dissertation specifies not only the period of time of its
analysis and duration, but also the definition of cases (Mahoney & Villegas, 2007). This
dissertation uses secondary sources, namely reviews and analyses of academic and governmental
data and publications, and the qualitative method of within-case analysis, using process tracing
to support some explanations (Mahoney and Villegas, 2007) and establishing pattern-matching to
provide corroborating evidence for a causal argument (Gerring, 2007).
According to Gerring, the case study is defined as “the intensive study of a single unit or
a small number of units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar
units (a population of cases)” (2007, p. 96). Case studies from Chile, Colombia and Mexico are
used to deepen the understanding of the influence of CCTs in diminishing inequality and poverty
in Latin America.
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This dissertation uses the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS), which is a cross-
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national data center located in Luxembourg and is the largest available and harmonized source of
income, wealth, and employment dataset microdata collected, enabling cross-national
comparisons from approximately 50 countries around the globe, spanning five decades (LIS
2020b). “The great achievement of the LIS project is to have brought together microdata sets for
a wide range of different countries” (Smeeding et al., 1990: xviii), reorganizing the data of each
country into common standards, concepts, and structures (Smeeding et al., 1990). Moreover, the
LIS data is extensive, comparable, detailed, and accurate (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006).
An additional benefit to LIS data is that results for these case studies (Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico) can easily be compared to results for other countries in Latin America and
elsewhere. The key contribution of the LIS is that, while it does not collect any data on its own, it
does allow for meaningful comparison in a way that was not previously possible. Therefore, the
contribution of this dissertation is that the results can easily be placed in a broader context.
A significant element of the standard method for cross-national analyses is that income is
not measured on the individual level but on the household level (Van Den Bosch and Cantillon
2008). The availability of new analytical methods and detailed household surveys has enabled
studies to assess the impact of macro public policies at the micro level (Bourguignon et al., 2008,
pp. 24-25). The LIS uses household surveys in order to access the data and develop public policy
analysis, adding waves of data for various countries and having a time series of cross-sections
(Smeeding et al., 1990). The following waves that this dissertation uses are the ones available
from LIS data for Mexico, Colombia, and Chile in the period of study.
This dissertation focuses on Waves V, VII, X and XI offered by the LIS. Wave V
analyzes data before the implementation of CCTs; Wave VII presents the data information in the

middle of the implementation of CCTs; Wave X shows the most recent information of CCTs
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after at least 15 years of their implementation. In the case of Mexico, this dissertation will use
Wave XI in order to have the most recent data. In sum, this dissertation uses the following
national household surveys: Chile (1998, 2006, 2017); Colombia (2007, 2016); and Mexico
(1998, 2008, 2018) (see Table 2).

Table 2. Waves of LIS data for CCT Analysis
Country
Chile

Wave
VII

Wave IV

Wave V

Wave VI

1994
1996

1998
2000

2003

2006

2004

2007

Colombia

Wave
VIII

Wave IX

Wave X

2009
2011

2013

2015
2017

2010

2013

2016

Wave XI

1998
2012
Mexico
2000
2004
2008
2010
2016
2018
2014
2002
Source: Prepared for the author on the basis of METadata Information System (METIS), which
is a powerful search tool that provides immediate access to a comprehensive set of
documentation about the LIS Database [online] http://www.lisdatacenter.org/frontend#/home
1994
1996

As can be seen, this dissertation does not analyze Colombia’s case or Chile’s case before
the implementation of CCTs nor does the 2004 Colombian household survey due to the absence
of data offered by the LIS. Even though this is a shortcoming of the analysis, it is important to
analyze the evolution of Colombia from the midterm of CCTs’ execution to the most available
data and of Chile from its first year of CCT’s implementation. The following subsection explains
the main common characteristics and differences among the national household surveys of
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia used by the LIS.

National Household Surveys.
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The household surveys used by the LIS and this dissertation are the Household Income
and Expenditure Survey of Mexico (1996, 2008 and 2018), the Large Integrated Household
Survey of Colombia (2007 and 2016), and the National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey
of Chile (1998, 2006 and 2017). The summary of the differences and common features of these
surveys are explained in Table 3.
Mexico: Household income and expenditure survey. The LIS data from Mexico is
based on the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares / National Survey of
Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH), and its main objective is “[t]o obtain information
on the distribution, amount and structure of incomes and expenditures for the household with the
final aim of evaluating the developments in the standards of living of the population” (LIS
2020b). In addition, it offers information on the housing infrastructure and household equipment
features and the occupational and sociodemographic characteristics of the household members
(INEGI 2019).
According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía / National Institute of
Statistic and Geography (INEGI) (2017a), the design of the ENIGH-2016 has the following
characteristics: the target population is the households of the national territory and the
geographic coverage of the survey is the state, including urban and rural areas. Moreover, its
sample design is probabilistic, meaning the results obtained from the survey are generalized to
the entire population. Moreover, the design is two-fold––stratified and by conglomerates––where
the last unit of selection is the household and the unit of observation is the home (INEGI, 2017a).
In addition, the selection of the sample was based on the INEGI National Housing
Framework 2012 and constructed from the cartographic and demographic information obtained

from the 2010 Population and Housing Census. This sample is a master sample from which to
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select the subsamples for all the housing surveys carried out by INEGI. Its design is
probabilistic, stratified, single-stage and by conglomerates, which are also considered primary
sampling units, since it is the households that make up the samples of the different surveys
selected in the second stage. Finally, the sample size was 81,515 households (INEGI, 2017a).
The GEIH’s instrument developed for the collection of information includes a scheme of
themes, categories, variables, and classifications. The theme current income includes a category
denominated as Income from transfers (INEGI, 2017c). According to INEGI (2017b), a transfer
is the monetary income received by the members of the household and for which the provider or
donor does not demand remuneration of any nature; the variables included under this concept
are: a) retirement and pensions; b) scholarships from the government and institutions; c)
monitary donations from institutions and other households; d) income from other countries; e)
benefits from government programs; f) transfers in kind from other households (gifts); and g)
transfers in kind from institutions. In all cases, the value of transfers in kind is estimated by the
informant based on the retail market value of the goods or services received.
The variable Benefits from governments includes Prospera benefit income: a
classification that represents, according to INEGI (2017c), an entry in money derived from the
direct benefit for health, food, and education provided by the Ministry of Social Development
through the Prospera program, previously Progresa, Pronasol, or Oportunidades (these
programs were explained in Chapter 1).
Colombia: Large integrated household survey. Regarding the data for Colombia, the
LIS uses the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares / National Household Survey (ENH) and the Gran
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH). The ENH was the first instrument developed by the

Departamento Administratico Nacional de Estadísticas (DANE), which is the institution
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responsible for the planning, compilation, analysis and dissemination of the official statistics of
Colombia (DANE, 2019). The ENH’s objective was to measure changes in the employment
levels of the population and provide basic information for the diagnosis of the labor force
(DANE, 2019). This survey was administered from 1970 to 2000.
From 2000 to 2006, DANE changed the ENH to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares /
Continue Household Survey (ECH). Since 2006, DANE has developed the Gran Encuesta
Integrada de Hogares / Large Integrated Household Survey (GEIH). The GEIH provides basic
information on the size and structure of the workforce of the country's population, such as
employment, unemployment and inactivity, and the socio-demographic characteristics of the
Colombian population. The GEIH allows characterizing the population according to sex, age,
kinship, educational level, and affiliation to the social security system, among others. Currently
the information is collected in 13 cities and their metropolitan areas, 11 intermediate cities, eight
capitals with less populated departments, and populated centers and rural dispersed areas in more
than 443 municipalities (DANE, 2020b).
Moreover, the GEIH is a continuous survey, with monthly subsamples, meaning every
month the DANE develops the survey nationally and then collects all the information annually
(LIS, 2020b). The data type is a sample survey, the unit of observation is the household, and the
unit of analysis corresponds to households and individuals (DANE, 2020b).
The survey universe for the GEIH is made up of the non-institutional civilian population
residing in private households; the type of sampling is probabilistic, stratified, and multistage.
This population is estimated based on population censuses and migration statistics (DANE,
2020b). The survey has specialized in measuring the structure of the labor market and household
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income, having a total annual sample of approximately 240,000 households, which makes it the
most comprehensive national survey (DANE, 2019).
Initially, the monthly sample size corresponded to approximately 23,000 households. In
2000, with the implementation of the ECH, the master sample was expanded from 165
municipalities to more than 240, with 30,000 homes in 13 areas and 7,500 in the rest of the
capitals, population centers, and scattered rural areas. During 2004, the master sample was
expanded, with a total of 44,400 households, with 30,000 households in 13 areas and 14,400 in
the rest of the capitals, population centers, and scattered rural areas. In 2006, with the
implementation of the GEIH, the sample was expanded to 11 more cities, with 17,600 additional
households, for a total of 62,000 households. With the framework generated by the 2005 census,
the new sample implemented in 2009 is made up of 437 municipalities and approximately
248,028 households visited annually, concentrated in 22,548 segments. The monthly sample is
20,669 households, 18,790 homes and 1,879 segments in the capitals of the less populated
departments (DANE, 2017). In addition, sample sizes are calculated with a desired precision of
the unemployment rate variable not exceeding a relative standard error of 5% and an
unemployment rate of 10%. The calculations are made with the formulas corresponding to the
type of sample design (DANE, 2017).
The instrument developed for the collection of information from the GEIH has a series of
questions and incorporates chapters and modules (from A to R). Chapter M is regarding other
incomes, in which the variable V2747 considers the More Families in Action program. The
question in the survey is, Was the aid in money from More Families in Action? Then, variable
V2745 includes the value that the family received for this program.

Chile: National socio-economic characterization survey. Finally, the Encuesta de
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Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional / National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey
(CASEN) of Chile is a cross-sectional household survey conducted by the Ministry of Social
Development to characterize the population in terms of demographics, education, health,
housing, employment, and income issues. “The information derived from CASEN is mainly used
to estimate the magnitude of poverty and the income distribution and to evaluate the impact of
different social programs targeted to the most vulnerable groups in the population. Since the first
year in which it collected data, CASEN has increased the number of surveyed households,
reaching 87,000 households in 2011” (Parro & Reyes, 2017, p. 7).
According to the Ministry of Social Development of Chile (2018a), the CASEN 2017
survey, as its previous versions, is an instrument for diagnosis, evaluation and targeting in order
to: 1) periodically know the situation of households and the population, especially those in
poverty and those groups defined as priority by social policy, in relation to demographic,
education, health, housing, work and income aspects, 2) estimate the magnitude of poverty and
income distribution, 3) identify gaps and demands of the population in the areas indicated, 4)
evaluate the different gaps that separate the different social segments and territorial areas, and 5)
evaluate the impact of social policy, in terms of coverage, targeting, and distribution of fiscal
spending of the main national social programs among households, according to their income
level as well as the impact of this expense on household income and its distribution.
In addition, the target population of the survey is the population residing in private
dwellings throughout the national territory, excluding the areas of difficult access defined by the
government. Inside each selected dwelling, all households and persons who declare themselves
habitual residents are interviewed (Ministry of Social Development, 2018a). Moreover, the
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survey’s coverage includes national, national urban, national rural, and regional areas (Ministry
of Social Development, 2018a).
The questionnaire included 15 modules from A to Y. Module Y is called Work, which
included the question: Do you have another activity or income? Responses included other
sources of incomes such as unemployment insurance, allowances, income, and state transfers
(Ministry of Social Development, 2018b). Additionally, the questionnaire included the module Y
denominated as Incomes, which includes a section denominated State subsidies or transfers. This
section includes the following question: Last month, did you receive Asignacion Familiar /
Family Allowance subsidy? It also asked for the amount received to be indicated. Moreover, the
questionnaire included the following questions: Does your family participate in Chile Solidario?
Does your family nucleus participate in the Programa Seguridades y Oportunidades (Ingreso
Ético Familiar) / Securities and Opportunities Program (Ethical Family Income)? Last month,
did you receive income from ...? (Ministry of Social Development, 2018b).
As can be seen, the last national-household surveys of Mexico, Colombia, and Chile,
which are included in this dissertation’s analysis, comprise specific questions regarding the
participation of households in CCTs and the amount received. This is crucial because this
information is also taken into consideration by the LIS, assigning a specific variable and
permitting the analysis of the efficiency of CCTs and CCTs’ impact on inequality and poverty.

Table 3. General Information Survey: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Description
Name of
Survey

Generic Information

Responsible
Institution

Main
Objective

Structure of
Data Source
Frequency

Chile
National Socio-Economic
Characterization Survey (CASEN).
Ministry of Social Development/
Ministerio de Desarrollo Social.
To periodically assess the situation
of households and of the
population, especially of those in
poverty and of those groups defined
as priority by social policy.
To estimate the coverage, targeting
and distribution of fiscal spending
of the main social programs of
national scope among households,
according to their level of income,
to assess the impact of this
expenditure on household income
and on the distribution of income.

Colombia
Great Integrated Household
Survey (GEIH).
National Administrative
Department of Statistics /
Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadística (DANE).

To gather information about the
employment conditions of persons
as well as about the general
characteristics of the population
The GEIH provides information at
the national, urban-rural, regional,
and departmental levels, as well as
for each one of the department
capitals.

Cross-sectional multi-purpose
survey.

Cross-sectional household survey
data.

The CASEN Survey has been
carried out by the Ministry of
Social Development since 1987,

Continuous survey, with monthly
subsamples. The GEIH was
introduced in 2006, when it

Mexico
Household Income and
Expenditure Survey (ENIGH).
National Statistical Institute /
Instituto Nacional de
Estadística, Geografía e
Informática (INEGI).

To obtain information on the
distribution, amount and
structure of incomes and
expenditures for the household
with the final aim of evaluating
the developments in the
standards of living of the
population.

Cross-sectional.
Every other (even) year.
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Description

Sampling

Coverage

Sampling
Procedure

Sample Size

Chile

Colombia

every two or three years. So far, the
surveys applied correspond to the
years 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994,
1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006,
2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.

replaced the three main existing
household surveys, namely the
Continue Household Survey, the
Encuesta de Ingresos y Gastos /
Income and Expenses Survey and
the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida /
Quality of Life Survey

All national or foreign households
living in private dwellings in the
national territory. Households
living in collective dwellings are
not included in the sample.
The sample design of the CASEN
2017 survey can be characterized as
probabilistic and stratified,
according to geographic area and
population size, both in urban and
rural areas. The selection of the
sample is carried out in two stages two-stage sampling in rural and
urban areas. The primary sampling
units are selected with probability
proportional to the size, in terms of
total housing in the rural area,
while in the urban area they are
selected systematically and with
equal probability.
To achieve the defined accuracy
levels, the expected achieved

Civilian non-institutional
population living in the entire
national territory.

Sample design is probabilistic,
multi-staged, self-weighted, and
stratified with unequal clustering.
The sampling frame consists of the
cartographic inventory and listings
of dwellings by city from the
Population and Housing National
Census of 2005, with continuous
updates and new counts of
buildings and dwellings through
the same sample, with the
corresponding maintenance.
231,178 households including
778,238 individuals.

Mexico

All national or foreign
households living in private
dwellings in the national
territory. Households living in
collective dwellings are not
included in the sample.

Stratified multi-phase sample
with the dwelling as primary
sampling unit includes: first,
basic geostatistical areas,
stratified according to five
geographic and socio-economic
criteria, are selected. It is
developed by the National
Census (Censo de Población y
Vivienda).

70,311 households and 257,805
individuals out of which 147
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Description

Chile

Colombia

sample size was of 69,816 homes
nationwide. To achieve this goal,
interviews were attempted in
around 95,159 homes (oversized
sample).
The LIS files contain 216,231
household members in 70,948
households (note that 208 domestic
servants were excluded from the
LIS individual file).

Collection

Collection
Period

Description of
Instruments

The fieldwork of the CASEN
Survey 2017 lasted for 13 weeks,
between the first week of
November 2017 and the fourth
week of February 2018.

The questionnaire is composed of
seven modules that aim at
collecting information about the
characteristics of the households:
register of residents, education,
employment, incomes, health,
residents, and dwelling.

Mexico
non-household members
(domestic workers, lodgers and
their family members) were not
included in the LIS sample.

January to December 2016.

Questionnaire divided into several
sections: The Dwelling, Household
and persons roster sections, filled
by the household head. At the
individual level, directly
completed by individuals age 18 or
older and by individuals aged
between ten and 17 if they work or
are searching for a job, while for
the others the questionnaire is
completed by an adult.

Between August 21, 2016 and
November 28, 2016.

The survey consisted of five
questionnaires and one diary:
Households and Dwellings
Questionnaire: dwelling
characteristics, identification of
households in the dwelling,
socio-demographic
characteristics of all household
members, access to food,
household equipment, and
transfer time to nearest hospital.
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Definitions

Household

Data Quality Aspects

Household
Head
Non-Response
Error

Weighting

Persons who usually live in the
household, including persons
temporarily absent for study, work,
business, sickness, holiday, or other
reasons, as long as those periods of
absence are not longer than six
months (with the exception of the
household head and the children
below six).

As self-reported by the respondent.

Non-response amounted to 25%.
Historically, for each CASEN
survey, two expansion factors were
developed for each person
interviewed: one that expands the
regional population projection
(expr) and another that expands the
communal population (expc).
LIS note: the LIS uses the first of
these two factors.

A person or a group of people
occupying all or part of a dwelling
who have partnered to share the
dwelling and/or food. They may or
may not be related to each other.
The domestic servants and their
families are part of the household
as long as they sleep in the same
house where they work. Boarders
and lodgers are considered
household members if there are
less than five of them in one
household.

The person recognized as such by
other household members given
considerations of age, financial
support, or other reasons.
Data is not available.
Household level weights,
correcting for sampling bias, nonresponse, and population
composition adjustments
according to the latest population
projections based on the 2005
Census.

A group of persons (not
necessarily related by blood)
who usually reside in the same
private dwelling and share
meals. Domestic servants and
guests who usually reside and
share meals in the dwelling are
considered as usual residents of
the dwelling but not as
household members (they are
part of the sample, but little
information is collected for
them). Several households can
share the same dwelling, in
which case the one including
the owner of the dwelling is the
principal household.
Person recognized as such by
the household members.

15.14%.
The weighting household factor
corrects for both sampling bias
and non-response bias; it also
inflates to total population.
Another weighting factor is also
available to inflate to the total
number of dwellings.

73

Labour Market Information

Eligibility

Employment

Income

Reference
Period

Unit of Time

Individuals aged 12 or older in the
urban areas and those aged ten or
older in the rural ones.

Household members aged 12 or
older.

Main activity (in which the most
time is spent), as well as questions
on paid employment, job search
and availability following ILO
definition; only the ILO employed
are routed to the Employed
section.

Employment is defined as "any
economic activity carried out
against pay (in cash or in kind),
including those activities that
contribute to the obtention of
incomes or to the production in
the households." Reference
period is the month preceding
the interview.

Mostly the month before the
interview (the previous three
months for income from main
regular job). Last 12 months for
irregular or annual incomes.

Mainly the previous month for
labour incomes and regular
incomes (rental income, pensions
and alimony) and the last 12
months for other incomes.

The previous six months for
most monetary income sources.
Non-monetary incomes are
collected with the same
reference period as the
expenditures (see the
description of the Expenditure
Questionnaire and Diary
above).

Mostly monthly amounts, some
annual amounts for irregular or
annual incomes (end-of-year
bonuses, farming income, and
rental income).

Monthly amounts for labour
incomes and regular incomes
(rental income, pensions, and
alimony) and annual amounts for
other incomes.

Persons aged 15 and older.

ILO definition of current Labour
Force Status. Employed persons are
then asked about job characteristics
of their main job and some
information about a secondary job.
If they are not working, they are
asked if they are willing to work, if
they are looking for a job, and if
they would accept one if it was
offered to them. All inactives are
asked up to 2 main reasons for not
working.

Each monetary income source
was collected on a monthly
basis for each of the previous
six months.
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Monetary income sources and
in-kind earnings are collected at
the individual level for all
All income sources were collected
household members (the
at the individual level for all
Individual level mainly, aged 12 or income subcategories are more
Unit of
household members (some income older in the urban areas and those
detailed for adults). Other nonCollection
sources were collected only for
aged ten or older in the rural ones. monetary income sources (inadults).
kind transfers, ownconsumption and gifts from
other households) are collected
at the household level.
Dependent employees report gross
Wage income is collected net of
All income sources are asked
wages, all other incomes are net.
Taxes and
taxes and contributions, no mention
net of taxes and social
Information on taxes and
Contributions of taxes and contributions for all
contributions (or any other
contributions paid is not collected;
other incomes.
deduction such as union fees).
they were simulated externally.
Some income sources are not
Restrictions
included in the data (mostly social assistance household incomes).
Source: Database of non-contributory social protection programmes in Latin America and The Caribbean of the Economic
Commission for Latin America and The Caribbean, conditional cash transfers programs [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and the
CEPALSTAT database. Most of the information given in this table is literally taken from the source.
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Definition of Concepts and Variables
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In order to develop the method, it is necessary to define some concepts that this dissertation uses.
First of all, the main concepts applied in this dissertation are poverty and inequality. Poverty is:
a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity. It means lack of basic
capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not having enough to feed and
clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to, not having the land on which to
grow one’s food or a job to earn one’s living, and not having access to credit. It means
insecurity, powerlessness, and exclusion of individuals, households and communities. It
means susceptibility to violence, and it often implies living in marginal or fragile
environments, without access to clean water or sanitation. (United Nations, 1998)
In order to complement this definition and to use the measure of poverty as a variable, this
dissertation uses the following definition of poverty: The Headcount, the Income Gap, and the
Interval Measure. According to the LIS (2010), the head count ratio is defined as the percentage
of the country’s population of individuals living in poor households. “The headcount ratio . . .
measures poverty incidence (i.e., the number or proportion of poor people), but gives every
person equal weight no matter how far they fall from the poverty line” (LIS, 2010, p. 28). In
addition, it does not show how the poverty measure increases when there is a reduction in
income of a person below the poverty line (Sen, 1976, p. 219).
Moreover, the Income Gap (I) measures poverty intensity or depth, “measured as the
difference between the median income of the entire population and the mean income of
the poor (…), standardized by the population median income” (Mahler and Jesuit, 2006 p. 496),
meaning how poor are the poor, but not its distribution among the poor (LIS, 2010). Finally, the
Interval Measure (HI), which is the product of H and I (Atkinson, 1987 and Brady, 2003), is a
“simple, parsimonious measure combining quantity and depth on poverty” (Brady, 2003, p. 727),
meaning “the depth of poverty among households that fall below half their country’s median
income” (Jesuit & Mahler, 2006, p. 495).

Income inequality refers to the distribution of income among households or persons
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(Jesuit & Smeeding, 2002). The LIS uses the Gini coefficient in order to measure income
inequality. Although there are many available variables to measure inequality, the most common
is the Gini coefficient. The Gini index ranges from 0, in which all recipients receive exactly the
same income to 1.0, in which one recipient receives all income (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006). There
are different income concepts. One of the most useful variables by the LIS is the disposable
household income (dhi), which is the post-government income, after the governmental
intervention through taxation and transfers (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006). The dhi includes the
variables of labour and capital income, private transfers, private pensions, work-related insurance
transfers, universal benefits, and social assistance benefits, but excludes taxes and social
insurance contributions (LIS, 2019b). There are three other important income concepts: “One of
them is income before any government redistribution but including private pensions. The second
is income after taxes, social insurance, and universal benefits, but before social assistance is
included. The third one is after social assistance transfers, but before taxes, social insurance, and
universal benefits” (LIS, 2019b, p. 29).
Finally, the LIS income and consumption variables are split into the six major blocks:
current incomes; income deductions, transfers paid and loans repayments; extraordinary
incomes; imputed rent; consumption expenditures; and major economic aggregates. This
dissertation uses current incomes, income deductions, and major economic aggregates.
Current incomes (variables suffixed by hi and pi). “These consist of cash payments as
well as the value of goods and services received by the household or by individual members of
the household at periodic intervals (annual or smaller), that are available for current consumption
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and that do not reduce the net worth of the household” (LIS, 2019a, p. 8). The definitions of the
LIS current income variables that this dissertation uses are:
i. Total current income, household (hitotal): “Sum of cash and non-cash income from labor,
income from capital, income from pensions (including both public and private pensions) and
non-pension public social benefits stemming from insurance, universal or assistance schemes
(including in-kind social assistance transfers), as well as cash and non-cash private transfers”
(LIS, 2020b). This variable is comprised of the following factors: Labour income (hilabour),
Capital income (hicapital), Pensions (hipension), Public social benefits excl. pensions
(hipubsoc), and Private transfers (hiprivate). This dissertation focuses on Public social
benefits (hipubsoc).
ii. Factor income (hifactor): “Sum of cash and non-cash income from labour and income from
capital” (LIS, 2020b). This variable is always constructed according to the following
formula: hifactor = labour income (hilabour) + capital income (hicapital).
iii. Labour income (hilabour): “cash payments and value of goods and services received from
dependent employment, as well as profits/losses and value of goods from self-employment,
including own consumption” (LIS, 2020b).
iv. Capital income (hicapital): “cash payments from property and capital (including financial
and non-financial assets), including interest and dividends, rental income and royalties, and
other capital income from investment in self-employment activity” (LIS, 2020b).
v. Pensions (hipension): “pension income from all pillars (private, occupational, public), all
types (insurance, universal, assistance), all functions (old-age, disability, survivors)” (LIS,
2020b).

vi. Public social benefits excl. pensions (hipubsoc): “cash social security transfers (excluding
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public pensions) stemming from insurance, universal or assistance schemes, and in-kind
social assistance transfers” (LIS, 2020b). “hipubsoc includes family benefits, unemployment
benefits, sickness and work injury, disability benefits, general assistance, and housing
benefits” (LIS, 2020a). This variable is constructed according to the following formula:
hipubsoc = family benefits (hi41) + unemployment benefits (hi42) + sickness and work
injury pay (hi43) + disability benefits (hi44) + general assistance (hi45) + housing benefits
(hi46) + public in kind benefits (hi47) + amounts that are directly placed at the level of
hipubsoc. This dissertation uses general assistance, which is the key variable of this research
because it shows Conditional Cash Transfer programs.
vii. General assistance (hi45): “Monetary transfers from minimum income guarantee systems/last
resort systems, received from the state through social programmes targeted towards
individuals or households in need. Such means-tested systems are meant to provide a
minimum subsistence level, covering frequently the totality of the population” (LIS, 2020b).
The general assistance variable takes CCTs into consideration. While Chile’s general
assistance variable refers to the Family Support Bonus of the Ethical Family Income
Program (LIS, 2020b), Mexico’s general assistance variable shows social assistance from
PROSPERA (LIS, 2020b). Moreover, Colombia’s general assistance variable takes into
consideration conditional cash subsidies from the government (LIS 2020b). In this
dissertation, the variable, general assistance (hi45), is named CCTs.
viii.

Public transfers excluding pensions and CCTs (hipubsoc – hi45): This dissertation creates

the variable public transfers excluding pensions and CCTs, which is the variable public social
benefits excluding pensions (hipubsoc) minus the variable, general assistance (hi45), or
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CCTs. The creation of these variables enables this dissertation to separately measure CCTs in
the models that are going to be explained in chapter 4 and developed in chapter 5 to 7.
ix. Private transfers (hiprivate): “cash transfers and value of in-kind goods and services of a
private nature that do not involve any institutional arrangement between the individual and
the government or the employer, including transfers provided by non-profit institutions, other
private persons/households, and other bodies in the case of merit-based education transfers”
(LIS, 2020b).
This variable excludes non-monetary income from capital1 and non-monetary universal
transfers from the government2, which are very difficult to evaluate at the individual level
and are typically only available at the macro-level. For this reason, the value of these
transfers is also excluded from the dhi and are not available in the LIS microdata (LIS,
2020b).
Income deductions, transfers paid and loans repayments. These variables (suffixed by
hx and px) “consist of non-consumption expenditures such as taxes, contributions, donations,
inter-household transfers and interest paid on loans” (LIS, 2019a, p. 8). This dissertation uses the
variable income taxes and contributions (hxitsc).
Major income aggregates. “These incomes aggregates are either derived from other LIS
variables, ensuring prefect comparability across datasets, or are produced from original variables,

1

According to LIS (in www.lisdatacenter.org), non-monetary incomes from capital “refer to the imputed value of
the service of durable goods owned by the household, including the dwelling and other durables such as cars. As
important as these incomes may be, they are rarely available in the income microdata and, when available, they are
calculated with widely varying methodologies. For these reasons, they are excluded from dhi. Users wishing to
include them can do so with the use of the LIS microdata.”
2
According to LIS (in www.lisdatacenter.org), non-monetary universal transfers from government “refer to
government-provided services that benefit individuals but are provided with the primary objective of meeting the
general needs of the overall population, rather than that of assisting the poor. Specifically, we do not include nonmonetary transfers in the areas of housing, care (including childcare), education, or health.”

in which case it is not possible to recreate them on the basis of other detailed LIS variables”
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(LIS, 2019a, p. 11). This dissertation uses the variables disposable household income and public
transfers.
x. Disposable household income (dhi): “Sum of cash and non-cash income from labour, income
from capital, income from pensions (including private and public pensions) and non-pension
public social benefits stemming from insurance, universal or assistance schemes (including
in-kind social assistance transfers), as well as cash and non-cash private transfers, less the
amount of income taxes and social contributions paid” (LIS, 2020b).
xi. hpublic: “public transfers, which corresponds to the social security redistribution, and
includes public pensions and public social benefits excl. pensions” (LIS, 2019a, p.11); this
variable is further disaggregated into hpub_i, hpub_u, and hpub_a.
xii. hpub_i: “insurance transfers: transfers stemming from social security systems where
eligibility is based on the existence and/or the length of an employment status; in most cases
the benefits are financed by contributions paid by employers, workers or both, and their
amount is usually dependent on either previous earnings or previous contributions” (LIS,
2019a, p. 11).
xiii.

hpub_u: “universal transfers: transfers stemming from public programmes that provide

flat-rate benefits to certain residents, provided that they are in a certain situation, but without
consideration of income, employment or assets; note that in some cases the benefit amount
may also depend on the other incomes of the individuals, which at the limit may result in
some proportion of the population at the upper end of the income distribution being excluded
from receipt” (LIS, 2019a, p. 11).

xiv.
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hpub_a: “assistance transfers: transfers stemming from public programmes that provide

benefits especially targeted to individuals or households in need (i.e. with a strict income
and/or assets test); the amount of the benefit is either a flat rate or is based on the difference
between the recipient income and a standard amount representing the minimum subsistence
needs as guaranteed by the government” (LIS, 2019a, p. 11).

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION
The methodology applied in this dissertation is the Public Policy Analysis of Conditional Cash
Transfer programs (CCTs), taking into consideration the case studies of Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. This chapter explains this methodology and some technical aspects for its
operationalization. In addition, this chapter describes the methods for measuring the impact of
CCTs on inequality: the analysis of fiscal redistribution that includes the impact of CCTs, and
the decomposition of the Gini index in one period of time and multiple periods of time.
Moreover, the effects of taxes, public transfers and CCTs on poverty and the counterfactual
analysis are describes, which are used to measure the impact of CCTs on poverty. In addition,
this chapter describes an index to measure the efficiency of CCTs. Finally, a cross-national
comparative model based on the results of the previous models is described.
Public Policy Analysis and Operationalization
The main methodology applied in this dissertation is a Comparative Public Policy Analysis
based on the analysis of microdata. As was explained in chapter 3, this dissertation uses the data
of the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), which harmonized household national surveys of
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The following subsections explain the method of the Public Policy
Analysis used by this dissertation and some technical aspects that are necessary to apply in order
to develop the method.
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Methodology.
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In order to answer the research question—have CCTs diminished inequality and poverty
in Latin America?—this dissertation uses Public Policy Analysis to analyze how CCTs have
impacted inequality and poverty in Latin America:
The analyst focuses on the effects generated by the state measures. . . . establishing the
benefits and costs of policy, including where applicable whether groups have effectively
modified their behavior. In summary, policy evaluation involves the empirical testing of
the validity of the causality model on which the policy is based. Thus, the analysis
concerns both the relevance of this ‘theory of action’ and the scope of its practical
application. (Knoepfel, 2007, p. 221)
Policy evaluations are expected and planned in order to legitimize policies already adopted and
prepare the basis for future decisions (Knoepfel, 2007). Four criteria can be established in order
to evaluate the effects of a public policy: impact, effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance
(Knoepfel, 2007). As it was described in chapter 2, most of the literature on CCTs has analyzed
their impact on poverty. In addition, the literature has determined the effectiveness of CCTs by
measuring the outcomes of the conditionalities, especially school attendance and nutritional
check-ups for children. This dissertation focuses on the impact of CCTs in Latin America, by
examining the overall success of the program in terms of income inequality and poverty
reduction, and the analysis of targeting low-income groups as beneficiaries.
This dissertation first focuses on the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty.
According to Knoepfel (2007), the observation of the desired changes should be analyzed in all
instances wherein implementation acts have been applied, adopting a causal perspective which
allows the analyst to determine the causal relationships within public policies. CCTs main goal is
to increase human capital, reducing poverty and inequality. The ultimate aim of public policies is
to bring real changes, resolving the collective action problem (Knoepfel, 2007), in this case,
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poverty and inequality. “The product resulting from an impact analysis is a methodologically and
statistically sophisticated document detailing relationships and relative levels of importance
among a number of variables” (Chatrejee &Vadapalli 2009, p. 85). In addition, this dissertation
analyzes the efficiency of CCTs.
After analyzing the impact of CCTs on inequality, their impact on poverty, and their
efficiency, this dissertation designs a descriptive multivariate, cross-national model, taking into
consideration the measures and results of this dissertation regarding the impact of CCTs on
inequality and poverty, and CCTs’ efficiency. Therefore, the dependent variables are the impact
of CCTs on poverty and inequality, and CCTs’ efficiency. Moreover, the independent variable is
the CCT, measured by budget and coverage; time is an intervening variable that can enhance the
effect of the CCT or show that it is not able to effectively accomplish its goal. Finally, this
chapter defines some control variables that will be described in chapter 6. The purpose is to show
the level of poverty and inequality during the introduction of the CCTs from the late 1990s to the
early 2000s, in the middle of the development of CCTs from 2006-2008, and from the last
available data from 2016-2018.
Technical Details.
In order to analyze the fiscal redistribution and the impact of CCTs on inequality and
poverty in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, it is necessary to take into consideration a few technical
details. First of all, there must be a review of the availability of the data and variables that are
needed to develop the models: disposable household income, factor income, private pensions,
insurance transfers, universal transfers, assistance transfers, private transfers, and income taxes
and contributions (see Table 4).

Table 4. LIS Documentation Availability – Effects of Taxes and Public Transfers on Inequality–Part I
Country

Chile

Colombia

Year

1998

2000

2003

2006

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2004

2007

2010

2013

2016

Short name

cl98

cl00

cl03

cl06

cl09

cl11

cl13

cl15

cl17

co04

co07

co10

co13

co16

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

V

V

VI

VII

VIII

VIII

IX

X

X

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

Total current income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Disposable household income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Factor income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Insurance transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Universal transfers

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Assistance transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

Labor income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Capital income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Pensions

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Private pensions

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

Public social benefits*

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

General assistance

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

Private transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Income taxes and contributions

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

Variable
Label
(Household)

LIS Wave

*Excluding pensions.
Note1: The unite of Analysis is household
Note 2: 1 means the data is available; 0 means the data is not available.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) METadata Information System (METIS), http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico; February 12, 2020). Luxembourg: LIS.
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Table 4. LIS Documentation Availability – Effects of Taxes and Public Transfers on Inequality–Part II
Country

Mexico

Year

1998

2000

2002

2004

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Short name

mx98

mx00

mx02

mx04

mx08

mx10

mx12

mx14

mx16

mx18

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

Wave

V

V

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

IX

X

XI

Total current income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Disposable household income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Factor income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Insurance transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Universal transfers

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

Assistance transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Labor income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Capital income

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Pensions

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Private pensions

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

Public social benefits*

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

General assistance

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Private transfers

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Income taxes and contributions

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Variable
Label
(Household)

LIS Wave

*Excluding pensions.

Note1: The unite of Analysis is household
Note 2: 1 means the data is available; 0 means the data is not available.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) METadata Information System (METIS), http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico; February 12, 2020). Luxembourg: LIS.
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Once the availability of LIS variables was reviewed, two out of three case studies did not have
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information for the variable income taxes and contributions. For this reason, it was necessary to
generate this variable with the available data. According to the LIS,
dhi

=

hitotal =

hitotal - hxitsc : hxitsc = Income taxes and contributions
hifactor + hipension + hipubsoc + hiprivate :

hipubsoc ⊃ hi45

According to the aggregation rules in the LIS User Guide, “while the disaggregation of total
current income into the five main income blocks is always ensured (i.e. hitotal = hilabor +
hicapital + hipension + hipubsoc + hiprivate), the disaggregation of each of these five blocks into
further subcomponents is not always possible” (LIS 2019a). Knowing that the aggregation of
hitotal and its five components are ensured, hkitsc is obtained by (hitotal – dhi), where hitotal
and dhi data are available for all of the case studies. In order to have traceability, hkitsc were
obtained in the same way for the three case studies. Moreover, the result of obtaining Colombia’s
hkitsc by (hitotal – dhi) has the same result as the variable hkitsc, meaning this disaggregation is
ensured.
In addition, most of the data does not include universal transfers except Mexico (2010 to
2018), affecting the analysis of the Gini after taxes, social insurance benefits, and universal
benefits. Moreover, the LIS data from Colombia and Mexico (1996 to 2004) does not include
private pensions, which affects the analysis of market income. Even though Colombia has a
hybrid pension system, which includes both private and public systems, the latter is much larger
than the former. In sum, the fiscal redistribution analysis and the impact on inequality and
poverty should take into consideration the absence of some data in the case studies.
As can be seen, all the variables of general assistance (hi45) are available, excepting
Colombia’s general assistance (hi45) in 1996 and Chile’s general assistance (hi45) in 1998 and
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2000. As explained in chapter 3, this is the main reason that this dissertation does not include the
analysis of Colombia and Chile in these years. This is a weakness of this research because it does
not include Colombia’s and Chile’s analysis before the implementation of CCTs, but the analysis
of Colombia and Chile during the middle of the implementation of CCTs in 2006 and the last
data available in 2016 is a contribution to the literature. Moreover, this dissertation includes the
data of Chile in 2003, which is just one year after Solidarity Chile was developed.
Secondly, all the cases that have a missing value in any of the variables of interest for the
research are dropped from the analysis by creating an indicator variable that is equal to one if dhi
or any of its income and expenditure sub-components is missing, and equal to zero otherwise
was created (LIS, 2019b).
Third, “[c]omparative researchers are typically interested in the characteristics of national
populations, not the samples provided. It is very important to understand and use sample weights
correctly in order to get representative results for the total underlying population” (LIS, 2019b, p.
9). The weighted descriptive statistics are obtained with the summarize command (LIS, 2019b):
sum <varlist> [w=<varname>], de
This dissertation uses analytic weights, which are “the natural kind of weights typically used
with the summarize command” (LIS, 2019b, p. 11). The LIS records the household level weights
in the variable hpopwgt.
Fourth, this dissertation builds the disposable household income, applying top- and
bottom-codes to remove extreme values, using macros in this analysis. Because some inequality
measures are sensitive to the extreme values of the income distribution due to reasons of
confidentiality (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006), this dissertation applies top- and bottom-codes to avoid
this problem (LIS, 2019b), ensuring comparability between the datasets of Chile, Colombia, and

Mexico. The problem with top coding is not so much that data on very high incomes are not
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reported as that the maximum value reported (e.g., all income above $2 million are reported as
$2 million) differs from country to country. Rather than generating a new variable for the topcode value, a global macro is generated by using the Stata command global (LIS, 2019b): global
topline = 10*r(p50).
Fifth, this dissertation creates an equivalized income variable that adjusts for household
size. “In order to get measures of income inequality in a population, it is necessary to compare
income across different types of households. It is not logical to directly compare total household
income between households of different sizes and composition” (LIS, 2019b, p. 16). Because it
is desirable to develop a scale that accounts for the number of household members in an
equivalent way, taking into consideration economies of scale in larger households, this
dissertation equivalizes income by dividing “the total household income by the value of the
equivalence scale for each observation” (LIS, 2019b, p. 17), making sure that the weight matches
the unit of analysis. It would be necessary to adjust the real value of income from the periods
before and in the middle of the implementation in order to be consistent with the last period,
using the general consumer price of each country. Nevertheless, the LIS provides a dataset that
includes conversion factors for Consumer Price Index (CPI) adjustment and Purchasing Power
Parities (PPPs) adjustment to 2011 international dollars:
All income variables have been expressed from nominal local currency units to 2011
international dollars. Converting income amounts in PPP terms is common in comparing
incomes across countries and results in incomes that hold roughly equal purchasing
power measured in international dollars. The conversion was done by applying first a
national consumer price deflator to the nominal amounts to express them in terms of year
2011 prices. Those amounts were then converted to international dollars using PPPs. The
national deflators and PPPs were taken from the World Development Indicators from the
World Bank. (LIS, 2019a, p. 8)
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The equivalizing weighting of household members produces a lower estimate of inequality than
a per-capita measure due to the assumptions of economies of scale in large households (LIS,
2019b). The LIS uses the variable hpopwgt for weighting the variables which are intrinsically at
the household level (LIS, 2019b).
In order to develop the fourth and fifth technical details, the foreach loop is used to repeat
the same commands for multiple variables and to apply an equivalence scale and bottom codes to
the four different income variables (LIS, 2019b):
foreach var in mi siti sa dhi
gen e`var'_b = `var'
replace e`var'_b = 0 if `var'<0
replace e`var'_b = (e`var'_b/(nhhmem^0.5))
Sixth, a new variable from public social benefits (excluding pensions) is generated, named
hipubsoc2: hipubsoc2= hipubsoc- hi45. The variable hipubsoc2 represents public social benefits,
excluding pensions and CCTs. This new variable allows a differential analysis of CCTs (hi45),
analyzing the impact of CCTs on inequality.
Impact on Inequality: Gini Index-Net Income and the Decomposition of the Gini Index
Before analyzing the decomposition of the Gini index, this dissertation measures and compares
the fiscal redistribution of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in order to introduce the impact of
government intervention on inequality. This dissertation develops three models in order to
measure the impact on inequality. The first model calculates the Gini coefficients of Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico based on disposable income and comparing income concepts. The second
model decomposes the Gini index, analyzing the last year of data available for each country. The
third model decomposes the Gini coefficients and analyzes the impact of CCTs on inequality in

three different periods of time: before CCTs, in the middle of implementation, and the most
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recent and available data.
Impact of Taxes, Public Transfers, and CCTs on Inequality.
Public transfers are a redistribution of income and wealth by the government, such as
subsidies; CCTs are considered a public transfer. For this reason, this dissertation separates
CCTs from public transfers in order to measure the impact of CCTs on inequality. The first
model calculates the Gini coefficients of Chile (2003, 2006, and 2017), Colombia (2007 and
2016), and Mexico (1998, 2008, and 2018)3, which are the most recent and available data, based
on current income. This model uses LIS data, is based on the works of Kakwani (1997),
Shorrocks (1982), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986), and
compares the following income concepts. First, income before taxes and government transfers or
market income (mi), which is the sum of factor income, private transfers and private pensions,
meaning the income before any taxes and government transfers but including private pensions
(LIS, 2019b; Mahler and Jesuit, 2006).
Second, income after taxes, social insurance benefits, and universal benefits (siti) results
from the addition of market income (mi), social insurance transfers and universal benefits, while
subtracting taxes and social contributions paid (LIS, 2019b). This income is before social
assistance is included (LIS, 2019b). Third, income after social assistance benefits (sa) is before
taxes, social insurance, and universal benefits (LIS, 2019b).

1

The LIS variables’ denomination for these countries are cl03, cl06, cl17, co07, co16, mx98, mx08, and mx18,
respectively. “For convenience, throughout our documentation, LIS uses short country/territory names – i.e., those
that are commonly used in cross-national academia – in conjunction with standard two-letter ISO abbreviations.
This convention does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of LIS concerning the legal
status of any country or territory. LIS recognizes that several supranational organizations designate country/territory
names which may differ from the ones that LIS uses” (LIS, 2020b).

Fourth, disposable household income (dhi) is the measure of post-tax and post-transfer
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income and is obtained by deducting “from total gross income the most important taxes that are
paid directly by households at the source: income taxes and mandatory social insurance
contribution” (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006, p.488). The total gross income measures the effect of
direct state redistribution via taxes and transfers (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006; LIS, 2019b). Gross
income includes “all income from employment and self-employment, property income,
occupational pensions, state and private cash transfers, as well as other cash incomes”
(Smeeding, O’Higgins & Rainwater, 1990).
Fifth, the Gini coefficient is calculated, obtaining some insight into the effect of
government programs on inequality and using each of these four income concepts. This
dissertation uses Stata in order to calculate the Gini index. The command used is: ineqdec0
[varname] [w=<weight>] (LIS, 2019b). This command includes zero values when it calculates
the Gini coefficient (LIS, 2019b), which is the desirable result.
Subsequently, fiscal redistribution is obtained by focusing on the absolute change rather
than the relative differences between the Gini components of market income and disposable
income (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006; Pontusson, 2005). This formulation is more straightforward and
“allows to compare the extent of state redistribution in a way that is not affected by trends in
market income inequality” (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006, p. 488). Then, transfer reduction and taxes
reduction are calculated.
Finally, this dissertation shows the reduction in the Gini index of private income
inequality owing to CCTs (hi45) in order to determine the impact of CCTs on inequality.
Following the method used by Mahler and Jesuit (2006), this dissertation measures the market
income Gini including CCTs in all of the countries under examination. Then it reduces the

94
market income, obtaining the reduction of CCTs on the market income Gini index. The formula
is: CCTs impact = (mi + hi45) – mi
Decomposition of the Gini Index in One Period of Time.
The impact of CCTs on inequality in a specific period of time is measured by the
decomposition of the Gini index, taking as a reference Shorrocks (1982), Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1985), and López-Feldman (2006). According to Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986), the
influence of any income source upon total income inequality depends on the importance of the
income source with respect to total income, the distribution of the income source, and the
correlation between the income source and the distribution of total income (López-Feldman,
2006).
We are often interested in which of the different income sources, or components of a
measure of well-being, are primarily responsible for the observed level of inequality. . . .
If one of the income sources were raised by 1 percent, what would happen to overall
inequality? The simplest and most commonly used procedure is to compute the measure
of inequality using the initial data, and then to simulate a new distribution (for instance,
by raising wages by 1 percent) and recompute the measure of inequality. (Haughton &
Khandker, 2009, p. 161)
This model decomposes the Gini coefficients of Chile (2017), Colombia (2016), and Mexico
(2018). In order to measure the decomposition of the Gini index in one period of time, this
dissertation uses the command descogini in Stata.

“Where Sk represents the share of source k in total income, Gk is the source Gini corresponding
to the distribution of income from source k, and Rk is the Gini correlation of income from source
k with

the distribution of total income” (López-Feldman, 2006, p. 107). This dissertation analyzes

CCTs, meaning the source k is the variable hi45. Therefore, the effect that a 1% change in

income from CCTs will have on total income inequality can be estimated. This effect is given
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by:

The total current income household is decomposed into six categories: labor income, capital
income, pensions, public social benefits (excluding pensions and CCTs), CCTs, and private
transfers.
The Decomposition of the Gini Index in Multiple Periods of Time.
The impact of CCTs on inequality comparing different periods of time is measured by the
decomposition of the Gini index, taking as a reference Kakwani (1980), Shorrocks (1982),
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985, 1994), Yitzhaki (1994, 1999), Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002), Soares
et al. (2007), and Medina and Galvan (2008). “The Gini coefficient can be easily decomposed
according to factor components. The resulting expression depends only upon the concentration
coefficient of each component and its weight in total income” (Soares et al., 2007, p. 8).
Therefore, the decomposition of the Gini index can be used to establish the contribution of each
source of income, such as CCTs, to the total change in the Gini index, through the analysis of
their weight and concentration. This model decomposes the Gini coefficients of Chile (2003,
2006, and 2017), Colombia (2007 and 2016), and Mexico (1998, 2008, and 2018).
The calculation of the decomposition of the Gini index is based on the following
equations (Soares et al., 2007:8-9):
Equation 1:
G = ∑CkSK
K

:

CK = Concentration coefficient

SK = Share in total income
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Ck Sk = Contribution to total inequality
Equation 2:
∴

∆G = ∑(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck)
K

:

Sk∆Ck = Concentration effect
(Ck - G)∆Sk = Composition effect
(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck) = Concentration and composition

When the concentration index of CCTs is lower than the Gini index of total income, it can be
claimed that CCTs are contributing to diminishing inequality (Soares et al., 2007). Conversely,
when the concentration coefficient is bigger than the Gini index, the variable measured by the
concentration coefficient increases inequality. A negative concentration coefficient also has an
inequality-reducing impact and suggests that the measured variable is more concentrated among
the poorest. Finally, the product of the concentration coefficient of an income source and its
share shows the total contribution of the source to the overall inequality as measured by the Gini
index (see equation 1).
Total current income household is decomposed into six categories: labor income, capital
income, pensions, public social benefits (excluding pensions and CCTs), CCTs, and private
transfers. Thus, decomposing CCTs shows the impact of CCTs in the middle of their time of
execution (2006 – 2008) and the point of time afterwards is the closest available (2016 – 2017).
The analysis of the decomposition of changes in inequality (see equation 2) shows the
decomposition and the concentration effects.
The decomposition points out the contribution of the share (composition effect) and the
concentration of each source of income to the total change in the Gini index. By dividing
the contribution of the change in each factory by the change in the Gini index, we derive

the contribution of the factor as a percentage of the total change in inequality (Soares et
al., 2007, p. 15)
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In sum, the LIS data decompose the income in some sources, including CCTs, which are
essential to identify the contribution of CCTs to a change in inequality. These variables are
available for Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
In conclusion, the hypotheses established to develop the analysis of the impact of CCTs
on inequality in Latin America are:
Hypothesis 1: CCTs have diminished inequality in Latin America
Impact on Poverty: Gini Index-Net Income and Counterfactual Analysis
The main reasons to measure poverty are keeping poor people on the agenda, targeting domestic
and worldwide interventions, monitoring and evaluating projects and policy interventions, and
evaluating the effectiveness of institutions (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). First, this dissertation
measures and compares the poverty reduction of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, comparing
poverty on market income and disposable income and getting the impact of CCTs on poverty.
Then this dissertation measures the impact of CCTs on poverty using a counterfactual method.
Effects of Taxes, Public Transfers, and CCTs on Poverty.
This dissertation separates CCTs from public transfers in order to measure the impact of
CCTs on poverty. This model calculates and compares two poverty measures: the Headcount
Ratio and the Interval Measure. These poverty measures are used in Chile (2017), Colombia
(2016), and Mexico (2018), which are the most recent and available data, based on the market
income and the disposable income. On the one hand, as was explained in chapter 3, the
Headcount Ratio is defined as the percentage of the country’s population of individuals living in
poor households. “The headcount ratio (H) measures poverty incidence (i.e., the number or
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proportion of poor people), but gives every person equal weight no matter how far they fall from
the poverty line” (LIS, 2010, p. 28). The poverty line is defined as 50% of the median
equivalized income. On the other hand, Interval Measure (HI) is the product of Headcount Ratio
and the Income Gap (Atkinson, 1987 and Brady, 2003), which measures poverty intensity or
depth.
This model uses LIS data based on the works of Kakwani (1997), Shorrocks (1982),
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986), and compares the following
income concepts: market income (mi); income after taxes, social insurance benefits, and
universal benefits (siti); income after social assistance benefits (sa); and disposable income (dhi).
These concepts were defined above.
In order to calculate the Headcount Ratio, which was explained above, this dissertation
uses the following command to get the median equivalized income (LIS, 2019b):
sum edhi_tb [w=hpopwgt*nhhmem], de
Because the median will be stored in r(p50), a dummy variable is created to define the poverty
line as 50% of the median equivalized (LIS, 2019b). The command used is:
gen byte poor=(edhi_tb<r(p50)*0.5)
Then, the Interval Measure rates are calculated. Before calculating the Interval Measure, the
Income Gap must be calculated. Subsequently, the Interval Measure is obtained by multiplying
the poverty Headcount by Income Gap.
Finally, the poverty reduction is obtained by focusing on the absolute change of poverty
rates rather than the relative differences between the poverty components of market income and
disposable income (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006; Pontusson, 2005).

Counterfactual Analysis of CCTs and Poverty.
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Using the same methodology used by Stampini and Tornarolli (2012), this dissertation
determines the percentage of the transfers in beneficiaries’ total income and estimates the impact
in poverty “by comparing estimated incomes with a no-CCT counterfactual in which incomes are
recalculated net of the transfers” (Stampini &Tornarolli, 2012, p. 11). According to Stampini and
Tornarolli (2012), the implementation of this concept involves selecting a measure of welfare
(for household or individual) and a poverty line.
Even though the literature recommends the use of consumption, the LIS and most of the
household surveys in Latin America include questions on income. The LIS (2019b) allows for
creating a relative poverty line based on the level and distribution of household disposable
income in the total population. “Households are classified as poor or non-poor on the basis of
whether their income is lower or higher than the relative poverty line” (LIS, 2019b, p. 25).
The poverty measures selected in this model are the Headcount Ratio and the Interval
Measure. Therefore, a counterfactual with no-CCTs of Chile, (1997), Colombia (2016), and
Mexico (1998) is developed, taking into consideration the Headcount Ratio and the Interval
Measure, separately. These counterfactual analyses establish the impact of CCTs on poverty.
In conclusion, the hypotheses established to develop the analysis of the impact of CCTs
in Latin America are:
Hypothesis 2: CCTs have diminished poverty in Latin America
Efficiency: Targeting Beneficiaries
Using the methodologies developed by Smeeding and Jesuit (2002), Smeeding (2005), and
Mahler & Jesuit (2006), this dissertation determines the magnitude of redistribution of CCTs in

Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, analyzing the quality of the targeting mechanisms used for the
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inclusion of beneficiaries.
Following the method used by Mahler and Jesuit (2006), a summary index of the degree
to which transfers are targeted towards low-income groups is calculated, applying Kakwani’s
(1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers and using a program to produce target efficiency
values provided by Joakim Palme; this index “takes on the value of -1.0 if the poorest person
gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets an equal amount, and .1.0 if the richest person gets
all transfer income” (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006, p. 292).
Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ only applies to households that are poor,
meaning that its results show if CCTs target the poorest of the poor. This dissertation analyzes
the efficiency of CCTs in Chile (2003, 2006, and 2017), Colombia (2007, 2016), and Mexico
(1998, 2008, and 2018).
Descriptive Multivariate, Cross-National Model
The last part of this dissertation describes a cross-sectional/time-series model. The countries of
analysis remain Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The dependent variables are the measures of
impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty, and CCTs efficiency, which were explained above.
Moreover, the independent variables are the main features of CCTs explained in chapter 1, which
are budget and coverage in terms of beneficiaries. Finally, this dissertation descriptively analyzes
some control economic and institutional variables that could have caused the diminishing of
inequality and poverty. This dissertation describes the cross-national model, but it does not
develop it because of the narrow size of the sample (n=8). Nevertheless, the results for these
countries can easily be compared to results for other countries in Latin America and elsewhere.

The key contribution of the LIS is that, while it does not collect any data on its own, it does
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allow for meaningful comparison in a way that was not previously possible.
Before summarizing the variables of this descriptive model, this section describes the
control variables: GDP growth and economic globalization, the degree of intervention by the
government (ideological orientation), participation and political voice and corruption.
The economic variables are the GDP and economic globalization. The larger the GDP,
the larger the fiscal redistribution, meaning the larger the investment on CCTs. Furthermore,
some theories show there is little evidence of the relationship between the three major modes of
international integration ––trade, foreign direct investment, and international financial flows––
and the fiscal redistribution and more evidence of the relationship between financial openness
and earnings inequality (Mahler, 2004).
In addition, institutional variables can explain this relationship: the degree of intervention
by government (ideological orientation), participation and political voice, and corruption. The
ideological orientation of governments may influence the degree of redistribution that include
CCTs. The degree of intervention by governments to reduce inequality among and within
societies differs from social democratic and right-wing parties. While social democratic
corporatism is characterized by high levels of government expense, high rates of economic
growth, and high deficits, right-wing parties have fewer progressive public policies, low rates of
economic growth, and low deficits (Garrett, 1998).
Perhaps the most commonly addressed question from a power resources perspective is
whether the partisan orientation of national governments is an important determinant of
the extent of fiscal redistribution. Despite several decades of intensive work on this topic,
the verdict is still in doubt. While a number of empirical studies have found support for
the importance of partisanship, others have found little or no relationship. One reason for
this lack of consensus may be that in nearly all of the empirical work on the topic the
dependent variable is not fiscal redistribution per se but rather the size of social benefit
programmes relative to the economy. (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006, pp. 501-02)

Moreover, participation and political voice could also affect the reduction of poverty and
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inequality in Latin America. According to the median voter theorem, the more unequal the
income distribution, the more the median voter has to gain through the joint action of taxes and
transfers, and the more likely the citizen is to vote for higher taxes and transfers (Mahler, 2010).
Low-income groups and disadvantaged educated people are less likely to vote and participate in
politics in the American democracy (Schlozman et al., 2012). Furthermore, public officials are
more responsive to high-income groups than to average income groups and low-income groups
(Kenworthy, 2008). The level of democracy measures participation and political voice.
Finally, corruption is a variable that can affect the fiscal redistribution and therefore the
impact of CCTs on poverty and inequality. Social programs are used by politicians as a form of
patronage in order to build political machines (Fukuyama, 2011), taking advantage of national
programs with large number of beneficiaries for exclusively particular interests. Politicians can
use CCTs to influence beneficiaries to vote, using the data to invite them to attend meetings of
the official party that is in power.
In sum, the variables of the descriptive cross-national model are:
•

Dependent variables
o CCTs’ inequality reduction: based on the impact of CCTs on market income.
o CCTs’ poverty reduction: measured by the counterfactual analysis of CCTs using the
Interval Measure.
o CCTs’ efficiency: measured by the results of the Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of
concentration’.

•

Independent variables
o CCTs’ budget: based on the public investment in CCTs as a percentage of GDP.

o CCTs’ coverage: measured by individuals in recipient households of CCTs as a
percentage of total population.
•

Control variables (described above)
o GDP growth: World Bank and ECLAC statistics.
o Economic globalization.
o Ideological orientation of governments.
o

Participation and political voice.

o Corruption.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON INEQUALITY
As was reviewed in chapter 2, most of the literature has focused on the effectiveness of CCTs
and the impact of CCTs on poverty but not as much as the impact of CCTs on inequality and the
efficiency of CCTs. The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of CCTs on
inequality, using the Gini index.
This dissertation develops three models in order to measure the impact on inequality. The
first model analyzes effects of taxes, public transfers, and CCTs on inequality, taking into
consideration the fiscal redistribution. The second and third models are based on the method of
the decomposition of the Gini index, which were explained in chapter 4. The first model
calculates the Gini coefficients of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico based on current income and
income concept comparisons, calculating the impact of CCTs on the market income Gini index
in the years of analysis. The second model decomposes the Gini index, analyzing the last year of
data available for each country. The third model decomposes the Gini coefficients and analyzes
the impact of CCTs on inequality, comparing different periods of time. This third model looks to
if and how CCTs decreased inequality in Chile from 2003 to 2017, in Colombia from 2007 to
2016, and in Mexico from 2008 to 2018.
The first model analyzes three different periods of time: before CCTs (Mexico 1998 and
Chile 2003), in the middle of the implementation (Chile 2006, Colombia 2007, Mexico 2008),
and the most recent and available data (Colombia 2016, Chile 2017, and Mexico 2018). The
104

second model only takes into consideration the most recent and available data. As it was
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mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, even though LIS data has most of the variables for the years of
analysis, some data form the national household surveys and the LIS have not been included in
some specific years. For this reason, the main analysis surveys according to the LIS waves and
the available data are from Chile (2003, 2006, and 2017), Colombia (2007, 2016), and Mexico
(1998, 2008, and 2018). Finally, the third model analyzes two different periods of time: before
CCTs (Mexico 1998 and Chile 2003) and the most recent and available data (Colombia 2016,
Chile 2017, and Mexico 2018).
Effects of Taxes, Public Transfers, and CCTs on Inequality
Before analyzing the decomposition of the Gini index, this dissertation measures and compares
the fiscal redistribution of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. In addition, this dissertation shows the
impact of CCTs on the market income Gini index. Market income is the money that families earn
either through work or through government aid programs prior to taxation. This section uses the
Gini index to measure inequality. As was mentioned in chapter 3, the Gini index ranges from 0,
in which all recipients receive exactly the same income to 1.0, in which one recipient receives all
income (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006).
As was mentioned in chapter 4, most of the data does not include universal transfers
except from Mexico in 2018, affecting the Gini after taxes, social insurance benefits, and
universal benefits. For this reason, this Gini is not going to be included in the analysis. Even
though the analysis of this Gini is not included, the future inclusion of the variable universal
transfers in LIS data and the national household surveys of Colombia and Chile conducted by the
governmental authorities is highly recommend in order to homogenize the data among the
countries. This is one of the conclusions that this dissertation shows and expands upon in the

final chapter. Moreover, LIS data of Colombia and Mexico (1998) does not include private
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pensions. The absence of these data affects the analysis of market income. Nevertheless, it does
not affect the results of fiscal redistribution because private pensions are neither taken into
consideration in the Gini after taxes and all transfers (disposable household income).
Impact of Taxes, Public Transfers, and CCTs on Inequality.
As was reviewed in chapter 4, public transfers are a redistribution of income and wealth
by the government, such as subsidies; CCTs are considered a public transfer. For this reason, this
dissertation separates CCTs from public transfers in order to measure the impact of CCTs on
inequality. Market income is the sum of factor income, private transfers, and private pensions,
meaning the income before any taxes and government transfers but including private pensions
(LIS, 2019b; Mahler & Jesuit, 2006); factor income is the “[s]um of cash and non-cash income
from labor and income from capital” (LIS, 2020b).
Moreover, disposable household income (dhi) is the measure of post-tax and post-transfer
income and is obtained by deducting “from total gross income the most important taxes that are
paid directly by households at the source: income taxes and mandatory social insurance
contribution” (Mahler & Jesuit, 2006, p. 488). These variables are important because they show
the impact of public transfers and CCTs on inequality in market income, which means that the
analysis of these variables show the impact of the intervention of government on inequality in
market income through taxes and public transfers (redistribution).
Table 5 offers data on a number of aspects of fiscal redistribution, such as a number of
aspects of the Gini index before taxes and government transfers (market income) as well as after
taxes and all transfers (disposable household income). Moreover, it offers the impact of public
transfers and taxes on the Gini of market income, which shows the impact of governmental
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intervention on inequality. The expected result is that redistribution by the government impacts
the reduction of the Gini index of market income.

Table 5. Gini Index and Fiscal Redistribution
Gini index before taxes
Gini index after taxes
and government
and all transfers –
Fiscal redistribution
Dataset
transfers – market
disposable household
(dhi-mi)
income (mi)
income (dhi)
Chile 2003
0.550
0.506
0.044
Chile 2006
0.521
0.477
0.044
Chile 2017
0.522
0.461
0.061
Colombia 2007
0.574
0.562
0.012
Colombia 2016
0.500
0.477
0.023
Mexico 1998
0.515
0.506
0.009
Mexico 2008
0.493
0.475
0.018
Mexico 2018
0.452
0.429
0.023
Note 1: ch96, col07, col16, mx96’ data do not include private pensions.
Note 2: All the dataset, excepting mx18, does not include universal benefits.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico; {1998 - 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
A historical analysis for each country brings the following conclusions based on the
results in Table 5. In 20 years, Mexico has diminished the Gini index of disposable household
income in 0.077 due to the reduction of the Gini index of market income and the increase of
fiscal redistribution. Mexico increased fiscal redistribution from 1998 to 2008 by 0.009 and from
2008 to 2018 by 0.005. This increase is parallel to the expansion of PROSPERA in terms of
number of beneficiaries. The following subsections analyze the impact of PROSPERA on
inequality.
On the other hand, Colombia has diminished the Gini index of disposable household
income by 0.085 from 2007 to 2016. This decrease is due to the reduction of the Gini index of
market income by 0.074 and the increase of fiscal redistribution by 0.011. Finally, Chile has

reduced the Gini index of disposable household income by 0.045 from 2003 to 2017. This
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decrease is due to the reduction of the Gini index of market income by 0.029 and the increase of
fiscal redistribution by 0.017.
Table 5 shows that Chile’s (2017) fiscal redistribution is three times the fiscal distribution
of Colombia in 2016 and Mexico in 2018, meaning Chilean government intervention through
taxes and redistribution has a higher impact on inequality.
The most extensive overall fiscal redistribution occurs in Chile in 2017 while households
in Colombia and Mexico experience the least extensive state redistribution. As can be seen in
Table 5, while the Gini index went down 0.061 points from market income to disposable
household income in Chile in 2017, the Gini index diminished 0.009 from market income to
disposable household income in Mexico in 1998. In addition, the Gini index diminished 0.023
points in Colombia in 2016 and in Mexico in 2018.
The disposable household income is not only a product of state redistribution, but also a
product of private sector income. While Chile’s Gini index of market income was 0.522 in 2017,
Mexico’s Gini index was 0.452 in 2018, and Colombia’s Gini index was 0.500 in 2016. On the
one hand, household’s income in Chile in 2017 is primarily a product of extensive state
redistribution in which market income inequality is the most unequal among the three case
studies, but after taxes and all transfers, Chile reaches and exceeds Colombia in 2016 and is close
to that of Mexico in 2018. On the other hand, Mexico is a product of private sector income,
having the lowest Gini index of market income among the cases studies. Nevertheless, Mexico’s
Gini of disposable household income is equal only to Colombia and less than Chile because of its
narrow egalitarian redistribution. Mexico’s Gini index of disposable household income was
0.429 in 2018, while Chile’s Gini index of disposable household income was 0.461 in 2017.

Conversely, Colombia in 2016 is the most unequal country among the three cases
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because the relatively inegalitarian distribution of its disposable income is more a result of
limited state redistribution than of a highly inegalitarian distribution of private sector income;
Colombia’s Gini index of disposable household income was 0.477 in 2016. Egalitarian
distribution in Colombia is the same as Mexico, but its Gini index of market income is higher
than Mexico.
In sum, Mexico has the lowest Gini index over time compared to Chile and Colombia,
being very similar to Chile. Moreover, Chile has the highest Gini market income inequality over
time. Nevertheless, Chile has a similar Gini index of disposable household income to Mexico
because Chile has maintained the highest distribution over the years among the three case
studies. Finally, Colombia is the most unequal country after government intervention through
taxation and redistribution. Having done the analysis of fiscal redistribution, it is important to
analyze the impact of CCTs on inequality.
Impact of CCTs on Inequality of Market Income.
This section measures the market income Gini index with CCTs added in order to
calculate the impact of CCTs on inequality of market income. The expected result in this model
is that CCTs impact the reduction of the Gini index of market income, which means that it is
expected that CCTs diminish the Gini index after the intervention of government through taxes
and redistribution. As was described in chapter 1, CCTs in Mexico started in 1997, in Colombia
in 2001, and in Chile in 2002 (ECLAC, 2020).
Table 6 shows the market income, market income with CCTs, and the impact of CCTs on
inequality of market income in all of the countries under examination. The impact of CCTs on
inequality of market income is the result of the subtraction between the first and the second

variable and shows the contribution of CCTs from market income to disposable household
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income. A negative result of this impact means that CCTs reduce inequality. On the contrary, a
positive result means that CCTs increase inequality. Chile’s CCTs, called the Ethical Family
Income Program, has had the same impact on market income over the years, with a marginal
reduction of 0.0003 Gini points in 2003, 2006, and 2017.
Conversely, Colombia’s More Families in Action has increased the positive impact of
CCTs on inequality over the years. More Families in Action decreased the market income Gini
index by 0.0001 Gini points in 2007 and 0.008 Gini points in 2016, meaning that CCTs in
Colombia had a marginal impact on reducing inequality. Even though More Families in Action
reduces inequality, this model shows that the impact is almost null. Finally, Mexico’s Prosperity
increased the impact on inequality of the market income from 0.0016 in 1998 to 0.0104 in 2008,
meaning that the program has increased its impact on reducing inequality. Nevertheless,
Prosperity reduced its impact on market income from 0.0104 in 2008 to 0.0093 in 2018.

Table 6. Impact of CCTs on Inequality of Market Income in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country and year
Chile 2003
Chile 2006
Chile 2017
Colombia 2007
Colombia 2016
Mexico 1998
Mexico 2008
Mexico 2018

Market Income
(mi)
0.5504
0.5210
0.5219
0.5737
0.5003
0.5145
0.4927
0.4517

Market Income
including CCTs
0.5501
0.5207
0.5216
0.5736
0.4923
0.5129
0.4823
0.4424

CCTs Impact on
Inequality of
Market Income
-0.0003
-0.0003
-0.0003
-0.0001
-0.0080
-0.0016
-0.0104
-0.0093

Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico; {1998 - 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.

In sum, the impact of CCTs on inequality of market income in Chile, Colombia, and
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Mexico has had limited results with the exception of Mexico in 2008. This second model shows
that CCTs have not had a robust impact on inequality of the market income Gini index. I
expected that CCTs would have produced an important impact on inequality of market income.
As was described in chapter 1, one objective of CCTs is the reduction of inequality. Large CCT
programs in terms of targeting (number of beneficiaries) and budget, such as Mexico and
Colombia have a greater impact than those smaller programs, such as Chile. Nevertheless, the
impact of CCTs on inequality of market income is still not robust.
Decomposition of the Gini Index in One Period of Time
The impact of CCTs on inequality in a specific period of time is measured by the decomposition
of the Gini index. Chapter 4 explains that the influence of any income source upon total income
inequality depends on the share of the income source with respect to total income (Sk), the
distribution of the source or source Gini (Gk), and the Gini correlation (Rk) between the income
source and the distribution of total income (López-Feldman, 2006).

The importance of measuring the share of the income (Sk) is that it shows how the CCTs are with
respect to total income. If CCTs' share of current income is large, it may impact inequality;
conversely, if CCTs’ share of current income is small, is unlikely to have an impact on
inequality. Furthermore, the importance of source Gini (Gk) is that it establishes how CCTs are
equally or unequally distributed. If the CCT’s Gini is close to 1, it means that a CCT is unequally
distributed and they have an impact on inequality. This impact could be positive (reducing
inequality) or negative (increasing inequality), meaning this variable shows if CCTs have an
impact on inequality, but it does not establish if the impact is positive or negative. Conversely, if
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the CCT’s Gini is close to 0, it means that a CCT is equally distributed and it does not have any
impact on inequality. Moreover, the importance of the Gini correlation (Rk) is how CCTs and the
distribution of total income are correlated. If the Gini correlation of CCTs with the total
household income is close to 0, it means CCTs target mostly low-income households; conversely
if it is close to 1, it means CCTs target mostly high-income households.
If an income source represents a large share of total income, it may potentially have
a large impact on inequality. However, if income is equally distributed (Gk= 0), it
cannot influence inequality, even if its magnitude is large. On the other hand, if this
income source is large and unequally distributed (Sk and Gk are large), it may either
increase or decrease inequality, depending on which households (individuals) at which
points in the income distribution earn it. If the income source is unequally distributed and
flows disproportionately toward those at the top of the income distribution (Rk is positive
and large), its contribution to inequality will be positive. However, if it is
unequally distributed but targets poor households (individuals), the income source may
have an equalizing effect on the income distribution. (López-Feldman, 2006, p. 107)
The total current household income is decomposed into six categories: labor income, capital
income, pensions, public social benefits (excluding pensions and CCTs), CCTs, and private
transfers. The data is taken from the LIS. Total current income household is the income of a
household that includes market income and government intervention through taxation and
transfers.
As was reviewed in chapter 4, public transfers are a redistribution of income and wealth
by the government, such as subsidies; CCTs are considered as a public transfer; labor income is
“cash payments and value of goods and services received from dependent employment, as well
as profits/losses and value of goods from self-employment, including own consumption” (LIS
2020b); capital income is “cash payments from property and capital (including financial and
non-financial assets), including interest and dividends, rental income and royalties, and other
capital income from investment in self-employment activity” (LIS, 2020b).

113
In addition, private transfers are “cash transfers and value of in-kind goods and services
of a private nature that do not involve any institutional arrangement between the individual and
the government or the employer, including transfers provided by non-profit institutions, other
private persons/households, and other bodies in the case of merit-based education transfers” (LIS
2020b); public social benefits excluding pensions are the public transfers without considering
pensions. Moreover, this dissertation creates the variable public transfers excluding pensions and
CCTs, which is the variable public social benefits excluding pensions and CCTs in order to
separately analyze the impact of CCTs. These variables are important because they comprise the
total household income and are the sources of a micro analysis based on the LIS and the
household surveys of Chile and Colombia. The results of this analysis are national.
This model decomposes the Gini coefficients of Chile (2017), Colombia (2016), and
Mexico (2018) in order to show the impact that an increase of 1% in CCTs will have on total
income inequality. The expected result in this model is that an increase of 1% in CCTs will
reduce inequality. The larger the CCTs in terms of budget and targeting, the larger the impact on
inequality, meaning it is expected that a 1% increase in Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program
and Colombia’s More Family in Action will have a bigger impact on inequality than a 1%
increase of Mexico’s Prosperity. In addition, it is expected that the distribution of the CCTs (Gk)
will be close to 1, meaning CCTs will be unequally distributed and, therefore, CCTs will impact
inequality. Finally, it is expected the Gini correlation of CCTs (Rk) with the total household
income will be close to zero, meaning CCTs target mostly poor households.
Tables 7, 8, and 9 offer data from Chile, Colombia, and Mexico on the shares of these
sources of income in the current income (Sk), the distribution in terms of inequality of these
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sources of income (Gk), and the Gini correlation of each income source with the total household
income (Rk).

Table 7. Gini Decomposition by Income Source, Chile 2017
Current Income Variable: Total current income household
Source
Sk
Gk
Rk
Share % Change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Labor
0.814
0.579
0.947
0.916
0.102
Capital
0.029
0.973
0.750
0.043
0.014
Pension
0.116
0.757
0.135
0.024
-0.092
Pub Transfer 0.012
0.797 -0.031
-0.001 -0.012
CCTs
0.001
0.967
0.050 -0.000
-0.001
Private
0.029
0.915
0.324
0.017 -0.011
Current income
0.488
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile;
{2017}).
Luxembourg: LIS.
Table 8. Gini Decomposition by Income Source, Colombia 2016
Current Income Variable: Total current income household
Source
Sk
Gk
Rk
Share % Change
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Labor
0.778
0.542
0.899
0.771 -0.007
Capital
0.042
0.955
0.654
0.053
0.011
Pension
0.115
0.924
0.690
0.149
0.034
Pub Transfer 0.004
0.939
0.445
0.004 -0.001
CCTs
0.007
0.898 -0.188 -0.002 -0.010
Private
0.053
0.899
0.266
0.026 -0.027
Curent income
0.492
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Colombia;
{2016}). Luxembourg: LIS.

Table 9. Gini Decomposition by Income Source, Mexico 2018

115

Current Income Variable: Total current income household
Source
Sk
Gk
Rk
Share % Change
---------------------------------------------------------------------------Labor
0.776
0.523
0.904
0.838
0.064
Capital
0.012
0.984
0.667
0.019
0.015
Pension
0.081
0.914
0.534
0.090
0.044
Pub Transfer 0.021
0.916
0.422
0.018 -0.005
CCTs
0.011 0.871 -0.203 -0.004 -0.036
Private
0.099 0.725
0.241
0.040 -0.089
Current income
0.438
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Mexico;
{2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
CCTs does not represent a large share of total household income, particularly in Chile.
While Mexico’s CCTs represents 0.011 of current income, Colombia’s CCTs 0.007. Conversely,
Chile’s CCTs represents 0.001 of current income. A small CCTs' share of current income may be
unlikely to have an impact on inequality.
In addition, the decomposition of the Gini index shows that CCTs of Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico are unequally distributed because Gk is close to 1. The distribution of Chile’s CCTs
is the highest unequally distributed variable (Gk equals 0.967). It is followed by Colombia’s
CCTs with a Gk that equals 0.898, and Mexico’s CCTs of Gk that equals 0.871. According to
these results, Ethical Family Income Program, More Families in Action, and Prosperity could
impact inequality because the beneficiaries are not equally distributed in terms of their total
income. Nevertheless, the CCTs’ Gini (Gk) does not show if the impact is positive (reducing
inequality) or negative (increasing inequality), meaning CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
may increase or decrease inequality, depending on the income groups targeted.
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The Gini correlation of CCTs with the total household income is close to zero, meaning
CCTs target mostly poor households. Nonetheless, there are differences among the programs.
While Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has a Gini correlation of current income that
shows that most of the CCTs’ beneficiaries are poor households (R k = 0.050), Mexico shows a
correlation that does not exclusively target poor households (R k = -0.203). Conversely,
Colombia is in between these last cases, in which the correlation of R k equals -0.188, meaning
that a large portion of beneficiaries are poor households. In sum, Chile’s CCTs mostly targets
poor households. Therefore, Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has a better chance of
having an equalizing effect on income distribution than Colombia’s More families in Action and
Mexico’s Prosperity. Nevertheless, as was explained above, Chile’s CCTs do not have a great
share and their size is small, which made the good results of targeting much less robust.
The decomposition of the Gini index of Chile (1997), Colombia (1996), and Mexico
(1998) shows that an increase of 1% in CCTs decreases the Gini index of total household
income. The decomposition of the Gini index in Mexico shows that a 1% increase in CCTs, all
else being equal, decreases the Gini coefficient of total household income by 0.036%. Similarly,
in Colombia, a 1% increase in CCTs decreases the Gini index of total household income by
0.010%, meaning Mexico’s Prosperity has a slightly major impact than More Families in Action
in Colombia. The results of More Families in Action and Prosperity are positive results, but it
does not seem enough regarding the investment and the number of people targeted. While
Prosperity targeted 24.13% of the total population and executed a budget equivalent to 0.35% of
the GDP in 2018, More Families in Action targeted 21.61% of the total population and executed
a budget equivalent to 0.29% of the GDP in 2016.
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The decomposition of the Gini index in Chile shows that a 1% increase in CCTs, all else
being equal, decreases the Gini coefficient of disposable household income by 0.001%, which is
practically no impact on inequality. This absence of impact of Ethical Family Income Program
on inequality could be caused by the size of the program: 4.4% of the total population and 0.14%
of the GDP in 2017.
In conclusion, Chile’s Ethical family Income Program is highly unequally distributed—
meaning CCTs are not equally distributed among low, medium, and high-income groups—and
targets poor households, which suggests an impact on inequality. Nevertheless, its limited
magnitude results in a negligible impact on inequality. In the case of Colombia, More Families
in Action is also unequally distributed and targets poor households (less than Chile); even though
Colombia’s CCTs is larger than Chile’s, it only shares 0.007 of the current income. Therefore,
More Families in Action does not have a significant impact on inequality. Moreover, Mexico’s
Prosperity is also highly unequally distributed, and it is the largest share of current income
among the cases. Nevertheless, it does not exclusively target poor households. Therefore,
Mexico’s CCTs has a negligible impact on inequality.
Finally, the decomposition of the Gini index in one period of time shows that the impact
of CCTs on inequality is extremely limited. If CCTs represent a large share of current income
and mostly target poor households, it may potentially have a significant impact on inequality.
The Decomposition of the Gini Index in Multiple Periods of Time
This model examines the magnitude of the changes in overall inequality in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. The decomposition of the Gini Index in multiple periods of time shows the factor
decomposition of changes in inequality of Chile from 2003 to 2017, Colombia from 2007 to
2016, and Mexico from 1998 to 2018, establishing the concentration effect and the composition
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effect. While the concentration effect points out the concentration of CCTs to the total change in
the Gini index, the composition effect shows the contribution of the changes in the share.
Inequality was and still is exceedingly high in all three countries. Table 10 shows
changes of 0.020, 0.060, and 0.072 of the Gini indexes of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
respectively. While Mexico has a reduction on the Gini index of 14.06% from 1998 to 2018 and
Colombia of 10.92% from 2007 to 2016, Chile only has a reduction on the Gini index of 3.97%
from 2003 to 2017.
The total current household income is decomposed into six categories: labor income,
capital income, pensions, public social benefits (excluding pensions and CCTs), CCTs, and
private transfers. The data is taken from the LIS and its importance was explained in the model
above.
Share and distribution of each income source.
Chapter 4 explained that the decomposition of the Gini index can be used to establish the
contribution of each source of income, such as CCTs, to the total change in the Gini index,
through the analysis of their weight (SK) and concentration (CK).
The calculation of the decomposition of the Gini index is based on the following equation
(Soares et al., 2007:8-9):
G = ∑CkSK
K

:

CK = Concentration coefficient
SK = Share in total income
Ck Sk = Contribution to total inequality
The share in total income weight (SK) measures the weight of each income source with

respect to total income. The concentration coefficient (CK) is the product of the distribution of
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CCTs—which is the source Gini (Gk)—and the Gini correlation (Rk), which were both explained
in the model above. Finally, the product of the concentration coefficient (CK) and the total
income weight (SK) measures the contribution of each income source to total inequality.
The importance of measuring the share of the income (Sk) is that it shows how the
income source is with respect to total income. If the share of an income source is large, it may
impact inequality; conversely, if the share of an income source is small, it is unlikely to have an
impact on inequality (Soares et al., 2007). Furthermore, the importance of the concentration
effect (Ck) is that it establishes if an income source contributes to the rise or the reduction of
inequality. “When the concentration index of a source is higher than the Gini index of total
income, we claim that this source is contributing to increase inequality” (Soares et al., 2007:12).
Conversely, if the concentration index of a source is smaller than the Gini index of total income,
the income source is contributing to inequality reduction. In addition, this model calculates the
percentage contribution of each source to total inequality by dividing the concentration index
over the Gini index (Soares et al., 2007). The expected result is that Colombia’s More Families
in Action and Mexico’s Prosperity will have a positive contribution on reducing inequality,
because of the large size of both CCT programs in terms of budget and targeting. In addition, it is
expected that Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program will contribute less to reducing inequality
than CCTs in Mexico and Colombia because of its small size in budget and targeting.

Table 10. Decomposition of the Gini Index and Gini Coefficients in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
G = ∑CkSK
k

Income
Source - k

Gini index - GK

Ck
Concentration
Coefficient

Sk
Share in Current
Income

CK SK
Contribution to
Total Inequality

Chile
2003
2017

Colombia

Mexico

2007

2016

1998

2018

0.508

0.488

0.552

0.492

0.509

0.438

Labor

0.555

0.548

0.547

0.487

0.530

0.473

Capital

0.746

0.730

0.629

0.625

0.693

0.656

Pension

0.218

0.102

0.677

0.638

0.459

0.488

Pub Transfer

0.009

0.025

0.567

0.418

0.481

0.387

CCTs

-0.344

0.048

0.462

-0.169

-0.035

-0.177

Private

0.278

0.296

0.291

0.239

0.203

0.175

Labor

0.827

0.814

0.798

0.778

0.886

0.776

Capital

0.027

0.029

0.038

0.042

0.016

0.012

Pension

0.114

0.116

0.110

0.115

0.037

0.081

Pub Transfer

0.013

0.012

0.007

0.004

0.001

0.021

CCTs

0.001

0.001

0.000

0.007

0.004

0.011

Private

0.018

0.029

0.046

0.053

0.057

0.099

Labor

0.459

0.446

0.436

0.379

0.469

0.367

Capital

0.020

0.021

0.024

0.026

0.011

0.008

Pension

0.025

0.012

0.075

0.073

0.017

0.040

Pub Transfer

0.000

0.000

0.004

0.002

0.000

0.008

CCTs

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.001

0.000

-0.002

Private

0.005

0.009

0.013

0.013

0.012

0.017

Source: Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003, 2017}; Colombia {2006,
2017}; Mexico; {1998, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
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As can be seen in Table 10, labor income is the most important source of income in the
three case studies. Labor income’s share in current income varies from 78% in Mexico in 2018
and Colombia in 2016 to 89% in Mexico in 1998. Moreover, the importance of labor income has
decreased over time. The main reasons for a reduction in labor income varies from country to
country, which is caused by the increase of other sources of income. Mexico, which had the
biggest decrease in labor income of 11% from 1998 to 2018, is due to the increase of pensions
(4.4%); private transfers (4.2%); and public social benefits excluding pensions and CCTs (2%).
Moreover, Colombia and Chile suffered a decrease of labor income of 2% from 2007 to 2016
and 1.3% from 2003 to 2017, respectively. This trend was associated with a very small increase
in capital income, pension, and general assistance.
The second most important source of income varies across countries: pensions in Chile
and Colombia and private transfers in Mexico. On the one hand, the pensions share in current
income has slightly increased in all three countries, having the highest increase in Mexico of
4.4%. The pensions share in current income has an increase of 0.5% from 2007 to 2016 in
Colombia and 0.2% from 2003 to 2017 in Chile. On the other hand, the share of private transfers
in current income has also slightly increased in the three countries. Mexico’s share of private
transfers in current income increased 4.2% from 1998 to 2018; Chile’s private transfers share
increased 1.1% from 2003 to 2017, and Colombia’s private transfers share marginally increased
0.7% from 2007 to 2016.
Conversely, CCTs are the least important income source in all three countries and the
income source that has changed the least. Regarding the analysis of the income sources’ share,
Table 10 shows that CCTs are the least concentrated income source in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. CCTs’ share in Chile in 2003 and 2017 was the same: 0.1% of total income. CCTs’

share in Colombia in 2007 was 0% of total income and it increased to 0.7% in 2016.
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Nevertheless, they remained the smallest share. CCTs’ share in Mexico in 1998 was 0.4% of
total income and 1.1% in 2018. As was mentioned, if the share of an income source is small, it is
unlikely to have an impact on inequality (Soares et al., 2007). For this reason, one can state that
CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico may not contribute to impacting inequality because they
are the smallest share of total income. Chiles’s Ethical Family Income Program is about one
tenth the size of the Colombia’s More Families in Action and Mexico’s Prosperity.
The concentration coefficients presented in Table 10 show how each income source is
distributed across the population (Soares et al., 2007) and the effects of each income source on
inequality varies from country to country. Table 10 shows that the high concentration of capital
income contributes to the rise in inequality in all three countries. The concentration coefficient of
capital income in Chile was 0.746 in 2003 and 0.730 in 2017, which were higher than the Gini
index of 0.508 and 0.488 respectively. Similarly, the concentration coefficient of capital income
in Colombia was 0.629 in 2007 and 0.625 in 2016, which were higher than the Gini index of
0.522 and 0.492, respectively. Comparably, the concentration coefficient of capital income in
Mexico was 0.693 in 1998 and 0.656 in 2018, which were higher than the Gini index of 0.509
and 0.438 respectively.
Moreover, the high concentration of labor income contributes to the rise in inequality in
Chile and Mexico. The concentration coefficient of labor income in Chile was 0.555 in 2003 and
0.548 in 2017, which were higher than the Gini index of 0.508 in 2003 and 0.488 in 2017.
Similarly, the concentration coefficient of labor income in Mexico was 0.530 in 1998 and 0.473
in 2018, which were higher than the Gini index of 0.509 and 0.438, respectively. Conversely,
labor income contributes to a reduction of inequality in Colombia. The concentration coefficient
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of labor income in Colombia was 0.547 in 2007 and 0.487 in 2016, which were smaller than the
Gini index of 0.552 and 0.492, respectively.
The pensions concentration coefficient shows different results in Table 10. While
pensions contributed to reducing inequality in Chile in 2003 and 2017 and Mexico in 1998, it
contributed to raising inequality in Mexico in 2018 and Colombia in 2007 and 2016. The
concentration coefficient of pension in Chile was 0.218 in 2003 and 0.102 in 2017, which were
smaller than the Gini index of 0.508 in 2003 and 0.488 in 2017. Conversely, the concentration
coefficient of pension in Colombia was 0.677 in 2007 and 0.638 in 2016, which were higher than
the Gini index of 0.552 and 0.492, respectively. Finally, pensions in Mexico changed from
contributing to the reduction in inequality in 1998 to increasing inequality in 2018. The
concentration coefficient of pension in Mexico was 0.459 in 1998, which was smaller than the
Gini index of 0.509. Conversely, the concentration coefficient of pension in Mexico was 0.488 in
2018, which was higher than the Gini index of 0.438.
Finally, Table 10 shows the contribution of each income source to total inequality.
Moreover, Table 11 shows the percentage contribution of each source to total inequality by
dividing the concentration index over the Gini index. As can be seen, labor income is the highest
variable that contributes to total inequality, ranging from 77% in Colombia in 2016 to 92% in
Mexico in 1998. Pension is the second highest variable that contributes to total inequality and
capital income the third. Conversely, CCTs did not contribute (0%) to inequality in Chile in 2003
and 2017, Colombia in 2007 and 2016, or Mexico in 1998 and 2018. In sum, CCTs in Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico have not contributed to total inequality, but neither have they contributed
to a reduction in inequality.

Table 11. Contribution of income source to total inequality in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
G = ∑CkSK
k

Chile
Income
Source - k

2003

Colombia
2017

Value

%

Value

1998
%

Value

2018

%

0.508

100

0.488

100

0.552

100

0.492

100

0.509

100

0.438

100

Labor

0.459

90

0.446

91

0.436

79

0.379

77

0.469

92

0.367

84

Capital

0.020

4

0.021

4

0.024

4

0.026

5

0.011

2

0.008

2

0.025

5

0.012

2

0.075

13

0.073

15

0.017

3

0.040

9

0.000

0

0.000

0

0.004

1

0.002

0

0.000

0

0.008

2

0.000

0

0.000

0

0.000

0

-0.001

0

0.000

0

-0.002

0

CK SK
Pension
Contribution to
Total Inequality Pub Transfer
CCTs

%

2016

Value

Gini index - GK

Value

2007

Mexico
%

Value

Private
0.005
1
0.009
2
0.013
2
0.013
3
0.012
2
0.017
Source: Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003, 2017}; Colombia {2006,
2017}; Mexico; {1998, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
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Factor Decomposition of Changes in Inequality.
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Chapter 4 explained that the decomposition of the Gini index can be used to establish the
concentration effect of an income source (Sk∆Ck), the composition effect of an income source
((Ck - G)∆Sk ), and the concentration and contribution of an income source to total inequality
((Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck)). The calculation of the decomposition of the Gini index is based on the
following equation (Soares et al., 2007:8-9):
∆G = ∑(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck)
K

:

Sk∆Ck = Concentration effect
(Ck - G)∆Sk = Composition effect
(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck) = Concentration and composition

The concentration effect shows “the concentration of each source income to the total change in
the Gini index” (Soares et al., 2007, p. 15). Additionally, “By dividing the contribution of the
change in each factor by the change in the Gini index, we derive the contribution of the factor as
a percentage of the total change in inequality” (Soares et al., 2007:15). The higher the percentage
of an income source’s concentration effect, the higher its contribution to the total change in
inequality. Conversely, the smaller the percentage of an income source’s concentration effect,
the smaller its contribution to the total change in inequality. In addition, the composition effect
shows the contribution of the changes in the share. The higher the composition effect of an
income source, the higher the impact of an income source on inequality.
Moreover, the concentration and composition effect measure the Gini points that each
income source contributes to the total change in inequality. The higher the percentage of an
income source’s concentration and composition effect, the higher its contribution to the total
change in inequality. Conversely, the smaller the percentage of an income source’s concentration
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and composition effect, the smaller its contribution to the total change in inequality. Moreover, if
the percentage of an income source’s concentration and composition effect is positive, the value
of contribution to the total change would be negative, meaning that the income source
contributes to reducing inequality. Conversely a negative percentage means an increase in
inequality. Finally, the size of the value of an income source’s concentration and composition
effect depends not only on the percentage of the income source’s concentration effect and its
share, but also on the total change of the Gini index from one period of time to other, which
means that a high percentage of an income source’s concentration-and-composition-effect and a
high share in the total change in inequality do not necessarily mean a high value in Gini points to
the total change in inequality.
Table 12 shows the factor decomposition of changes in inequality from 2003 to 2017 in
Chile, 2007 to 2016 in Colombia, and 1998 to 2018 in Mexico. The expected result is that the
CCTs’ concentration and composition effect on Mexico and Colombia will be higher than Chile
because of the size of budget and targeting. It is expected that the percentage of concentration
and composition effect in the three cases will be positive, meaning the value will be negative,
contributing to reducing inequality. Moreover, it is expected that the percentage and the value of
concentration and composition effect of Colombia’s More Families in Action and Mexico’s
Prosperity will be high and robust. Conversely, a small percentage and value in Chile’s Ethical
Family Income Program is expected.
Table 12 shows the results in terms of the concentration and composition effect of each
income source in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. While labor income was the most significant
income source causing changes in inequality in Colombia and Mexico, pension was the most
significant income source causing change in Chile. Labor income was responsible for 77.6% of

the total change in inequality in Colombia and 70.4% in Mexico. In Chile, labor income was
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29.4%, being the second income source responsible for the total change in inequality.
Nevertheless, the contribution of labor income to the reduction of inequality is still small. Labor
income reduced 0.006 Gini points in Chile from 2003 to 2017, 0.047 Gini points in Colombia
from 2007 to 2016, and 0.050 Gini points in Mexico from 1998 to 2018.
In addition, pensions were responsible for 71.4% of the total change in inequality in
Chile, 10% in Mexico, and 7.2% in Colombia. Pensions were the first income source responsible
for the change in inequality in Chile and the second in Colombia and Mexico. Pensions reduced
0.014 Gini points in Chile from 2003 to 2017, 0.004 Gini points in Colombia from 2007 to 2016,
and 0.007 Gini points in Mexico from 1998 to 2018.
Furthermore, private income was the third highest income source responsible for -25.8%
and -14.2% of the total change in inequality in Chile and Mexico, respectively. Therefore,
private income increased inequality by 0.005 Gini points in Chile from 2003 to 2017 and in
Mexico by 0.010 Gini points from 1998 to 2018.
Regarding the impact of CCTs on inequality, Table 12 shows that CCTs’ contribution to
the total change in inequality were insignificant. CCTs were responsible for 7.7% and 6.8% of
the total change in inequality in Colombia and in Mexico, respectively, which represented a
reduction of 0.005 Gini points in Colombia from 2007 to 2016 and 0.005 Gini points in Mexico
from 1998 to 2018. Conversely, the CCTs were responsible for -1.9% of the total change in
inequality in Chile, which represented a value of 0.000 Gini points. In sum, CCTs had a marginal
impact on the total change in inequality in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
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Table 12. Decomposition of the Gini Index and Changes in the Gini Coefficients in Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico
∆G =
∑(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck)
k

∆G - Change in Gini

Sk∆Ck
Concentration
effect

(Ck - G)∆Sk
Composition effect

(Ck - G)∆Sk + Sk∆Ck)

Concentration and
composition

Income
Source - k
Total

Chile
2003 - 2017
Value
%

Colombia
2007 - 2016
Value
%

Mexico
1998 - 2018
Value
%

-0.020

-0.060

-0.072

100

100

100

Labor

-0.005

26.0

-0.047

77.7

-0.047

66.1

Capital

0.000

2.3

0.000

0.3

-0.001

0.7

Pension

-0.013

65.7

-0.004

7.4

0.002

-2.4

Pub Transfer

0.000

-1.0

-0.001

1.4

-0.001

1.5

CCTs

0.000

-1.9

-0.002

3.7

-0.001

1.5

Private

0.000

-2.1

-0.003

4.3

-0.002

3.1

Labor

-0.001

3.4

0.000

-0.2

-0.003

4.3

Capital

0.000

-1.8

0.000

-0.7

-0.001

1.0

Pension

-0.001

5.7

0.000

-0.3

-0.009

12.4

Pub Transfer

0.000

-0.7

0.000

-0.8

-0.001

1.1

CCTs

0.000

0.0

-0.002

4.0

-0.004

5.3

Private

0.005

-23.7

0.001

-1.4

0.012

-17.3

Labor

-0.006

29.4

-0.047

77.6

-0.050

70.4

Capital

0.000

0.4

0.000

-0.4

-0.001

1.7

Pension

-0.014

71.4

-0.004

7.2

-0.007

10.0

Pub Transfer

0.000

-1.7

0.000

0.5

-0.002

2.6

CCTs

0.000

-1.9

-0.005

7.7

-0.005

6.8

Private
0.005 -25.8
-0.002
2.9
0.010 -14.2
Source: Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile
{2003, 2017}; Colombia {2006, 2017}; Mexico; {1998, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
In conclusion, these results show that pensions and labor income were the most important
income source for reducing inequality in Chile and Mexico. While pensions were responsible for
71.4% of inequality reduction in Chile and 10% in Mexico, labor income was responsible for

29.4% of inequality reduction in Chile and 70.4% in Mexico. Conversely, private transfers
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contributed to 25.8% of inequality increase in Chile and 14.2% in Mexico. Similarly, labor
income was the most important income source for reducing inequality in Colombia, representing
77.6% of inequality reduction. Nevertheless, the second most important factor of reducing
inequality in Colombia was CCTs, which represents 7.7% of inequality reduction. In Mexico,
CCTs were responsible for 6.8% reduction of inequality.
In sum, labor income was the most significant variable in the share of current income and
the contribution to total inequality, while CCTs were less significant in both of them. CCTs have
marginally increased their share in current income in Colombia and Mexico, but it had not
increased in Chile. This model suggests that targeting the poorest has improved over the years in
all three countries. The success of Colombia and Mexico in reducing inequality was not
exclusively due to CCTs; labor income was the most important. Chile has not decreased
inequality in recent years, but it is the least unequal country among the three cases. In addition,
CCTs in Chile has been small in amounts and beneficiaries, having an irrelevant impact. CCTs
was not responsible for any change in reducing inequality in Chile. CCTs contribute to
diminishing inequality in Mexico and Colombia, representing the third and the second income
source in reducing inequality, respectively. Nonetheless, the real amount of inequality reduction
is marginal, with 0.005 Gini points in Colombia from 2007 to 2016 and 0.005 Gini points in
Mexico from 1998 to 2008.
This chapter has analyzed the impact of CCTs on inequality. The impact of CCTs on
inequality has been marginal. There lacks robust evidence to support the thesis that CCTs have
diminished inequality. The next chapter analyzes the impact of CCTs on poverty, the efficiency
of CCTs, and describes some control variables.

CHAPTER 6
IMPACT ON POVERTY AND THE EFFICIENCY OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER
PROGRAMS
As was reviewed in chapter 2, most of the literature has focused on the impact of Conditional
Cash Transfer programs (CCTs) on poverty, but it has not discussed sufficiently the efficiency of
CCTs. This chapter examines the impact of CCTs on poverty in Chile, Mexico, and Colombia by
developing two main models. The first one analyzes the effects of taxes, public transfers, and
CCTs on the poverty Headcount Ratio of market income. The second model develops a
counterfactual analysis measuring the impact of CCTs on two measures of poverty: the
Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure. Finally, this chapter analyzes the efficiency of CCTs
applying Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration,’ which was explained in chapter 3.
Impact on Poverty: Gini Index-Net Income
This chapter analyzes the effect of CCTs on poverty in market income, comparing the results of
two different measures: the poverty Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure. Market income is
the money that families earn either through work or through government aid programs prior to
taxation.
Impact of Taxes, Public Transfers, and CCTs on Poverty.
Before the development of the counterfactual analysis of CCTs and Poverty, this section
measures the poverty reduction of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico and compares the poverty rates
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of market income and disposable household income, using the poverty Headcount Ratio. As was
reviewed in chapter 3, “the Headcount ratio . . . measures poverty incidence (i.e., the number or
proportion of poor people), but gives every person equal weight no matter how far they fall from
the poverty line” (LIS, 2012, p. 28).
Impact of taxes and public transfers on poverty. This model separates CCTs from
public transfers in order to measure the impact of CCTs on poverty. In addition, this section
measures and compares the poverty reduction of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, comparing
poverty of market income (mi) and disposable household income (dhi), measuring the effects of
taxes and public transfers on poverty. As was explained in chapter 4, market income is the sum
of factor income, private transfers, and private pensions, meaning the income before any taxes
and government transfers but including private pensions (LIS, 2019b; Mahler & Jesuit, 2006);
factor income is the “[s]um of cash and non-cash income from labour and income from capital”
(LIS, 2020b). Moreover, disposable household income (dhi) is the measure of post-tax and posttransfer income, meaning after the intervention of government through taxation and transfers.
As was reviewed in chapter 4, public transfers are a redistribution of income and wealth
by the government, such as subsidies; CCTs are considered as a public transfer. For this reason,
this dissertation separates CCTs from public transfers in order to measure the impact of CCTs on
inequality. These variables are important because they show the impact of public transfers and
CCTs on poverty in market income, which means that the analysis of these variables shows the
impact of the intervention of government on poverty of market income through public transfers.
Table 13 offers data on a number of aspects of the poverty Headcount Ratio before taxes
and government transfers as well as after taxes and all transfers. Moreover, it offers the impact of
public transfers and taxes on poverty of market income, which shows the impact of
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governmental intervention on poverty Headcount Ratio, meaning the impact of taxes and public
transfers (redistribution) on this poverty measure. While poverty Headcount of market income
(mi) is the percentage of people who are in poverty before governmental intervention through
taxes and all transfers, poverty Headcount Ratio of disposable household income (dhi) is the
percentage of people who are in poverty after taxes and all transfers. This information is
important because it reflects the impact on poverty of government through taxation and
redistribution (public transfers) of market income and establishes the poverty Headcount Ratio
after all transfers and taxations.

Table 13. Poverty Headcount Reduction in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Data in Percentage)
Poverty Headcount
Poverty Headcount
before taxes and
after taxes and all
Poverty Headcount
Dataset
government transfers –
transfers – disposable
reduction
market income (mi)
household income (dhi)
Chile 2003
27.44
19.35
8.09
Chile 2006
26.56
18.49
8.07
Chile 2017
26.71
16.01
10.01
Colombia 2007
25.22
23.24
1.98
Colombia 2016
23.48
20.06
3.42
Mexico 1998
24.13
22.02
2.11
Mexico 2008
24.88
19.67
5.21
Mexico 2018
22.37
16.04
6.33
Note 1: ch96, col07, col16, mx96’ data do not include private pensions
Note 2: All the dataset, excepting mx18, does not include universal benefits
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico; {1998 - 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
The expected result is that redistribution by the government impacts the reduction of the
poverty Headcount of market income, meaning that government redistribution efforts are
expected to reduce poverty by increasing the disposable income of households. As can be seen in
Table 13, the most extensive overall poverty reduction occurred in Chile in 2017. Chile’s (2017)
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poverty reduction is almost three and 1.5 times the poverty reduction of Colombia in 2016 and
Mexico in 2018, respectively, meaning the intervention of government in Chile through taxes
and redistribution has a higher impact on poverty. While Chile’s poverty Headcount reduction
was 10.01 in 2017, Mexico’s poverty reduction was 6.33 in 2018, and Colombia’s poverty
reduction was 3.42 in 2016.
A historical analysis for each country brings the following conclusions. In 20 years,
Mexico has diminished the poverty Headcount of disposable household income by 5.98% from
1998 to 2018 because of the increment in poverty reduction from 2.11% in 1998 to 6.33% in
2018 and the decrease of the poverty Headcount of the market income in 1.76% from 1998 to
2018. This decrease of poverty Headcount is parallel to the expansion of PROSPERA /
Opportunities in terms of number of beneficiaries. In nine years, Colombia has diminished the
poverty Headcount of disposable household income in 3.18% from 2007 to 2016. This decrease
is caused by the decrease of the poverty Headcount of the market income in 1.74% and the
increment in poverty reduction from 1.44% from 2007 to 2016. Finally, Chile has decreased the
poverty Headcount reduction of disposable household income in 3.34% from 2003 to 2017. This
reduction is due to the decrease of the poverty Headcount of market income in 0.73% and the
increase of the poverty Headcount reduction in 1.92% in the same period of time.
While the poverty Headcount Ratio was reduced 10.01% from market income to
disposable household income in Chile in 2017, the poverty Headcount Ratio diminished 6.33%
from market income to disposable household income in Mexico in 1998. In addition, the poverty
Headcount ratio diminished 3.42% in Colombia in 2016. Therefore, Chile has done much better
at poverty reduction than Colombia and Mexico.
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The poverty Headcount of disposable income is not only a product of state redistribution
but also of market income. While Chile’s poverty Headcount of market income was 26.71 in
2017, Mexico’s poverty Headcount was 22.37 in 2018, and Colombia’s poverty Headcount was
23.48 in 2016. On the one hand, household’s income in Chile (2017) is primarily a product of
extensive state redistribution in which the poverty Headcount is the highest rate among the three
case studies, but after taxes an all transfers, Chile reaches and exceeds Colombia (2016) and
Mexico (2018). Chile (2017) diminished the poverty Headcount in 10.01 points from market
income to disposable household income. On the other hand, Colombia (2016) had the higher rate
of poverty Headcount on disposable household income among the three case studies because the
relatively high poverty Headcount Ratio of its disposable household income is more a result of
limited state redistribution than of a highly negative distribution among the poor of private sector
income. Table 13 shows that Colombia’s poverty Headcount of disposable household income
was 20.06 in 2016. In addition, Mexico (2018) diminishes poverty Headcount in 6.33 points
from market income to disposable household income. Even though Mexico (2018) has the
smallest poverty Headcount of market income among the three countries, its poverty Headcount
of disposable household income is higher than Chile because of its narrow poverty reduction
through taxes and transfers. Mexico’s poverty Headcount of disposable household income was
16.04 in 2018 while Chile’s poverty Headcount of disposable household income was 16.01 in
2017.
In sum, Chile has the lowest poverty Headcount of disposable household income over
time compared to Mexico and Colombia. Even though Chile has the highest poverty Headcount
of disposable household income over time, Chile achieves the lowest poverty Headcount Ratio
over the other two case studies, meaning Chile has the better reduction of the poverty Headcount
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after taxes and redistribution. In addition, Mexico has the lowest poverty Headcount of market
income, but its poverty reduction after taxes and transfers has less impact on poverty than in
Chile. Finally, Colombia has the highest poverty Headcount after government intervention
through taxation and redistribution. Having done the analysis of poverty reduction from market
income to disposable household income, it is important to analyze the impact of CCTs on
poverty.
Impact of CCTs on poverty of market income. Poverty Headcount of market income
(mi) is the percentage of people who are in poverty before governmental intervention through
taxes and all transfers. This section measures the poverty Headcount Ratio of the market income
adding CCTs in order to calculate the impact of CCTs on poverty of market income. The
expected result in this model is that CCTs impact the reduction of the national poverty
Headcount Ratio of market income, which means that it is expected that CCTs diminish the
national poverty Headcount Ratio after the intervention of government through taxes and
redistribution. Moreover, it is expected that the impact of CCTs on poverty are greater than the
impact of CCTs on inequality because a cash transfer for poor households could let the
beneficiaries rise above the poverty line easier than reduce the income gap with the richest
households. In addition, it is expected that CCTs in Mexico and Colombia have a greater impact
on poverty than CCTs in Chile because the first two have larger programs in terms of
beneficiaries and budget.
Finally, it is expected that More Families in Action and Prosperity show better results in
reducing poverty in recent years because of the increase of their budget and targeting (number of
beneficiaries) through the years. For the same reason, it is expected that Chile has a similar result
through the years because Ethical Family Income has not had a significant increase of budget
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and targeting. As was described in chapter 1, CCTs in Mexico started in 1997, in Colombia in
2001, and in Chile in 2002 (ECLAC, 2020).
Table 14 shows components in the following columns: i) the poverty Headcount Ratio of
market income, which is the percentage of people who are in poverty before governmental
intervention through taxes and all transfers; ii) the poverty rate in market income adding CCTs,
which is the percentage of people who are in poverty before governmental intervention through
taxes and all transfers, but including the CCTs; and iii) the impact of CCTs on poverty in market
income in all of the countries under examination. The impact of CCTs on poverty of market
income is the result of the subtraction between the first and the second components and shows
the contribution of CCTs from market income to disposable household income. This impact
shows the percentage of poor people that CCTs help lift above the poverty line. A negative result
of this impact means that CCTs reduces poverty. On the contrary, a positive result means that
CCTs increase poverty.

Table 14. Impact of CCTs on Poverty of Market Income in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico

Chile 2003
Chile 2006
Chile 2017
Colombia 2007

Poverty Headcount
Ratio in market
income (mi)
27.435
26.560
26.706
25.220

Poverty Headcount
Ratio in mi
including CCTs
27.412
26.513
26.649
25.201

CCTs impact on
poverty Headcount
Ratio in mi
-0.023
-0.047
-0.057
-0.019

Colombia 2016
Mexico 1998
Mexico 2008
Mexico 2018

23.477
24.135
24.876
22.374

22.034
23.917
23.304
20.777

-1.443
-0.218
-1.572
-1.597

Country and year

Note 1: Poverty is measure by the Headcount Ratio.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico; {1998 - 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
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Colombia’s More Families in Action in 2016 and Mexico’s Prosperity in 2008 and 2018
contributed to diminishing the poverty of market income by around 1.5 poverty Headcount
points, meaning that 1.5% of the national population left poverty because of CCTs. It is notable
how CCTs in Mexico and Colombia have improved over the years in diminishing poverty. While
in 1998, Prosperity only reduced the poverty of market income in 0.218 points, it raised the
impact in reducing poverty in 1.597 points in 2018. More Families in Action has had a greater
increase in diminishing poverty, reducing the market income by 0.019 points in 2007 to 1.443
points in 2016.
These positive results in Colombia and Mexico could explain the increase of targeting
and budget through the years. As was described in chapter 1, targeting is measured by the
number of beneficiaries as percentage of the total population and budget is measured by the
budget of CCTs as percentage of GDP. Prosperity increased targeting from 8.09% in 1998 (at
that time the program was called Opportunities) to 24.13% of the total population in 2018 and
the budget from 0.07% in 1998 to 0.35% of the GDP in 2018. More Families in Action increased
targeting from 17% in 2007 to 21.61% of the total population in 2016 and the budget from
0.17% in 2007 to 0.29% of the GDP in 2016.
Conversely, Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program, has not had the same impact as in
Colombia and Mexico, reducing the poverty Headcount Ratio of market income by 0.023% in
2003, 0.047% in 2006, and 0.057% in 2017. These poor results can also be explained by the
small targeting and small budget of this program. Ethical Family Income Program’s targeting
was 2.56% in 2003 and 4.4% of the total population in 2017. Similarly, Ethical Family Income
Program’s budget was 0.02% in 2003 and 0.14% of the GDP in 2017. The results of the model
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above showed that Chile reduced poverty more than Mexico and Colombia, which may explain
that Chile has funded CCTs less than Colombia and Mexico because of their other povertyreducing programs.
In sum, CCTs have had an impact on diminishing the poverty Headcount Ratio of market
income. While Chile has reduced it by 0.05 points in 2017, Colombia and Mexico have reduced
it by 1.5 points in 2016 and 2018, respectively. I expected that CCTs would have had an
important impact on the poverty of market income. As was described in chapter 1, the main
objective of CCTs is the reduction of poverty. In fact, CCTs have an impact on the poverty of
market income, but it depends on the features of the CCTs. Large CCT programs, in terms of
number of targeting (number of beneficiaries) and budget, such as Mexico and Colombia, have a
greater impact than those smaller programs, such as in Chile. Therefore, Chile’s CCTs do not
have an impact on poverty. Nevertheless, the results do not show that CCTs produced an
important impact on poverty in all three countries.
In addition, if one compares the results of the impact of CCTs on the poverty of market
income developed in this model with the results of the impact of CCTs on inequality of chapter
5, in which the same method was applied, one can conclude that CCTs have a greater impact on
poverty that on inequality of market income. This conclusion is logical if one thinks about the
impact of a cash transfer for a poor household, in which the amount of the transfer will help the
household to achieve and overcome the poverty line. Nevertheless, the results show that few
families who receive the transfer go over the poverty line. These results show that the design of
CCTs programs should have not included the reduction of inequality as one of their main
objectives or they are not sufficiently funded in order to reduce inequality or that money is not
being sufficiently transferred from the rich to the poor.

Counterfactual Analysis of CCTs and Poverty.
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A model to determine the impact of CCTs on poverty is based on the percentage of the
transfers in beneficiaries’ total income and on the impact in poverty by comparing estimated
incomes with a no-CCT counterfactual. This counterfactual analysis recalculates incomes and
poverty rates by taking out CCTs. The following subsections develop a counterfactual analysis,
taking into consideration two different poverty measures: poverty Headcount Ratio (H) and
Interval Measure (HI).
Interval Measure (HI) is the product of Headcount Ratio and the Income Gap (Atkinson,
1987 and Brady, 2003); Income Gap measures poverty intensity or depth. Therefore, the Interval
Measure analyzes “the depth of poverty among households that fall below half their country’s
median income” (Jesuit & Mahler, 2006, p. 495). It is expected that the CCTs increase the
incomes of the poor families in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico by reducing the poverty Headcount
Ratio, meaning the percentage of poor people over the total population. In addition, it is also
expected that CCTs will reduce the Interval Measure, meaning CCTs reduce the poor's average
difference from the median of income.
Moreover, a difference between the results of the counterfactual analysis based on
Headcount Ratio and the counterfactual analysis based on the Interval Measure is expected,
meaning that it is probable that CCTs show a better impact on the Interval Measure than the
Headcount Ratio. It is expected that CCTs show a better impact on the Interval Measure because
the transfer should more effectively reduce the income gap or depth of poverty as opposed to
lifting the beneficiaries above the poverty line. Finally, it is expected that large CCTs, such as in
Mexico and Colombia, will have a significant impact on reducing poverty on both Headcount
Ratio and Interval Measure.
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Counterfactual analysis base on Headcount Ratio. This section looks at the impact of
CCTs on the poverty Headcount Ratio by recalculating income sources and the poverty
Headcount Ratio without CCTs. The difference between the observed poverty rate—which is the
index based on Headcount Ratio including all the income sources—and the poverty rate without
CCTs shows the impact of the CCTs on the poverty Headcount Ratio. Figure 7 shows that
Chile’s CCTs in 2017 did not have a significant impact on poverty, and CCTs in Colombia in
2016 and in Mexico in 2018 had a marginal reduction on the poverty Headcount Ratio.

Figure 7. Impact of CCTs on the Poverty Headcount Ratio in Chile, Colombia and Mexico
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Chile (2017)

Colombia (2016)

Poverty rate without CCT

Mexico (2018)

Observed poverty rate

Note 1: Poverty Headcount Ratio refers to the percentage of all households whose equivalized
income falls <50% of their country’s median.
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2017};
Colombia {2016}; Mexico {2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
In sum, the counterfactual analysis of deducting CCTs’ income from disposable
household income and recalculating the poverty Headcount Ratio in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico shows that CCTs do not have the expected impact, they do not appear to reduce poverty
in Chile and do not significantly reduce poverty in Colombia and Mexico.
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These results can be reinforced and complemented if one analyzes the immediate effect
on poverty of not making transfers, without giving households time to readjust their support
strategies.
Counterfactual analysis base on Interval Measure. In order to calculate the Interval
Measure (HI), one needs to obtain the Headcount Ratio (H) and the Income Gap (I). Chapter 3
explained that the Interval Measure is the product of the Headcount Ratio and the Income Gap
(Atkinson, 1987 and Brady, 2003). Headcount Ratio measures the percentage of the country’s
population of individuals living in poor households. The Income Gap measures poverty intensity
or depth. Table 15 shows the observed poverty rate of Chile in 2017, Colombia in 2016, and
Mexico in 2018 in three different measures: H, I, and IH.

Table 15. Observed Poverty Rate: Poverty Measures in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country / year

Headcount Ratio (H)

Income Gap (I)

Interval Measure (IH)

Chile (2017)

0.16

30.39

4.86

Colombia (2016)

0.20

40.38

8.07

Mexico (2018)
0.16
32.22
5.17
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2017};
Colombia {2016}; Mexico {2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
Moreover, Table 16 shows the measures of poverty (H, I, and IH) without counting CCTs in
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. This data is the counterfactual analysis to determine the impact of
CCTs on poverty (Interval Measure).

Table 16. Counterfactual Analysis: Poverty without CCT in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country / year

Headcount Ratio (H)

Income Gap (I)
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Interval Measure (IH)

Chile (2017)

0.16

30.43

4.88

Colombia (2016)

0.21

42.96

9.04

Mexico (2018)
0.17
35.68
6.15
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2017};
Colombia {2016}; Mexico {2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
Figure 8 uses the data form the two previous tables and shows the impact of CCTs by
measuring the poverty Interval Measure of disposable household income—which includes
income after the intervention of government through taxation and redistribution—in Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico and is compared with a counterfactual analysis, which measures the
poverty Interval Measure of disposable household income without CCTs. The counterfactual
shows what the impact of CCTs is on the poverty Income Gap. Income Gap is the product of the
Headcount Ratio and the Income Gap, which measures depth. “Depth is measured as the poor's
average difference from (…) the median of income” (Brady, 2003, p. 128). In sum, the
counterfactual analysis of poverty without CCTs establishes the impact of CCTs on poverty,
which is measured by the percentage of the country’s population of individuals living in poor
households and poverty depth.
Figure 8 shows that Chile’s CCTs in 2017 did not have a significant impact on poverty,
and CCTs in Colombia in 2016 and in Mexico in 2018 had a marginal reduction on the poverty
Interval Measure. Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program marginally reduced the poverty
Interval Measure by only 0.013 in 2017. The observed rate in Chile in 2017 was 0.16, which
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means 16% of the total population were poor people (2,947,070 people)4; the poverty Headcount
Ratio without CCTs (counterfactual analysis) was also 16%, meaning CCTs in Chile did not
have an impact on the poverty Headcount Ratio. Moreover, the Income Gap in Chile in 2017 was
30.39, which means that the income of the poor people was 30.39% under the median income;
the Income Gap without CCTs was 30.43%. Therefore, CCTs contributed to reducing the Income
Gap by 0,04%, which is a marginal result. In sum, it can be established that Ethical Family
Income did not have an impact on the Interval Measure in 2017; the poverty observed rate of
Ethical Family Income was 4.88 in 2017. This result did not have any substantial change with the
Interval Measure without CCTs, which was 04.86 in 2017. This result is similar to the one
presented in the last two models.

Figure 8. Impact of CCTs on the Poverty Interval Measure in Chile, Colombia and Mexico
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Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2017};
Colombia {2016}; Mexico {2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.

1

The total population estimated in Chile in 2017 was 18,419,192, according to the National Institute of Statistics
(Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas).

Colombia’s More Family in Action decreased the poverty Interval Measure by 0.97
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points in 2016. Even though this is a positive impact on reduction of poverty, it is a marginal
result. The observed rate in Colombia in 2016 was 0.20, which means 20% (9,552,169 people) of
the total population were poor people; the poverty Headcount Ratio without CCTs was 21%,
meaning More Family in Action had an impact on reducing poverty Headcount Ratio by 1%,
which represents 477,608 people5. Moreover, the Income Gap in Colombia in 2016 was 40.38,
which means that the income of the poor people was 40.38% under the median income; the
Income Gap without CCTs was 42.97%. As a result, More Family in Action reduced the Income
Gap by 2.6%, which is bigger than Chile.
Mexico’s Prosperity diminishes the poverty Interval Measure by 0.98 points, which is
also a marginal result. The observed rate in Mexico in 2018 was 0.16, which means 16%
(20.052.447 people) of the total population were poor people; the poverty Headcount Ratio
without CCTs was 17%, meaning Prosperity had an impact on reducing poverty Headcount
Ratio by 1%, which represents 1,253,277 people 6. Moreover, the Income Gap in Mexico in 2018
was 32.22, which means that the income of the poor people was 32.22% under the median
income; the Income Gap without CCTs was 35.68%. As a result, More Family in Action reduced
the Income Gap by 3.4%, which is bigger than Chile and Colombia.
Therefore, it can be inferred that Ethical Family Income does not have any impact on the
reduction of poverty Interval Measure. As was mentioned in the last model, this result can be
caused by the size of targeting and the budget of this program, which is smaller than Mexico and
Colombia. Therefore, chapter 7 will deepen this analysis in the descriptive cross-national
variance model.

2
3

The population of Colombia in 2017 was 47,760,845 based on governmental sources (DANE, 2020a).
The total population estimated in Mexico in 2018 was 125,327,797, according to the Government of Mexico.
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As a conclusion, the poverty Headcount Ratio and the poverty Interval Measure present
differences in the counterfactual analysis. CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico do not have an
impact on poverty, using the Headcount Ratio measure. On the contrary, the same analysis using
the Interval Measure shows that CCTs in Colombia and Mexico have an impact. The difference
of the counterfactual analysis between both measures of poverty could show that CCTs in
Mexico and Colombia are impacting the poorest. The Headcount Ratio and the Interval Measure
take into consideration the percentage of the population socially excluded (H), but the Interval
Measure also takes into consideration the depth of poverty. CCTs in Mexico and Colombia do
not have the impact expected, taking into consideration the large coverage and budget described
in chapter 1. This analysis will be described in chapter 7, describing the control variables.
Moreover, this counterfactual analysis shows the immediate effect on poverty of not
making CCTs, without giving households time to readjust their support strategies. This is a static
exercise that only considers the first-order effect of transfers. In a real situation, households
would surely respond by changing their behavior—for instance working more hours for
employed members, members previously inactive entering the labor market, etc.—and
diminishing the impact on poverty, meaning the results will be even narrower than this
counterfactual analysis shows. Finally, it can be established that CCTs have had a marginal
impact on poverty.
Efficiency: Targeting Beneficiaries
This dissertation has analyzed the impact of CCTs on inequality in chapter 5 and on poverty in
this chapter. In addition, the purpose of this dissertation is to measure and analyze the efficiency
of CCTs. Chapter 2 reviewed the concept of efficiency, which establishes the degree to which
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transfers are targeted towards low-income groups and it is measured by the Kakwani’s (1986)
‘index of concentration’.
The efficiency of CCTs in Table 17 shows Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’.
According to Mahler and Jesuit (2006), an index value of -1.0 means that the poorest person gets
all of the transfer income, 0 means everybody gets an equal amount, and 1.0 means the richest
person gets all of the transfer income. Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ only applies to
households that are poor. Therefore, low target efficiency means that CCTs do not focus on the
very poor among those who are merely poor, but it does not mean that they do not focus on the
poor more generally. This dissertation analyzes the efficiency of CCT programs in Chile (2003,
2006, and 2017), Colombia (2007, 2016), and Mexico (1998, 2008, and 2018).

Table 17. CCTs Efficiency in Targeting the Poorest in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country / year

Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index
of concentration

Chile (2003)

-0.10

Chile (2006)

-0.08

Chile (2017)

-0.10

Colombia (2007)

0.14

Colombia (2016)

0.03

Mexico (1998)

0.01

Mexico (2008)

-0.03

-0.02
Mexico (2018)
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org
(Chile {2017}; Colombia {2016}; Mexico {2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
The expected result in this model is that the coefficient for most of the case studies gets
negative values, meaning that most of the beneficiaries are the poorest people. Moreover, it is
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expected that the results are closest to -1.0, which means that the poorest of the poor people are
the beneficiaries. Nonetheless, it is expected that the larger the CCT is, the less efficient it is,
because it is easier to only target poor families when having a small size target and budget.
Regarding the CCTs that have been increased over the years in targeting (number of
beneficiaries and budget) and budget, such as Mexico and Chile, it is expected the Kakwani’s
(1986) ‘index of concentration’ will get closer to zero, but still being negative, which means that
CCTs would be less efficient. Conversely, in the case of Chile’s CCTs, it is expected to be highly
efficient because it is a small program in terms of targeting (number of beneficiaries) and budget,
meaning the coefficient should be negative and close to -1.
Table 17 shows that Chile’s CCTs are the only programs that had a negative Kakwani’s
index, meaning the poorest were targeted. The Kakwani’s index in Chile was -0.10 in 2003 and
2017. Still these results are closer to zero than one, meaning it targeted the poor, but not
necessarily the poorest among the poor. Conversely, the Kakwani’s index for Colombia’s More
Families in Action in 2007 and 2016 presented a positive result, meaning it did not target the
poorest. Nevertheless, the index in Colombia was getting closer to 0, having a result of 0.14 in
2003 to 0.03 in 2016, meaning the program was getting more efficient, but still does not have
good results. Finally, Mexico’s Prosperity was the closest to zero among the cases, meaning both
the rich and poor were beneficiaries of the program.
In conclusion, there are slight differences among the three programs. On the one hand,
Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has the highest target-efficient among the three
programs. On the other hand, Colombia’s More Families in Action is the least efficient.
Moreover, it was expected that the changes of the size of the program, such as targeting and
budget, will negatively affect the efficiency of the program. Two conclusions are made regarding
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the size of CCTs: first, it seems that budget and size did not negatively affect the efficiency of
the program, meaning that the size could have positively affected the efficiency of the program.
Second, small programs have better efficiency, such as in Chile.
Colombia and Mexico have significantly grown the targeting and budget through the
years, and their efficiency has decreased. Mexico’s Prosperity increased targeting from 8.09% in
1998 (at that time the programs was called Opportunities) to 24.13% of the total population in
2018 and budget from 0.07% in 1998 to 0.35% of the GDP in 2018. Conversely, Prosperity
increased its efficiency from 0.01 Kakwani index points in 1998 to (0.02) Kakwani index points
in 2018.
Similarly, while More Families in Action increased targeting from 17% in 2007 to
21.61% of the total population in 2016 and budget from 0.17% in 2007 to 0.29% of the GDP in
2016, More Families in Action increased its efficiency from 0.14 Kakwani index points in 2007
to 0.01 Kakwani index points in 2016. Nonetheless, these results should be verified in a variance
model to establish the correlation between the variables efficiency with the variables targeting
and budget. Therefore chapter 7 describes a Cross-National Model, in which dependent
variables, independent variables, and some control variables are defined and described.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that Chile reduced poverty more than Mexico and
Colombia, which may explain that Chile funds CCTs less than Colombia and Mexico because of
their other poverty-reducing programs. Therefore, Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has
not reduced poverty. In addition, larger CCTs’ sizes in terms of beneficiaries and budget have a
greater impact that smaller sizes. Those are the cases of Mexico and Colombia. Nevertheless, the
impact is still not robust.
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Moreover, the measure of efficiency, which establishes the degree to which transfers are
targeted towards low-income groups, has shown that only Chile’s CCTs have an efficient
targeting, meaning it targets low-income groups. Conversely, Colombia and Mexico do not
target only the poorest, meaning their targeting is less efficient. So, part of the problem with
CCTs then is that they might not be targeting enough the poorest of the poor people to have
much of an effect on inequality or poverty.

CHAPTER 7
DESCRIPTIVE MULTIVARIATE, CROSS-NATIONAL MODEL
Finally, this chapter describes a cross-national variance model, which could explain the changes
on poverty and inequality in the countries of analysis taking into consideration some control
variables. Because three dependent variables are described in this chapter, three models will also
be presented. The small number of cases (n=8) of these models does not allow for
generalizability. Nevertheless, because this dissertation uses LIS data, the results for these case
studies can easily be compared to results for other countries in Latin America and elsewhere.
Therefore, the contribution of this dissertation is that the results can easily be placed in a broader
context. The variables that comprised this model are divided in two groups: first, some variables
that have been found during the development of this dissertation; second, external variables that
the literature has considered relevant to include in this kind of analysis.
The dependent variables are a result of the models developed in previous chapters that
measures CCTs’ efficiency and the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty. Moreover, the
independent variables are defined by the key features of CCTs explained in chapter 1, which are
related to their budget and coverage. Finally, the control variables are divided by two main
groups: economic variables and institutional variables. The following subsections summarize the
independent and dependent variables that were already explained and describes the control
variables. In addition, each variable is ranked from one to three in order to describe the three
models at the end of the chapter. This model seeks to find how significantly related the
150
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dependent and control variables are with the changes of inequality in the countries of analysis,
how significantly related they are to the changes of poverty, and finally, how significantly related
they are to the efficiency of CCTs.
Dependent Variables: CCTs’ impact on Inequality and Poverty, and CCTs’ Efficiency
This section describes the three dependent variables that are the main focus of this dissertation:
CCTs’ impact on inequality reduction, CCTs’ impact on poverty reduction, and CCTs’
efficiency. Therefore, three models are described at the end of this chapter, one for each
dependent variable.
CCTs’ impact on inequality reduction.
First, CCTs’ impact on inequality reduction was measured by the factor decomposition of
changes in inequality from 2003 to 2017 in Chile, 2007 to 2016 in Colombia, and 1998 to 2018
in Mexico. The concentration and composition effect measure the Gini points that each income
source contributes to the total change in inequality. The higher the percentage of an income
source’s concentration and composition effect, the higher its contribution to the total change in
inequality. Conversely, the smaller the percentage of an income source’s concentration and
composition effect, the smaller its contribution to the total change in inequality. Moreover, if the
percentage of an income source’s concentration and composition effect is positive, the value of
contribution to the total change would be negative, meaning that the income source contributes
to reducing inequality. Conversely, a negative percentage means an increase in inequality. As
was described in chapter 1, CCTs in Mexico started in 1997, in Colombia in 2001, and in Chile
in 2002 (ECLAC 2020).
Table 18 shows that CCTs’ contribution to the total change in inequality were
insignificant. CCTs were responsible for 7.7% and 6.8% of the total change in inequality in

Colombia and in Mexico, respectively, which represented a reduction of 0.005 Gini points in
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Colombia from 2007 to 2016 and 0.005 Gini points in Mexico from 1998 to 2018. Conversely,
the CCTs were responsible for -1.9% of the total change in inequality in Chile, which
represented a value of 0.000 Gini points. In sum, CCTs had a marginal impact on the total
change in inequality in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The results are that Mexico’s Prosperity
and Colombia’s More Families in Action are ranked 1st, and Chile’s Ethical Family Income
Program is ranked 3rd.

Table 18. Decomposition of the Gini Index, Changes in the Gini Coefficients and Ranking
Country and year

CCTs’ contribution to total
inequality in Gini points

Ranking

3
Chile (2003-2017)
0.000
1
Colombia (2007-2016)
-0.005
1
Mexico (1998-2018)
-0.005
Source: Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile
{2003, 2017}; Colombia {2006, 2017}; Mexico; {1998, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
In order to rank the results of this dependent variable, one can state that negative numbers
are better than positive ones because they mean that the impact of CCTs reduce inequality.
Conversely, a positive result means an increase on inequality. Therefore, Table 18 shows that the
highest negative number is ranked one and zero is ranked as three because there was not decrease
at all in inequality in Chile.
CCTs’ impact on poverty reduction.
Second, CCTs’ impact on poverty reduction was measured by the counterfactual analysis
of the impact of CCTs on the poverty Interval Measure in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in
chapter 6. This dissertation measured the market income Gini index adding CCTs to calculate the

impact of CCTs on the poverty Interval Measure of market income. This is based on the
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percentage of the transfers in beneficiaries’ total income and the impact in poverty by comparing
estimated incomes with a no-CCT counterfactual. This counterfactual analysis recalculates
incomes and poverty Interval Measure by taking out CCTs. A positive result means that CCTs
reduce the poverty Interval Measure; the larger the result, the larger the impact. Table 19 shows
the impact of CCTs on reducing the poverty Interval Measure in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
Chapter 6 analyzed the results of the impact of CCTs on reducing the poverty Interval
Measure. Chile’s CCTs in 2017 did not have a significant impact on poverty, and CCTs in
Colombia in 2016 and in Mexico in 2018 had a marginal reduction on the poverty Interval
Measure. Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program marginally reduced the poverty Interval
Measure by only 0.01 in 2017. Colombia’s More Family in Action decreased the poverty Interval
Measure by 0.97 points in 2016. Mexico’s Prosperity reduced the poverty Interval Measure by
0.98 points, which is also a marginal result.

Table 19. Impact of CCTs on the Poverty Interval Measure in Chile, Colombia and Mexico
Country and year

CCTs impact on Interval
measure of market income

Chile (2003)
0.04
Chile (2006)
0.05
Chile (2017)
0.01
Colombia (2007)
0.02
Colombia (2016)
0.97
Mexico (1998)
0.27
Mexico (2008)
1.40
Mexico (2018)
0.98
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003,
2006, 2017}; Colombia {2007, 2016}; Mexico {1998, 2008, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.

In order to describe the models and to rank the results of this dependent variable, this
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section determines the average of the results for each country (see Table 20). Then, the variables
are ranked according to the impact on poverty. These results show that a positive result means a
reduction on poverty. Conversely, a negative result means an increase in poverty. Therefore,
Table 20 shows that the highest positive average-result is ranked as one and the lowest averageresult is ranked as three.

Table 20. Impact of CCTs on the Poverty Interval Measure and Ranking
Average of CCTs’ impact on
Ranking
Interval Measure of market income
Chile
0.03
3
Colombia
0.50
2
Mexico
0.88
1
Source: Prepared by the author based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database,
http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003, 2006, 2017}; Colombia {2007, 2016}; Mexico
{1998, 2008, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS
Country and year

CCTs’ efficiency.
Finally, CCTs’ efficiency was measured by the results of the Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of
concentration’ in chapter 6. This index establishes the degree to which transfers target lowincome groups. Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ only applies to households that are
poor. Therefore, low target efficiency means that CCTs do not focus on the very poor among
those who are merely poor, but it does not mean that they do not focus on the poor more
generally. This dissertation analyzed the efficiency of CCTs in Chile (2003, 2006, and 2017),
Colombia (2007, 2016), and Mexico (1998, 2008, and 2018). Table 21 shows the efficiency of
CCTs through the Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’.

According to Mahler and Jesuit (2006), an index value of -1.0 means that the poorest
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person gets all of the transfer income, 0 means everybody gets an equal amount, and 1.0 means
the richest person gets all of the transfer income. Table 21 shows that Chile’s CCTs are the only
programs that had a negative Kakwani’s index, meaning the poorest were targeted more than the
rest of the poor. The Kakwani’s index in Chile was -0.10 in 2003 and 2017. Still these results are
closer to zero than one, meaning it targeted the poor, but not necessarily the poorest among the
poor. Conversely, Kakwani’s index for Colombia’s More Families in Action in 2007 and 2016
presented a positive result, meaning it did not target the poorest. Nevertheless, the index in
Colombia was getting closer to zero, having a result of 0.14 in 2003 to 0.03 in 2016, meaning the
program was getting more efficient, but still does not have good results. Finally, Mexico’s
Prosperity was the closest to zero among the cases, meaning the poorest of the poor were not
beneficiaries of the program.

Table 21. CCTs Efficiency in Targeting the Poorest in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index
of concentration
-0.10
Chile (2003)
-0.08
Chile (2006)
-0.10
Chile (2017)
0.14
Colombia (2007)
0.03
Colombia (2016)
0.01
Mexico (1998)
-0.03
Mexico (2008)
Mexico (2018)
-0.02
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003,
2006, 2017}; Colombia {2007, 2016}; Mexico {1998, 2008, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS.
Country / year

Table 22 shows the average of the results for each country in order to describe the models
and to rank the results of this dependent variable. Therefore, the variables are ranked according

to the CCTs’ efficiency for each country. These results show that a negative index means the

156

program is efficient because it targets the poorest of the poor. Conversely, a positive index
means a CCT program is not efficient because it targets the poor but not the poorest among them.
Consequently, Table 22 shows that the highest negative average-index is ranked one and the
lowest average-index is ranked three. The results are Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program
ranks as one, Mexico’s Prosperity as two, and Colombia’s More Families in Action as three. The
next subsections describe the independent and control variables.

Table 22. CCTs Efficiency and Ranking
Average of Kakwani’s (1986)
Ranking
‘index of concentration’
Chile
-0.09
1
Colombia
0.09
3
Mexico
-0.01
2
Source: Prepared by the author based on Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database,
http://www.lisdatacenter.org (Chile {2003, 2006, 2017}; Colombia {2007, 2016}; Mexico
{1998, 2008, 2018}). Luxembourg: LIS
Country / year

Independent Variables: CCTs’ Most Important Features
The cross-national model proposed and described by this dissertation comprises two independent
variables, which are defined based on the main features of CCTs: budget size and scope of
targeting. The budget size of the program refers to the percentage of the GDP that each national
government expends on CCTs. The scope of the program refers to the coverage in terms of
number of beneficiaries of CCTs.In order to establish the data of the independent variables in
each of the models, the data is taken from the year the CCTs started to the year before the most
recent data that the dependent variables use. Therefore, the independent variable is based on the
data of Chile from 2002 to 2016, Colombia from 2001 and 2015, and Mexico from 1997 to 2017.

CCTs’ Budget Size.
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CCTs’ budget was defined in chapter 1 as the governmental budget of CCTs as a
percentage of the GDP. There are three objectives of this model with this independent variable: i)
to find how significantly related is the size of the budget with the impact of CCTs on inequality;
ii) to find how significantly related is the size of the budget with the impact of CCTs on poverty;
and iii) to find how significantly related is the size of the budget with the efficiency of CCTs.
Table 23 shows the CCTs’ budget as a percentage of the GDP in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

Table 23. Budget of CCTs in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Percentage of GDP)
Year
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
1997
N.A
N.A
0.03%
1998
N.A
N.A
0.07%
1999
N.A
N.A
0.14%
2000
N.A
N.A
0.14%
2001
N.A
0.01%
0.18%
2002
N.A
0.04%
0.23%
2003
0.02%
0.10%
0.29%
2004
0.07%
0.07%
0.29%
2005
0.09%
0.07%
0.32%
2006
0.09%
N/A
0.32%
2007
0.08%
0.17%
0.32%
2008
0.09%
0.25%
0.34%
2009
0.10%
0.28%
0.38%
2010
0.08%
0.36%
0.47%
2011
0.13%
0.23%
0.39%
2012
0.14%
0.18%
0.35%
2013
0.13%
0.23%
0.41%
2014
0.14%
0.30%
0.42%
2015
0.15%
0.29%
0.41%
2016
0.13%
N.A
0.42%
2017
0.14%
N.A
0.36%
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and
the CEPALSTAT database.
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In order to describe the models and to rank the results of this independent variable, this
section determines the average of the results for each country in the years defined above (see
Table 24). Then, the variables are ranked according to the amount of the budget as a percentage
of GDP. The higher the budget of CCTs as a percentage of GDP, the higher the means that let a
government impact the poor. Therefore, Table 24 shows that the highest average of the budget as
a percentage of GDP is ranked as one and the lowest average is ranked as three. The results are
Mexico’s average budget of CCTs as a percentage of GDP was 0.3% and it was ranked as one;
Colombia’s average was 0.18%, ranked as two; and Chile’s average was 0.10, ranked as three.

Table 24. Average of Budget of (percentage of GDP) and Ranking

Country

Average of Budget of
CCTs as a percentage of
GDP

Ranking

Chile
0.0010
3
Colombia
0.0018
2
Mexico
0.0030
1
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and
the CEPALSTAT database.
The expected results of the correlation among CCTs’ budget size vary according to the
analysis of each dependent variable. This dissertation has shown the relation between the budget
size of CCTs and the impact of the program on poverty. For this reason, it is expected that the
higher the budget of CCTs, the greater the impact of CCTs are on lowering poverty. In addition,
this dissertation has described that there lacks robust evidence of a relationship between the
budget size of a CCT and the impact of the program on inequality. Therefore, it is expected that
there is not a significant relationship between the budget size of CCTs and the impact of CCTs

on poverty. Finally, Chile’s Ethical Family Income has had a smaller budget than Colombia’s
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More families in Action, and Mexico’s Prosperity, and Ethical Family Income has been more
efficient than the other two programs. For this reason, the expected result is that the higher the
budget of CCTs, the smaller the efficiency.
CCTs’ Targeting Size.
The second independent variable is CCTs’ targeting size, which is the coverage in terms
of number of beneficiaries of CCTs. This variable was defined in chapter 1 as the individuals in
recipient households of CCTs as a percentage of the total population. There are three objectives
of this model with this independent variable: i) to find how significantly related is the coverage
with the impact of CCTs on inequality; ii) to find how significantly related is the coverage with
the impact of CCTs on poverty; and iii) to find how significantly related is the coverage with the
efficiency of CCTs. Table 25 shows the individuals in recipient households of CCTs in Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico as a percentage of the total population.
The expected results of the correlation among CCTs’ targeting size vary according to the
analysis of each dependent variable. This dissertation has described the relationship between the
targeting size of CCTs and the impact of the program on poverty. For this reason, it is expected
that the higher the targeting of CCTs, the greater the impact of CCTs on poverty, whether the
people targeted are actually poor. In addition, this dissertation has described that there lacks
robust evidence of a relation between the targeting size of a CCT and the impact of the program
on inequality. Therefore, it is expected that there is not a significant relationship between the
targeting size of CCTs and the impact of CCTs on poverty. Finally, this dissertation has analyzed
that Chile’s Ethical Family Income has targeted fewer people (meaning fewer beneficiaries) than
Colombia’s More families in Action and Mexico’s Prosperity; Ethical Family Income has been
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more efficient than the other two programs. For this reason, the expected result is that the higher
the targeting of CCTs, the smaller the efficiency.

Table 25. Individuals in recipient households of CCTs (Percentage of Total Population)
Year / Country

Chile

Colombia

Mexico

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.15%
2.56%
3.96%
5.41%
6.73%
7.73%
8.93%
10.11%
11.09%
12.33%
13.37%
2.38%
1.55%
1.78%
4.68%
4.44%

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2.68%
3.93%
4.16%
3.98%
5.60%
7.38%
17.00%
17.50%
26.01%
24.37%
22.36%
19.11%
24.04%
23.52%
22.29%
21.61%
21.50%

1.55%
8.09%
11.51%
12.19%
15.14%
20.35%
20.12%
23.44%
23.13%
22.78%
22.41%
22.26%
22.34%
24.29%
23.35%
22.47%
22.93%
23.89%
23.57%
23.06%
25.11%

Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online]
http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and the CEPALSTAT database.
Note 1: Chile: Solidarity Chile.
Note 2: Colombia: More Families in Action.
Note 3: Mexico: PROSPERITY (1998), Opportunities (2008), and Prosperity (2018).
Table 26 shows the average of the results for each country in the years defined above in
order to describe the models and to rank the results of this independent variable. Therefore, the

variables are ranked according to the amount of individual recipient households of CCTs as a
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percentage of the total population. The higher the targeting as a percentage of total population,
the higher the impact of CCTs. Consequently, Table 26 shows that the highest average of
individual recipient households of CCTs as a percentage of total population is ranked as one and
the lowest average is ranked as three. The results are Mexico’s average of the beneficiaries of
CCTs as percentage of total population was 20%, ranked as one; Colombia’s average was 15%,
ranked as two; finally, Chile’s average was 6%, ranked as three.

Table 26. Average of Beneficiaries of CCTs (Percentage of Total Population) and Ranking
Country

Average of targeting
Ranking
Chile
6.25%
3
Colombia
14.93%
2
Mexico
19.71%
1
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database of non-contributory social protection
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean of the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, Conditional cash transfers programs [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/, and
the CEPALSTAT database.
Note 1: Colombia’s 2016 data is not available. The value showed is from 2015.
Descriptive Control Variables: Economic and Institutional Variables
Finally, this model proposes two economic control variables and four institutional variables. The
economic variables are GDP growth and economic globalization. The institutional variables are
ideological orientation of government, participation and political voice and corruption. The
following subsections describe and analyze these control variables in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. In order to establish the data of the control variable in each of the models, the data is
taken from the year before the CCTs started to the year before the most recent data that the
dependent variables use. Therefore, the control variable is based on the data of Chile from 2001
to 2016, Colombia from 2000 and 2015, and Mexico from 1996 to 2017.

Economic Control Variables.
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As was explained, the economic control variables of this proposed model are GDP
growth and economic globalization.
GDP growth. The importance of controlling the models by GDP growth is that it can
cause the reduction of inequality and poverty. Measuring the GDP growth instead of the GDP
size may give a better understanding of the share of the economy and its influence on poverty
and inequality. Table 27 and Figure 9 show the GDP growth of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

Table 27. Rate of Growth of Annual Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices (Percentage)
Years/ Country
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
1996
7.41
2.06
6.77
1997
7.43
3.43
6.85
1998
4.32
0.57
5.16
1999
-0.41
-4.20
2.75
2000
5.33
2.92
4.94
2001
3.30
1.68
-0.40
2002
3.11
2.50
-0.04
2003
4.09
3.92
1.45
2004
7.21
5.33
3.92
2005
5.74
4.71
2.31
2006
6.32
6.78
4.50
2007
4.91
6.85
2.29
2008
3.53
3.26
1.14
2009
-1.56
1.21
-5.29
2010
5.84
4.35
5.12
2011
6.11
7.36
3.66
2012
5.32
3.90
3.64
2013
4.05
4.57
1.35
2014
1.77
4.73
2.80
2015
2.30
2.96
3.29
2016
1.67
2.09
2.91
2017
1.28
1.35
2.12
Note 1: ECLAC estimates based on national sources.
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org

Figure 9. Rate of Growth of Annual Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices (Percentage)
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Note 1: ECLAC estimates based on national sources.
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org
Mexico is one of the largest economies, being the second economy in Latin America after
Brazil in 2018. The GDP reached US$ 1,223 billion, which was 269% higher than Colombia’s
GDP. Colombia generated a GDP of US$ 330.9 billion in 2018. It was ranked as the fourth
economy in Latin America. Nonetheless, the GDP per capita in Colombia was US$ 6,642, which
was lower than Chile and Mexico (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2020b). Chile was the
fifth economy in Latin America with a nominal GDP of US$ 298.1 billion in 2018. Nevertheless,
the GDP per capita in Chile was US$ 15,902 in 2018, being the highest among the three
countries (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2020a).
Because of its economic structure, Chile was affected by the slowdown in the world
economy and the reduction of international prices of commodities, such as copper. Nevertheless,
the GDP grew at rates higher than 5% at the beginning of the 2010s. Then it narrowed to 1.3% in
2016 and 1.5% in 2017. Subsequently, the economy raised to 4% in 2018. Finally, a difficult

external environment and the internal social crisis and the loss of institutional confidence

164

generated resentment in economic activity and the GDP grew 1% in 2019 (Ministry of
Commerce of Colombia, 2020a).
In addition, Mexico's GDP decreased 0.1%. in 2019. Mexico has not shown a negative
variation since the international financial crisis in 2009. The country was affected by
uncertainties generated by the external context, with world trade tensions and the commercial
war between the United States of America and China. Mexico demonstrated a fall in investment
and a low level of consumption, all in public adjustment related to the new government (Ministry
of Commerce of Colombia, 2020c). Moreover, the reduction in international prices of mining
products, especially oil, and the drop in external and internal demand impacted economic growth
in Colombia. After growing 5.1% on average in 2011-2014, Colombia’s economy registered
variations in GDP of 2.1% and 1.4% in 2016 and 2017, respectively. However, the recovery was
evident with GDP growth of 2.5% in 2018 and 3.3% in 2019 (Ministry of Commerce of
Colombia, 2020b).
As was mentioned in chapter 4, there is a relationship between GDP growth and
disposable household income inequality. The larger the GDP, the larger the fiscal redistribution,
meaning the larger the investment on CCTs. For this reason, a negative relationship between
GDP growth and inequality and poverty is expected. Even though some studies show that the
greater the GDP growth, the smaller the inequality and the poverty, other studies show that GDP
growth does not necessarily reduce poverty or inequality. The models that this chapter is
describing consider that GDP growth could positively affect the impact of CCTs on inequality
and poverty.

Consequently, the expected result is that the greater the GDP growth, the greater the
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impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty, meaning a significant relationship between
globalization and the impact of CCTs is expected. Conversely, the larger the investment on
CCTs—which is caused by the increase of the GDP growth—, the smaller the efficiency of
CCTs. Therefore, a negatively significant relationship between GDP growth and the efficiency of
CCTs is expected. The greater the GDP growth, the smaller the efficiency of CCTs.
In order to describe the models and to rank the results of this control variable, this
section determines the average of the results for each country in the years defined above (see
Table 28). Then the variables are ranked according to the percentage of annual GDP growth. The
higher the percentage of annual GDP growth, the higher the means that let a government impact
the poor. Therefore, Table 28 shows that the highest average of the percentage of growth of
annual GDP is ranked as one and the lowest average is ranked as three. The results are Chile and
Colombia ranked as one; the decision to rank the same position was because of the proximity of
their results. While the average of the percentage of the GDP growth in Chile from 2001 to 2016
was 3.98, the percentage of the GDP growth in Colombia from 2000 to 2015 was 4.19.
Moreover, Mexico’s average was 2.78. Therefore, Mexico ranks as three.

Table 28. Average of the GDP Growth (Percentage) and Ranking
Country

Average of GDP
growth (percentage)

Ranking

Chile
3.98
1
Colombia
4.19
1
Mexico
2.78
3
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org

Economic globalization. Economic globalization is a variable that could impact the
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change of inequality and poverty. “The most traditional vehicle of economic openness cited by
globalization critics is international trade” (Mahler, 2004), which is represented by commercial
balance. In addition, a second variable to take into consideration is direct foreign investment
(Mahler, 2004). Therefore, this dissertation recommends using the degree of openness of the
economy, which is an index that measures how commerce (imports and exports) take place and
affect the size and growth of a national economy. This index is measured by adding imports and
exports in goods and services and divides this sum by GDP. The larger the ratio, the more the
country is exposed to international trade. Figure 10 and Table 29 shows the degree of openness
of the economy, at current prices in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

Figure 10. Degree of Openness of the Economy in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Current Prices)
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Note 1: ECLAC estimates based on national sources.
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org
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Table 29. Degree of Openness of the Economy in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Current Prices)
Years /
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Country
54.77
31.02
50.42
1996
54.95
30.67
48.78
1997
1998
54.32
30.93
51.00
1999
55.35
30.51
50.62
2000
59.32
34.37
52.43
2001
63.14
35.76
47.17
2002
63.39
34.81
46.70
2003
66.32
38.52
50.21
2004
69.73
37.79
53.49
2005
71.62
37.54
53.94
2006
73.10
39.75
56.09
2007
76.41
37.18
56.80
2008
80.79
39.24
57.78
2009
66.34
35.14
55.97
2010
69.06
34.32
60.76
2011
72.21
39.53
63.47
2012
68.27
38.87
65.77
2013
64.97
38.01
63.76
2014
65.27
37.49
64.96
2015
58.97
38.36
71.17
2016
55.71
36.20
76.10
2017
55.67
35.26
77.19
Note 1: ECLAC estimates based on national sources.
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org
According to the Ministry of Commerce of Colombia (2020d), the economic
globalization has had an impact on income inequality. The increase in wage inequality in Latin
America ––especially in Mexico and Chile––was the consequence of technological change
biased by international trade and investment (De Ferranti et al., 2003). Most countries in the
region experienced a significant increase in relative demand and skill premiums for more
educated workers. Nonetheless, this qualification of the workforce offers an opportunity for
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long-term development, as families and the public sector can focus on improving the quality and
coverage of education required by technological change. If Latin American countries increase
the supply of skills, they can accommodate high wages and an equitable wage distribution.
Even though Mexico is among the largest exporter and importer of goods in the world, it
has a highly dependent external sector on the United States. Mexican exports of goods reached
US$ 450.5 billion in 2018 and grew 2.3% in 2019, while imports were US$ 464 billion in 2018
and decreased 1.9% in 2019 (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2020c). Colombian and
Chilean exports have a traditional dependence on mining-energy goods. Due to the low prices of
commodities, exports in Colombia had a reduction. While Colombian exports represented US$
62 billion in 2012, they were near to US$ 38 billion in 2017. Colombia has registered a trade
deficit in goods since 2014, which was US$ 10.775 million in 2019. Although trade in services is
in a deficit, its export trend is increasing, with variations of 4.6% in 2016, 8.9 % in 2017, 14.1%
in 2018 and 3.5% in 2019 (Ministry of Commerce of Colombia, 2020b).
Chile's goods exports were affected because of the fall in international prices, particularly
mining. They suffered a reduction from US$ 81.437 million in 2011 to US$ 60.732 million in
2016. Nevertheless, Chilean exports recovered, growing 14% in 2017 and 9% in 2018. In 2019,
they suffered a reduction of 7.6%. Imports registered similar behavior, diminishing 7.5% in
2019. Foreign trade in goods and services represented 57.5% of GDP in 2018 (Ministry of
Commerce of Colombia, 2020a).
As it was mentioned in chapter 2, the relationship between economic globalization and
market income inequality have both supporters and critics. On the one hand, globalization affects
the wages, benefits and job security of low-income groups (Mahler, 2004). On the other hand,
globalization is a potential confounding factor of inequality, specifically in trade and imports

(Kenworthy, 2008). This dissertation considers the supporters’ analysis. For this reason, a
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negative relationship between globalization and inequality and poverty is expected. The greater
the globalization, the smaller the inequality. Therefore, globalization could positively affect the
impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty. Consequently, the expected result is that the greater
the globalization, the greater the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty will be, meaning a
significant relationship between globalization and the impact of CCTs is expected. Conversely, a
significant relationship between globalization and the efficiency of CCTs is not expected.
Table 30 shows the average of the results for each country in the years defined above in
order to describe the models and to rank the results of this control variable. Therefore, the
variables are ranked according to degree of openness of the economy in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico. The higher the degree of openness of the economy, the higher the impact of CCTs on
reducing inequality and poverty. Consequently, Table 30 shows that the highest average of the
degree of openness of the economy is ranked as one and the lowest average is ranked as three.
The results are Chile’s average of the degree of openness of the economy was 68% of the GDP,
ranked as one; Mexico’s average was 58%, ranked as two; finally, Colombia’s average was 37%,
ranked as three.

Table 30. Globalization: Average of the Degree of Openness of the Economy and Ranking
Country

Average of the degree of
Openness of the Economy

Ranking

Chile
67.83
1
Colombia
37.29
3
Mexico
57.93
2
Note 1: ECLAC estimates based on national sources.
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database from ECLAC in https://cepalstatprod.cepal.org

Institutional Control Variables.
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The institutional control variables of this model are ideological orientation of
governments, participation and political voice, and corruption.
Ideological orientation of national governments. Regarding ideological orientation,
leftist governments may be more likely to support the poor. While Colombian and Mexican
governments have been in recent years center right, Chile has been traditionally center left.
Nevertheless, the Chilean government has been a neoliberal left, which is not common in Latin
America. After the dictatorship of General Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte (1974 – 1990)
most of the administrations have been moderately left.
A left coalition of parties ruled the Chilean country from 1990 to 2010. The Coalition of
Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) was founded in 1988 and
won all the presidential elections from when military rule ended in 1990 to 2010 when the
conservative President Miguel Juan Sebastián Piñera Echenique (2010 – 2014 and 2018 –
present) won the Chilean presidential election in 2010.
The Ethical Income Family Program was created during the administration of President
Ricardo Froilán Lagos Escobar (2000 – 2006). It continued during the administrations of
President Verónica Michelle Bachelet Jeria (2006 – 2010 and 2014 – 2018), who was from the
same left coalition. Moreover, CCTs in Chile have also been continued by the conservative
President Piñera. CCTs in Chile were developed by left parties and have received the support of
conservative’ parties as well. Even though Chilean leftist parties developed CCTs in Chile, this
program has been the smallest in size and budget.
Mexico has a dominant party that ruled Mexico for 71 years in a row in the 20th century,
from 1929 to 2000. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional,
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PRI) was founded by Plutarco Elías Calles, President of Mexico from 1924 to 1928. Since that
time to 2000, Mexicans elected 12 presidents in a row from the PRI. A dominant party is similar
to a dictator party, in which their main difference is that the first continue in power by winning
the electoral process in a ‘democratic’ system. Even though the PRI is a full member of the
Socialist International, it is not considered as a social democratic party.
From 2000 to 2012 the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) won two
presidential elections in a row: President Vicente Fox Quesada (2000 – 2006) and President
Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa (2006 – 2012). The PAN, which was founded in 1939, is a
conservative political party in Mexico. In 2012, the PRI returned to power when Mexicans
elected President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012 – 2018). In sum, CCTs were created in Mexico
under the administration of the PRI hegemonic party. It has continued during the two
administrations of the PAN party. Both of them are center right parties, meaning CCTs have not
been developed exclusively by leftist governments.
Finally, Colombia has traditionally been ruled by center-right-wing parties. Academics
consider that this is because Colombia worked out democratic pact in 1958 that excluded left and
has suffered the longest internal conflict in the hemisphere. For 52 years, the guerrilla group,
especially The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, FARC–EP and FARC), has attacked the
civil population in rural areas, gotten involved in illegal drug business, and has had territorial
control of some remote areas. The conflict had disastrous consequences to the country: 240,000
people were killed, approximately six million people were displaced, and more than 2,000 people
were kidnapped. Also, the guerrillas entered into an illegal business, the production and sale of
cocaine, that has affected the economy, the security, and the image of the country.
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In 1998, a conservative president, Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998 – 2002), began a peace
process with the FARC. During this peace process, the government cultivated the conversation
between the government’s negotiators and the leaders of the guerrilla group in a place where the
military force could not enter. In the meantime, during the conversations, Pastrana’s government
strengthened the military forces with the cooperation of the United States’ government, which
gave significant amounts of resources through Plan Colombia. Nevertheless, the guerrillas
violated the agreement established on the negotiation and the government’s generosity, using this
land to keep the people who were kidnapped in this area, and to hide their members after a civil
attack. After that, President Pastrana decided to halt the peace process, thus ending the illusion of
peace for millions of Colombians. Because of the non-conclusion of the peace process and the
sensation that the FARC were playing with the government, the Colombian people elected a
right-wing president in 2002.
Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002 – 2010) promised to fight and diminish the capacity of the
guerrillas based on the Democratic Security Plan. The principal achievements of this plan were
to recover militarily territories where the guerrillas had control, to diminish the capacity of the
guerrillas, and to achieve better security indicators. Alvaro Uribe was reelected president in 2006
and continued with the same public policy. The attacks of the guerrillas FARC on civilians
diminished, the guerrilla members had to go to the borders of the country and to more remote
zones to hide from the public forces. It was the right time to initiate a new peace process to end
the conflict because the enemy was weak and tired. In 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos
Calderón (2010 – 2018) was elected and began a peace process with the guerrillas FARC. This
peace process ended this year and was ratified by the Congress. At this current time, it is already

in implementation. Three different Colombian administrations implemented a state policy in
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order to diminish the FARC, and then, to obligate them to negotiate and to end the conflict.
Finally, a right-wing president was elected who was strongly supported by former
President Uribe. President Iván Duque Márquez (2018 – present) is a member of the Democratic
Center Party (Partido Centro Democrático) which lead the opposition to the peace process
developed by the former government. More Families in Action has been developed and increased
its budget and size during these last administrations. All four of these administrations have been
center-right governments. In sum, although Mexican and Colombian leftist presidents did not get
elected; Colombia and Mexico established CCTs even though they were not leftist governments.
Ideological orientation of national governments can be establish based on the measure
‘cabinet balance’ (Armingeon et al., 2019), which calculates the partisan orientation of national
governments and “classifies national cabinets in a given year on a 5-point scale ranging from
hegemony of right-wing parties (1) to hegemony of left-wing parties (5)” (Mahler & Jesuit 2006,
p. 502). This measure is developed by Prof. Dr. Klaus Armingeon and collaborators at the
Institute of Political Science of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, through the "Comparative
Political Data Set" (CPDS), which is a collection of political and institutional country-levelannual data for 36 democratic countries (36 OECD and/or Europe Union member states) for the
period of 1960 to 2017 or since their transition to democracy (Armingeon et al., 2019).
One can develop the same methodology in order to classify ideological orientation of national
governments in Latin America from one to three, in which one is the most centre-left ideological
orientation and three is the most centre-right ideological orientation. Table 31 shows the
classification of the ideological orientation of national governments for Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico in the years of analysis.

Table 31. Ideological Orientation of National Government in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country

President/ Term of
Office

Political Party

Party
Ideological
Orientation
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Measure
Ideological
Orientation

Ricardo Lagos (2000 Party for
Centre-left
2
– 2006)
Democracy
Michelle Bachelet
Chile
Socialist
Centre-left
1
(2006 – 2010)
Sebastián Piñera
Chile
Conservative
Centre-right
1
(2010 – 2014)
Michelle Bachelet
Chile
Socialist
Centre-left
1
(2014 – 2018)
Andrés Pastrana
Colombia
Conservative
Centre-right
3
(1998 – 2002)
Álvaro Uribe
Colombia
Colombia First Centre-right
3
(2002 – 2010)
Juan Manuel Santos
Colombia
National Unity Centre-right
2
(2010 – 2018)
Ernesto Zedillo
Mexico
PRI
Centre-right
3
(1994 – 2000)
Vicente Fox.
Mexico
PAN
Centre-right
3
(2000 – 2006)
Felipe Calderón
Mexico
PAN
Centre-right
3
(2006 – 2012)
Enrique Peña Nieto
Mexico
PRI
Centre-right
3
(2012 – 2018)
Source: Prepared by the author. The measure of ‘ideological orientation’ is based on Institute of
Political Science of the University of Zurich, Armingeon et al. 2019.
Chile

In chapter 2, it was mentioned that the main mechanism of income distribution is the
welfare state in liberal democracies. The welfare state, developed in some western countries,
especially in Europe, involves compensatory arguments, taxing high-income groups, and
redistribution in order to reduce inequality (Scheve and Stasavage, 2016), especially through
social transfers and pensions. Social-welfare programs differ in the size and mode of social
assistance provided. Garrett (1998) states that the basic patterns of partisan politics show the
differences of the political-economic models of states in the era of global markets. The expected
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result is the leftist political orientation, the greatest impact of CCT programs on inequality and
poverty.
In order to describe the models and to rank the results of this control variable, this section
determines the average of the results for each country, reclassifying the measure of ‘cabinet
balance’ from one to three, taking into consideration the years defined above: Chile from 2001 to
2016, Colombia from 2000 and 2015; and Mexico from 1996 to 2017. Table 32 shows the
following results: While the average of ideological orientation of Chile is one, the average of
ideological orientation of Colombia and Mexico is three.

Table 32. Average of Ideological Orientation in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country
Chile
Colombia

Ideological
Orientation
1
3

Mexico
3
Source: Prepared by the author. The measure of ‘ideological orientation’ is based on Institute of
Political Science of the University of Zurich, Armingeon et al. 2019.
Participation and political voice. As was discussed in the last subsection, some Latin
American countries have been ruled by the same party or similar group of parties for several
decades, often ruled by the oligarchy. Most governments have been elected under democratic
systems since the last half of the twentieth Century. As it was mentioned, Mexico was ruled by
the PRI for seven decades of the last century, weakening the democratic system and becoming
the political system in a dominant party system. Dominant parties need to establish legal barriers
and monitor electoral fraud in order to keep the hegemonic party (Magaloni, 2006).

Nevertheless, two additional parties have won the presidential election in Mexico during the
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current century.
A democratic regimen was established in Chile after the end of the dictatorship of
Pinochet in 1990. Even though a left-center coalition has won most of the presidential election,
conservatives (right-center) have won some elections too. In fact, the last five administrations
have been left-center and right-center presidents. During 2019 and 2020, before the COVID-19
pandemic, class workers, young people, and women have protested for several months, fighting
for reduction of inequality, access to better public services, and fighting against corruption and
the traditional ruling class. In the end, Chileans were asking for a new constitution.
A large part of the population in Colombia also protested during 2019 and 2020 before
the pandemic. Similarly, Colombians have protested against corruption, inequality, and the
damage to the environment. In addition, Colombians have protested to ask the government to
accomplish the peace agreement signed by the former administration and the guerrillas FARC.
Colombia is the longest democracy in Latin America. Nevertheless, a traditional ruling class has
controlled the country.
This section proposes to measure participation and political voice by using the Electoral
Democracy index developed by the V-Dem Institute, which is an independent research institute
at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The Institute was
founded by Professor Staffan I. Lindberg in 2014.
The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society
organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or
systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the
country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media
capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem
conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any

other conception of representative democracy —liberal, participatory, deliberative,
egalitarian, or some other. (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 42)
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This measure has an interval scale from low to high (0-1). Table 33 shows the Electoral
Democracy index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The data levels added in the figure
correspond to the years of study for each country that this section uses in its analysis. In addition,
Figure 11 shows the electoral index for the three countries from 1998 to 2019.

Table 33. Electoral Democracy Index. Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Year
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
1996
0.853
0.574
0.528
1997
0.853
0.581
0.546
1998
0.859
0.558
0.596
1999
0.852
0.553
0.606
2000
0.875
0.562
0.619
2001
0.876
0.530
0.698
2002
0.880
0.555
0.711
2003
0.880
0.571
0.715
2004
0.880
0.553
0.720
2005
0.881
0.589
0.720
2006
0.898
0.538
0.698
2007
0.902
0.562
0.661
2008
0.902
0.583
0.648
2009
0.895
0.570
0.672
2010
0.894
0.596
0.657
2011
0.880
0.593
0.670
2012
0.893
0.627
0.665
2013
0.905
0.624
0.674
2014
0.902
0.676
0.681
2015
0.890
0.711
0.649
2016
0.865
0.652
0.680
2017
0.879
0.644
0.660
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

Figure 11. Electoral Democracy Index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature regarding the relationship between political voice and
inequality. According to the median voter theorem, the more unequal the income distribution,
the more the median voter has to gain through the joint action of taxes and transfers, and the
more likely the citizen is to vote for higher taxes and transfers (Mahler, 2010). Moreover, a
positive relationship between turnout and state redistribution is expected (Mahler & Jesuit,
2006), meaning “low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout”
(Lijphart, 1997, p. 2). For this reason, a significant relationship between the political
voice/participation and inequality is expected. The weaker the political voice, the lower the
inequality. Therefore, the result expected is that the weaker the political voice, the less impact of
CCTs will have on inequality and poverty. In addition, a stronger political voice results in higher
control over the redistribution of public transfers. Moreover, the higher the control over public
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transfers, the higher the efficiency of CCTs. For this reason, it is expected that the stronger the
political voice, the higher the efficiency of CCTs, establishing a significant relation between
political voice and the efficiency of CCTs.
Table 34 shows the average of the results for each country in the years defined above in
order to describe the models and to rank the results of this control variable. Therefore, the
variables are ranked according to the level of electoral democracy. The higher the degree of
electoral democracy, the higher one can assume may be the impact of CCTs on reducing
inequality and poverty. Consequently, Table 34 shows that the highest average of the degree of
electoral democracy is ranked as one and the lowest average is ranked as three. The results are
Chile’s average of electoral democracy was 0.89, ranked as one; Mexico’s average was 0.66,
ranked as two; finally, Colombia’s average was 0.59, ranked as three.

Table 34. Average of Electoral Democracy Index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Country

Average of Electoral
Democracy Index

Ranking

Chile
0.89
1
Colombia
0.59
3
Mexico
0.66
2
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Corruption. The last control variable that this dissertation proposes to this model is
corruption. Mexico, Chile, and Colombia are the only three Latin American members of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Even though being part of
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an organization such as the OECD is a sign of economic stability, transparency, and government
discipline, Mexico and Colombia have been negatively qualified in terms of transparency. The
Global Corruption Barometer Latin American and the Caribbean 2019 is the largest and most
detailed survey of Latin American citizens’ views on corruption and their experiences of bribery
developed by Transparency International. According to this survey, 34% of public service users
paid a bribe in the previous 12 months in Mexico, 20% in Colombia, and 13% in Chile (Pring
and Vrushi, 2019). Moreover, 54% think corruption has increased in the previous 12 months in
Chile, 52% in Colombia, and 44% in Mexico (Pring and Vrushi, 2019).
Mexico has been characterized because of its large bureaucracy and corruption in all
levels. Dominant parties, such as the Mexican PRI, need to offer rewards and access to
government positions to different politicians, and to mobilize voters in order to establish cooptation (Magaloni, 2006). For instance, the PRI in Mexico, which was a hegemonic party for 71
years, used clientelism, giving economic transfers to elites and communities in exchange for
their loyalty to the party and their votes (Magaloni, 2006).
Similarly, Colombia has had a high index of corruption perception. Citizens frequently
complain about corruption and the absence of justice in these cases. On the contrary, Chile has
been traditionally seen as a model in Latin America because of its strong institutions.
Nevertheless, Colombian and Chilean citizens, as was mentioned above, protested for several
months in 2019 and the beginning of 2020 against corruption and other issues. Young people,
women, ethnic minority groups, and the working class do not believe in current institutions and
are asking for a structural change. However, momentum has been building against corruption.
A growing distrust and disappointment in government has contributed to increasing anticorruption sentiment across the region, but this is empowering populist leaders who
frequently make matters worse. Despite these challenges, people are overwhelmingly
positive in their desire to make a difference in the fight against corruption. Ultimately,
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people have the right to report corruption, demand that politicians act with integrity, and
seize opportunities to actively shape the decisions and processes which affect their lives,
families and communities. (Pring and Vrushi, 2019, p. 3)
Chapter 2 described how politicians use CCTs to influence elections. For this reason, this
dissertation recommends using the Clientelism index, which has been developed by the V-Dem
Institute.
Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources
(goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates
for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input
variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more
democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note
that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run
from normatively worse to better. (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 273)
The Clientelism index has an interval scale from low to high (0-1). Figure 12 shows the
Clientelism index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The data levels added in the figure
correspond to the years of study for each country that this dissertation uses in its analysis. In
addition, Table 35 shows the electoral index for the three countries from 1998 to 2019. Chile has
a better situation than Mexico and Colombia. Moreover, Chile has reduced the Clientelism index
from 0.144 in 2006 to 0.09 in 2017. Conversely, Colombia has had a high Clientelism index; it
was 0.686 in 2016. Finally, Mexico had a high index of 0.418 in 2018.
Chapter 2 explained that social programs are used by politicians as a form of patronage in
order to build political machines (Fukuyama 2011), taking advantage of national programs with a
large number of beneficiaries for exclusively particular interests. Clientelism and corruption
negatively impact the outcomes of the social programs and public transfers. Therefore, a
negatively significant relationship between clientelism and the impact of CCTs on inequality and
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poverty is expected. For this reason, the expected result is that the higher the clientelism index,
the lower the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty.

Figure 12. Clientelism Index. Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Moreover, the higher the clientelism and the corruption, the lower the efficiency of
CCTs. For this reason, it is expected that the higher the clientelism index, the lower the
efficiency of CCTs, establishing a negatively significant relationship between clientelism and the
efficiency of CCTs.

Table 35. Clientelism Index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
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Year
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
1996
0.157
0.745
0.603
1997
0.155
0.745
0.546
1998
0.125
0.766
0.485
1999
0.126
0.778
0.485
2000
0.139
0.778
0.463
2001
0.139
0.778
0.288
2002
0.139
0.745
0.288
2003
0.139
0.754
0.300
2004
0.139
0.754
0.313
2005
0.138
0.733
0.313
2006
0.112
0.677
0.364
2007
0.144
0.663
0.415
2008
0.144
0.663
0.415
2009
0.145
0.663
0.434
2010
0.127
0.687
0.410
2011
0.100
0.668
0.410
2012
0.114
0.668
0.406
2013
0.112
0.678
0.422
2014
0.102
0.680
0.422
2015
0.073
0.684
0.429
2016
0.073
0.683
0.469
2017
0.075
0.686
0.441
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
In order to describe the models and to rank the results of this control variable, this section
determines the average of the results for each country in the years defined above (see Table 36).
Then, the variables are ranked according to the level of corruption. The narrower the index of
clientelism, the higher the means that a government has to impact the poor people. Therefore,
Table 36 shows that the lowest average of clientelism is ranked as one and the highest average is

ranked as three. The results are Chile’s average of the Clientelism index was 0.12, being the
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narrowest. Therefore, Chile was ranked as one. Mexico’s index was 041, ranked as two. Finally,
Colombia’s Clientelism index was 0.70, ranked as three.

Table 36. Average of Clientelism Index in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
Average of
Ranking
Clientelism Index
Chile
0.12
1
Colombia
0.70
3
Mexico
0.41
2
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the database Coppedge, Michael et al. 2020. ”VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.
and: Pemstein, Daniel et al. 2020. “The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data”. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 5th
edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.
Country

Multivariate Effects on the Dependent Variables
This section describes the effects of the independent and control variables on the three dependent
variables. The first model uses the dependent variable CCTs’ impact on inequality; the second
model uses the dependent variable CCTs’ impact on poverty, and the third model uses CCT’s
efficiency as a dependent variable.
Model 1: CCTs’ Impact on Inequality Reduction.
CCTs’ impact on inequality reduction was measured by the factor decomposition of
changes in inequality from 2003 to 2017 in Chile, 2007 to 2016 in Colombia, and 1998 to 2018
in Mexico. Table 37 shows the model of the impact of CCTs on inequality reduction.
The dependent variable is based on the CCTs’ contribution to total inequality in Gini points.
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Table 37. Model 1: CCTs’ Impact on Inequality Reduction
Variable / Country

Chile

Colombia

Mexico

Independent
Variable 1

Budget Size of
CCT

3

2

1

Independent
Variable 2

CCT's Targeting

3

2

1

Control
Variable 1

GDP Growth

1

1

3

Control
Variable 2

Globalization

1

3

2

Control
Variable 3

Government
Ideology

1

3

3

Control
Variable 4

Democracy

1

3

2

Control
Variable 5

Corruption

1

3

2

3

1

1

Dependent
Inequality
Variable
Reduction
Source: Prepared by the author.

Table 37 shows the model on the impact on CCTs budget size and targeting on inequality
reduction. Moreover, the model includes the following control variables: GDP growth,
globalization, government ideology, democracy, and corruption. Each variable was explained
through the development of this dissertation and in this chapter. The rank ordered of the
independent variables is closer to the rank-ordering of the dependent variables than any of the
control variables, which means that the size and targeting is more important in reducing
inequality than what can be explained by the control variables.
Nevertheless, as was explained in Chapter 5, the impact of CCTs on inequality has been
marginal. Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has the narrowest impact on inequality, which
was null. Table 37 shows that in terms of inequality, Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program is

the narrowest program, having the worst results. In addition, it seems that Chile’s strong
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performance in the control variables have enabled the country to have the best Gini index
compared to Colombia and Mexico. Chile is the first among the three countries in economic
openness, democracy, and controlling corruption. One can infer that this strong performance in
the control variables has enabled Chile to have public policies that have an impact on inequality.
Therefore, Chile has not increased the budget of CCTs, keeping it very small, and has not
increased the number of beneficiaries in comparison to Colombia and Mexico.
Regarding government ideology, Chile is the only centre-left administration between the
three countries. It was expected that the leftist governmental orientation will result in a robust
size and budget of CCTs. Nevertheless, it seems that ideological orientation does not have a
correlation with the reduction of inequality, which depends on the size and targeting. Similarly,
the governments of Mexico and Colombia have been both center-right and both have robust CCT
programs. Finally, the impact of CCTs on inequality has been highly marginal, as was explained
in Chapter 6.
Model 2: CCTs’ Impact on Poverty Reduction.
CCTs’ impact on poverty reduction was measured by the counterfactual analysis of the
impact of CCTs in poverty Interval Measure in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico in chapter 6. Table
38 shows the model of the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The dependent variable is
based on the impact on the Interval Measure of market income. This model uses the same
independent and control variables that the last model. All the variables have been described in
this chapter.
Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has had the narrowest impact on poverty. Table
38 shows a relation between the smaller impact on poverty and the size of CCTs. The smaller the

coverage and number of beneficiaries of CCTs, the smaller the impact of CCTs on poverty.
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Moreover, the smaller the budget of the government to finance the CCTs, the smaller the impact
of CCTs on poverty.

Table 38. Model 2: CCT’s Impact on Poverty Reduction
Country / Variable

Chile

Colombia

Mexico

Independent
Variable 1

Budget Size of
CCT

3

2

1

Independent
Variable 2

CCT's Targeting

3

2

1

Control
Variable 1

GDP Growth

1

1

3

Control
Variable 2

Globalization

1

3

2

Control
Variable 3

Government
Ideology

1

3

3

Control
Variable 4

Democracy

1

3

2

Control
Variable 5

Corruption

1

3

2

3

2

1

Dependent
AVE Poverty
Variable
Reduction
Source: Prepared by the author

Moreover, one can establish that there is a strong relationship between the budget size of
CCTs and the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The higher the budget, the higher the
impact, as was expected. Moreover, it can be inferred that there is a strong relationship between
the targeting of CCTs and the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The higher the number of
beneficiaries of CCTs over the total population, the higher the impact of CCTs on poverty.

In addition, it seems an inverted relation between the average of poverty reduction
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(dependent variable) and most of the control variables. While Chile’s reduction on poverty has
been the worst, Chile had the best practices in the openness of the economy, democracy, and
control of corruption. In addition, Colombia has had the worst performance among the three
cases in these areas.
It does not seem there is a relation between governmental orientation and the impact of
CCTs on reducing poverty. Perhaps because Chile has been the most centre-left among the three
countries, it has had the smallest impact on poverty. Furthermore, Chile has not had a robust
CCT size.
Model 3: Efficiency of CCTs.
The efficiency of CCTs was measured by the results of the Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of
concentration’ in chapter 6. Table 39 shows the model of efficiency of CCTs. The dependent
variable is based on the efficiency of CCTs in targeting the poorest. This model uses the same
independent and control variables as the last two models. All the variables have been described
in this chapter.
Table 39 shows that the bigger the budget of CCTs, the less efficient the CCTs, as was
expected. Therefore, it can be inferred that there is a strong relation between targeting and the
efficiency of CCTs. The smaller the size of CCTs in terms of targeting, the more efficient the
CCTs are in targeting low-income groups. Chile has had the smaller percentage of the number of
beneficiaries over its total population and Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has been the
more efficient among the three CCTs. Conversely, Colombia’s More Families in Action has had
a robust program in terms of beneficiaries and has been the least efficient, meaning it did not
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target the poorest of the poor. As was expected that a robust budget and number of beneficiaries
could negatively affect the efficiency of CCTs because of the large bureaucracy that is required.

Table 39. Model 3: Efficiency of CCTs
Country / Variable

Chile

Colombia

Mexico

Independent
Variable 1

Budget Size of
CCT

3

2

1

Independent
Variable 2

CCT's Targeting

3

2

1

Control
Variable 1

GDP Growth

1

1

3

Control
Variable 2

Globalization

1

3

2

Control
Variable 3

Government
Ideology

1

3

3

Control
Variable 4

Democracy

1

3

2

Control
Variable 5

Corruption

1

3

2

1

3

2

Dependent
AVE Efficiency
Variable
Source: Prepared by the author

In addition, one can infer that there is a close relation between the efficiency of CCTs and
most of the control variables than with the independent variables. The most open, the most
center-left, the most democratic, and the least corrupt is the most efficient. Chile has had the
strongest globalization, has had the best indexes in democracy and control of corruption, has had
the best economic performance (GDP growth), and Chile’s CCTs have been the more efficient.
Conversely, Colombia has been the least economically open, the center-rightest, the least
democratic, and the most corrupt among the three countries, and Colombia’s CCTs have been the
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least efficient. But paradoxically, as was reviewed in the last two models, Chile’s CCT program
has had the least effect on reducing inequality and reducing poverty, owing to the smaller size of
its program and its targeting. These results appear to support the paradox of redistribution
posited by Korpi and Palme, in which shallowly progressive but very large programs can
accomplish more redistribution than more targeted programs.
Therefore, further analysis of small CCTs that take into consideration these control
variables can be developed in order to determine if the efficiency on targeting in Chile is due to
the small number of beneficiaries and small budget, due to the control variables, or due to the
both of them.
As a conclusion, the description of this cross-national variance model is a contribution to
determine additional variables that could affect the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty
and the efficiency of CCTs. Additional data is necessary in order to develop the model and
generalize results. Other Latin American countries could be included, which their data is
comprised in the LIS. This model can be used for further studies.

CONCLUSIONS
This brief chapter reviews the key conclusions of this study, suggests some important
implications of the findings of this dissertation, and proposes some avenues for future research.
CCTs in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile
CCTs have been a common strategy for most Latin American countries for combating poverty and
inequality and have become an international reference because other regions in the world have
replicated CCTs. Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Peru comprise the Pacific Alliance, which is an
initiative of regional integration founded in 2011; one of its main objectives is “[to] drive further
growth, development and competitiveness of the economies of its members, focused on achieving
greater well-being, overcoming socioeconomic inequality and promot[ing] the social inclusion of
its inhabitants” (Pacific Alliance, 2019). This dissertation analyzed the impact and efficiency of
three important CCT programs: Prosperity in Mexico, More Families in Action in Colombia, and
Ethical Family Income Program in Chile.
Mexico, Colombia, and Chile have increased the number of beneficiaries over the years.
The three programs look to diminish poverty by increasing the income of low-income families
by giving a cash subsidy. In addition, the programs have some conditions regarding children’s
school attendance and health-nutritional check-ups. Nevertheless, there are some differences
between the programs, such as budget and coverage, which are causal relationships. According
to ECLAC (2020), Mexico has large and expansive CCTs that covered 24.13% of its population
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in 2018, expending 0.37% of the GDP. It is followed by Colombia, which covered 21.50% of its
population in 2017, expending 0.28%. Meanwhile, Chile covered only 4.44%, expending 0.12 of
the GDP. Most of the literature has analyzed the effectiveness of CCTs in Latin America and the
impact of the reduction of CCTs on poverty. The main contribution of this dissertation is the
evaluation and analysis of the impact of CCTs on inequality and poverty reduction. In addition,
this dissertation has evaluated the efficiency of CCTs and has studied the criteria of budget and
targeting to determine the variations of these criteria that could explain the differences among
CCTs in their impact and effectiveness.
Mexico’s Prosperity.
The data presented in this dissertation shows that CCTs contribute to diminishing
inequality in Mexico, representing the third income source in reducing inequality. Nonetheless,
the real amount of inequality reduction is marginal, with 0.004 Gini points from 1998 to 2008.
Moreover, Prosperity’s contribution to the total change in inequality was insignificant. CCTs
were responsible for 6.8% of the total change in inequality in Mexico, which represented a
reduction of 0.005 Gini points from 1998 to 2018. Conversely, pensions and labor income were
the most important income source for reducing inequality in Mexico.
Mexico’s Prosperity in 2018 contributed to diminishing the poverty of market income by
around 1.5 poverty Headcount points, meaning that 1.5% of the national population left poverty
because of CCTs. Moreover, Mexico’s Prosperity diminished the poverty Interval Measure by
0.98 points, which is also a marginal result. The observed rate in Mexico in 2018 was 0.16,
which means 16% (20,052,447 people) of the total population were poor; the poverty Headcount
Ratio without CCTs was 17%, meaning Prosperity had an impact on reducing the poverty
Headcount Ratio by 1%, which represents 1,253,277 people. Moreover, the Income Gap in
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Mexico in 2018 was 32.22, which means that the income of poor people was 32.22% under the
median income; the Income Gap without CCTs was 35.68%. Nevertheless, Mexico has not
targeted only low-income groups, meaning their targeting is inefficient.
These results could explain the increase of targeting and budget through the years.
Prosperity increased targeting from 8.09% in 1998 (at that time the program was called
Opportunities) to 24.13% of the total population in 2018 and the budget from 0.07% in 1998 to
0.35% of the GDP in 2018. The higher the budget, the higher the impact, as was expected.
Moreover, it can be inferred that there is a strong relationship between the targeting of CCTs and
the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The higher the number of beneficiaries of CCTs over
the total population, the higher the impact of CCTs on poverty.
It will be interesting to analyze how Prosperity will continue under the current
administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018 – present), who is a left-wing
and populist president elected in Mexico in 2018 and founder of the National Regeneration
Movement (Movimiento Regeneración Nacional).
Colombia’s More Families in Action.
The data presented in this dissertation shows that More Families in Action only shared
0.7% of the total income in 2016; the share measures the weight of each income source with
respect to total income. Therefore, More Families in Action have not had a significant impact on
inequality. In addition, More Families in Action’s contribution to the total change in inequality
were insignificant. Colombia’s CCTs were responsible for 7.7% of the total change in inequality
in Colombia, which represented a reduction of 0.005 Gini points from 2007 to 2016.
Colombia’s More Families in Action in 2016 contributed to diminishing the poverty of
market income by around 1.5 poverty Headcount points, meaning that 1.5% of the national
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population left poverty because of CCTs. Moreover, Colombia’s More Families in Action
decreased the poverty Interval Measure by 0.97 points in 2016. Even though this is a positive
impact on the reduction of poverty, it is a marginal result. The observed rate in Colombia in 2016
was 0.20, which means 20% (9,552,169 people) of the total population were poor; the poverty
Headcount Ratio without CCTs was 21%, meaning More Family in Action had an impact on
reducing the poverty Headcount Ratio by 1%, which represents 477,608 people. Moreover, the
Income Gap in Colombia in 2016 was 40.38, which means that the income of the poor people
was 40.38% under the median income; the Income Gap without CCTs was 42.97%.
These positive results could explain the increase of targeting and budget through the
years. More Families in Action increased targeting from 17% in 2007 to 21.61% of the total
population in 2016 and the budget from 0.17% in 2007 to 0.29% of the GDP in 2016. The higher
the budget, the higher the impact, as was expected. Moreover, it can be inferred that there is a
strong relationship between the targeting of CCTs and the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction.
The higher the number of beneficiaries of CCTs over the total population, the higher the impact
of CCTs on poverty. Finally, Colombia has not targeted the poorest of the poor, meaning their
targeting is inefficient.
Chile’s Ethical Income Family Program.
The data presented in this dissertation shows that even though Chile has had the most
egalitarian redistribution, CCTs in Chile have had a low impact on inequality and poverty. The
main reason that explains this paradox is the number of beneficiaries. Chile’s Ethical family
Income Program has been small in amounts and beneficiaries, having an irrelevant impact.
CCTs’ in Chile were not responsible for any change in reducing inequality in Chile. CCTs were
responsible for -1.9% of the total change in inequality in Chile, which represented a value of
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0.000 Gini points. Conversely, pensions and labor income were the most important income
source for reducing inequality in Chile.
Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program in 2107 did not contribute to diminishing the
poverty of market income. The observed rate in Chile in 2017 was 0.16, which means 16% of the
total population were poor people (2,947,070 people); the poverty Headcount Ratio without
CCTs (counterfactual analysis) was also 16%, meaning Ethical Family Income Program did not
have an impact on the poverty Headcount Ratio. Moreover, the Income Gap in Chile in 2017 was
30.39, which means that the income of the poor people was 30.39% under the median income;
the Income Gap without CCTs was 30.43%. Therefore, Ethical Family Income Program
contributed to reducing the Income Gap by 0,04%, which is a marginal result. Chile’s Ethical
Family Income Program marginally reduced the poverty Interval Measure by only 0.013 in
2017. Ethical Family Income Program did not have an impact on the Interval Measure in 2017;
the observed poverty rate of Ethical Family Income Program was 4.88 in 2017. This result did
not have any substantial change with the Interval Measure without CCTs, which was 04.86 in
2017.
These poor results can be explained by the small targeting and small budget of this
program. The smaller the coverage and number of beneficiaries of CCTs, the smaller the impact
of CCTs on poverty. Moreover, the smaller the budget of the government to finance the CCTs,
the smaller the impact of CCTs on poverty. Ethical Family Income Program’s targeting was
2.56% in 2003 and 4.4% of the total population in 2017. Similarly, Ethical Family Income
Program’s budget was 0.02% in 2003 and 0.14% of the GDP in 2017.
Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has the highest target-efficient among the three
programs. The measure of efficiency, which establishes the degree to which transfers are
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targeted towards low-income groups, has shown that only Ethical Family Income Program has
an efficient targeting, meaning it targets low-income groups. Chile has had the smaller
percentage of the number of beneficiaries over its total population and Chile’s Ethical Family
Income Program has been the more efficient among the three CCTs.
In sum, CCTs had a marginal impact on the total change in inequality in Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico. The bigger the size, the higher the impact on poverty, but the narrower the
efficiency and complementary institutional arrangements.
Findings in this Research
The analysis of fiscal redistribution shows some differences in the importance of income sources
in reducing inequality among Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. While labor income was the most
significant income source causing changes in inequality in Colombia and Mexico, pension was
the most significant income source causing change in Chile. Labor income was responsible for
77.6% of the total change in inequality in Colombia and 70.4% in Mexico. In Chile, labor
income was 29.4%, being the second income source responsible for the total change in
inequality. Nevertheless, the contribution of labor income to the reduction of inequality is still
small. Labor income reduced 0.006 Gini points in Chile from 2003 to 2017, 0.047 Gini points in
Colombia from 2007 to 2016, and 0.050 Gini points in Mexico from 1998 to 2018.
CCTs’ contribution to the total change in inequality were insignificant. CCTs were
responsible for 7.7% and 6.8% of the total change in inequality in Colombia and in Mexico,
respectively, which represented a reduction of 0.005 Gini points in Colombia from 2007 to 2016
and 0.005 Gini points in Mexico from 1998 to 2018. Conversely, the CCTs were responsible for
-1.9% of the total change in inequality in Chile, which represented a value of 0.000 Gini points.
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In sum, CCTs had a marginal impact on the total change in inequality in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico.
Regarding the analysis of poverty, this dissertation shows that Chile reduced poverty
more than Mexico and Colombia, which may explain why Chile funds CCTs less than Colombia
and Chile because of their other poverty-reducing programs.
Finally, chapter 7 suggested that the size of the programs and the targeting of the
programs had the same rank ordering as the reduction and both inequality and poverty. At the
same time, there did not seem to be any relationship between the controls and the dependent
variables, suggesting that it was the independent variables that had the most effect on the
dependent variables. Nevertheless, as was explained in Chapter 5, the impact of CCTs on
inequality has been marginal. Chile’s Ethical Family Income Program has the narrowest impact
on inequality, which was null.
One can establish that there is a strong relationship between the budget size of CCTs and
the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The higher the budget, the higher the impact, as was
expected. Moreover, it can be inferred that there is a strong relationship between the targeting of
CCTs and the impact of CCTs on poverty reduction. The higher the number of beneficiaries of
CCTs over the total population, the higher the impact of CCTs on poverty.
In addition, it seems an inverted relation between the average of poverty reduction
(dependent variable) and most of the control variables. While Chile’s reduction on poverty has
been the worst, Chile had the best practices in the openness of the economy, democracy, and
control of corruption. In addition, Colombia has had the worst performance among the three
cases in these areas.
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Finally, the results show that the bigger the budget of CCTs, the less efficient the CCTs,
as was expected. It can be inferred that there is a strong relation between targeting and the
efficiency of CCTs. The smaller the size of CCTs in terms of targeting, the more efficient the
CCTs are in targeting low-income groups. As was expected that a robust budget and number of
beneficiaries could negatively affect the efficiency of CCTs because of the large bureaucracy
that is required.
One can infer that there is a close relation between the efficiency of CCTs and most of
the control variables than with the independent variables. The most open, the most center-left,
the most democratic, and the least corrupt is the most efficient. Chile has had the strongest
globalization, has had the best indexes in democracy and control of corruption, has had the best
economic performance (GDP growth), and Chile’s CCTs have been the more efficient.
Conversely, Colombia has been the least economically open, the center-rightest, the least
democratic, and the most corrupt among the three countries, and Colombia’s CCTs have been the
least efficient. But paradoxically, as was reviewed in the last two models, Chile’s CCT program
has had the least effect on reducing inequality and reducing poverty, owing to the smaller size of
its program and its targeting.
Challenges of this Dissertation and Improvement Opportunities
There is some absence of data on the household national surveys that LIS cannot take into
consideration in its harmonized dataset, affecting the analysis of some studies. Most of the LIS
data used in this dissertation did not include universal transfers except for Mexico in 2018,
affecting the Gini after taxes, social insurance benefits, and universal benefits. For this reason,
this Gini was not included in the analysis. Moreover, the LIS data of Colombia and Mexico
(1998) does not include private pensions. The absence of these data affects the analysis of market
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income. Nevertheless, it did not affect the results of fiscal redistribution because private pensions
are neither taken into consideration in the Gini after taxes and all transfers (disposable household
income). Finally, taxes have not been included in Mexico and Chile, which kept this research
from including a specific analysis of the impact of taxes on inequality and poverty.
The future inclusion of the variable universal transfers in LIS data and the national
household surveys of Colombia and Chile conducted by the governmental authorities is highly
recommended in order to homogenize the data among the countries. Moreover, Chile, Mexico,
and Colombia are members of the OECD and the Pacific Alliance. It would be highly
recommended that these organizations contribute to the harmonization of the national household
surveys of their country-members in order to facilitate further research in different areas.
Implications of the Results of this Dissertation
Even if inequality has slightly diminished in Latin American, the gaps are still immense and
most Latin Americans are not conscious enough about the risks and threats of inequality. This
situation suggests that governments, academia, international organizations (IGOs and NGOs),
social organizations, and local communities must prioritize this problem, analyze and evaluate
alternatives, and design public policies and programs that address this situation. It is highly
recommended that Latin American governments switch from CCTs to another kind of program
in which poor citizens get the support to generate their own incomes, improve their education,
working skills, and opportunities to develop their own small and medium businesses.
The main reason that CCTs don’t have much of an effect on inequality reduction across
the entire income spectrum is due to how small these programs are as a share of GDP.
Consequently, one can state that if the problem is that not enough money is being put into CCTs,
then one solution is to increase the amount of the subsidy to the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the
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sustainability of the program is already at risk due to the large number of families that are
beneficiaries of the program, concretely in large CCT programs, such as in Colombia and
Mexico. More Families in Action’s targeting was 21.61% of the total population in 2016 and
Opportunities’ targeting was 24.13% of the total population in 2018.
The results of this dissertation appear to support the paradox of redistribution posited by
Korpi and Palme, in which shallowly progressive but very large programs can accomplish more
redistribution than more targeted programs. Therefore, the role of the state must strongly come
back to the supply-side, giving opportunities for the development of all citizens, including lowincome groups, rural areas, and ethnic groups, through high-quality education, health access,
promotion of cultural and sports activities, productive projects and employment, identity
documents, and the right to vote and participate. As Milanovic (2016) establishes, adopting a
goal of establishing equalizing endowments—such as the ownership of assets and quality in
education in long-term periods—should control and then reduce market income inequality,
making government intervention via transfers and taxes less important (Milanovic, 2016). The
supply side-programs should be implemented in order to let societies have access to fundamental
goods, which include education, health, housing, culture, and the right to vote and to participate
(Piketty, 2020). Because of the threats and risks of CCTs, the role of the state should focus on
the supply-side factor instead of the demand-side factor. Any cash transfer, including conditional
ones, must be given in extremely concrete and specific conditions and targeted to very specific
populations. CCTs have become a political machine and an unsustainable tool that has increased
without any control and with the support of international organizations.
Because this dissertation has inferred that CCTs have marginally impacted inequality
reduction and have slightly impacted poverty reduction, I propose that CCTs should be
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developed only to specific and vulnerable communities (the poorest of the poor) or those affected
by a natural disaster or a pandemic that have a vulnerable position. The propose of these CCTs
should not be the reduction of poverty and, more obviously, should not be the reduction of
inequality. The main objective of CCTs should be to support communities that are in great
danger and high vulnerability. I propose that CCTs should follow the following criteria: CCTs
should be targeted to only people who live in rural areas, should complement supply-side
programs, should have as beneficiaries a maximum of 5% of the total population, and should
have specific exit rules.
CCTs should be targeted only to people who live in rural areas because governments in
Latin America have historically struggled to develop socio-economic programs and public
policies for these communities. CCTs should only be developed if and only if the government is
simultaneously developing supply-side public policies in order to give real opportunities for the
development of these communities and the access of fundamental goods.
In addition, CCT beneficiaries should consist of a maximum of 5% of the total population
in order to get the sustainability in the middle- and long-term of the program and to guarantee its
continuity during crisis stages. Moreover, the smaller the CCTs, the higher the efficiency. Even
though CCTs in Chile have not had any impact on inequality and have had a marginal impact on
poverty, Chile has been the less unequal country among the three cases studies of this
dissertation, which means Chile has developed other public policies that had a better impact on
inequality and poverty than those developed in Mexico and Colombia. Since 2013, beneficiaries
in Chile made up 5% of the population, spending less than 0.15% of its annual GDP, which
means CCTs in Chile are sustainable in the long term. Moreover, Chile has been the more
efficient program among the three case studies. A small CCT program such as Ethical Family
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Income Program is more efficient, meaning the public transfers are used in a better way. A small
program also contributes to controlling corruption and clientelism.
In addition, CCTs should have specific exit rules that give the opportunity to other
vulnerable people to participate in the program. The cycle must be clearly defined, giving
enough time for the supply-side programs and access to the fundamental goods, such as
education, health, productive projects, and the right to vote by the distribution of income and
wealth. In sum, CCTs should be only considered as an impact-program to support highly
vulnerable communities that need rent, which should only be developed in a parallel way to the
supply-side programs.
In addition, it is important to design “universal-local” strategies that benefit all the
members of a community or set of communities, including broad communication and active
participation in their territories. These strategies could avoid some of the tensions caused when
some families are beneficiaries of policies, but others are not. In addition, it is necessary to
design methodologies that include the communities’ participation and decision in their territory
regarding governmental investment and its application.
In the design and implementation of a public policy aimed at rural communities, local
autonomy must be strengthened, and structural reforms must be developed to avoid a culture of
dependency. Furthermore, these structural reforms should emphasize cultural independence so
that local communities are less likely to experience vulnerability or self-doubt regarding the
ability to improve independently (UNDP, 2010).
It is necessary to continue to develop strategies for building trust between the community
and the actors of different levels. The community has expectations, but it distrusts institutions
because of the perpetual absence of the state in rural areas. Therefore, it is highly recommended
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that the strategy includes the inter-institutional articulation and the immediate implementation of
some projects of social and economic impact as early victories. In addition, this strategy must
include the socialization of progress and accountability to the community in a systematic and
regular basis to build this trust. Furthermore, it is necessary to strengthen inter-agency
coordination in the fields of national, regional, and local governments. In public administration,
it is a constant challenge to coordinate between the various bodies involving the same territory.
Governments must be very careful with a community that has been isolated from the presence of
the state because these communities can be greatly affected if the process of project development
is done in a disorganized way: an action without damage is a priority.
Finally, it is going to be very difficult for Latin American governments to reduce or to
end CCTs because of the social and political implications. It is necessary to plan a transition,
based on new models that reestablish the supply-side, in which the current families that are
beneficiaries could take part in every stage of this new policy. Socialization and strong
communication during the process will be necessary, as well as an evaluation of impacts and
learned lessons.
CCTs in Crisis, COVID-19, and Universal Income
Currently, the globe is struggling with a health and economic crisis caused by the pandemic
named COVID-19. Because of the global economic crisis of COVID-19, ECLAC expects a
negative growth of the GDP of -5.3% in Latin America., in which Chile’s GDP will decrease 4%, Colombia’s GDP -2.6%, and Mexico’s GDP -5.5% ECLAC (2020b). This pandemic has
shown that the poorest are more affected.
As in most crises, low-income groups struggle with the worst consequences. COVID-19
has not been the exception. The coronavirus pandemic is having severe repercussions for lower-
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income households in Latin America (Bottan et al., 2020). Some of the measures that some Latin
American governments have taken are cash transfers to low-income groups. For instance, the
Colombian government has not only given extra money for the current beneficiaries of More
Families in Action (2.6 million families) during this pandemic but also it has developed a new
program called Solidarity Income (Ingreso Solidario), benefiting an additional 2.5 million
families. CCTs should be implemented as a tool to support vulnerable communities in the middle
of an economic crisis, natural disaster, or a pandemic and should be used for a very specific
period of time.
There is a new discussion around the world on providing universal basic income. The
universal basic income is a broader discussion and has some similarities and differences with
CCTs. The main similarity is that universal rent and CCTs are cash subsidies. The main
difference is the conditionality to the beneficiaries; as was described, CCTs have some
conditions upon the beneficiaries, such as school enrollment and nutritional check-ups. Instead of
having the discussion of a universal income, I recommend focusing the discussion on the
importance of implementing a program of supply-side programs for the most vulnerable
communities, guaranteeing their access to fundamental goals, such as education, health, housing,
culture, and productive programs in order to give opportunities for their socio-economic
development.
Further Studies
Chile is a highly interesting case study. Perhaps Chile has been the most unequal country in the
market income among the three case studies, meaning that Chile has had the least Gini index
before taxes and government transfers while Chile has the highest fiscal redistribution with the
intervention of government through taxation and public transfers. This high fiscal redistribution
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has led Chile to be less unequal than Mexico and Colombia. CCTs in Chile were not the cause of
these results because the Ethical Family Income Program has not had an impact on inequality
reduction and has had a slight impact on poverty reduction. Therefore, the government
intervention that has good results is caused by other public policies and programs different from
CCTs. It is highly recommended to study what programs have caused a high fiscal redistribution
on Chile and their impact on inequality and poverty reduction in order to take into consideration
the learned-lessons that could be applied to other Latin American countries.
In addition, further analysis of small CCTs that take into consideration economic and
institutional control variables can be developed in order to determine if the efficiency of
targeting in Chile is due to the small number of beneficiaries and a small budget, due to the
control variables, or due to both of them.
A future study can better assess the effects of CCTs by including more countries in the
methods of the fiscal redistribution, the decomposition of the Gini index, the counterfactual
analysis, and the descriptive multivariate cross-national model in order to achieve some
statistically significant results. The LIS includes the following data for other CCTs in Latin
America: Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program from 2006 to 2016; Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa
and Social Allowance from 2011 to 2014; Panama’s Opportunities Network from 2007 to 2013;
Paraguay’s Tekoporâ from 2010 to 2016; and Uruguay’s National Social Emergency Response
Plan and Value of Assistance Card Social Uruguay from 2007 to 2016. These data can be
included in this research in order to have more robust results.
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